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1.  PROPERTIES, LAWS AND MODALITY 
 
1.1  Introduction 
Philosophers in general, and metaphysicians in particular, are largely concerned 
with metaphysical modality, that is, with what is possible and necessary, in the 
broadest sense, and with what makes propositions about metaphysical modality 
true. Metaphysicians are also concerned with ontology, that is, with what exists and 
the nature of what exists. Ontology covers such questions as “do numbers exist?” 
and “do universals exist?” and, if numbers and universals do exist, “what are they 
like?” and “how do they exist?”. The laws of nature, such as the law of universal 
gravitation, Coulomb’s law and the Schrödinger equation, for example, raise 
interesting philosophical questions at the intersection of metaphysics and the 
philosophy of science, such as “what is the relationship between laws of nature and 
scientific explanation?” and “in what sense, if any, are we free to break the laws?”. 
Questions about modality, ontology and laws of nature connect in 
interesting ways. The kinds of things – propositions, universals, possible worlds, 
etc. – that one is willing to countenance will impact what one can say about the 
metaphysics of modality and natural laws. The point is illustrated nicely via 
consideration of Humean constraints on respectable ontology popularized by David 
Lewis and the ensuing metaphysics of laws and modality that Lewis defends.1  
Characteristic of Humean ontology is the disavowal of metaphysically 
necessary connections between distinct, intrinsically typed, entities (see, e.g., Wilson 
2010). The ontology that Lewis defends, Humean Supervenience, conceives of the 
world as just a vast, contingent, 4-dimensional array of perfectly natural, intrinsic 
properties of, or instantiated at, space-time points, and the spatiotemporal relations 
between them. The characteristic absence of necessary connections between distinct 
existences is cashed out by maintaining that no perfectly natural, intrinsic property 
instance implies anything about any other property instance. Properties are 
                                                     
1 Hale (2013) also argues for mutual dependence between ontology and modality.  
7 
 
instantiated and stand in the spatiotemporal relations that they stand in, but no 
property instance metaphysically necessitates the existence of any other property 
instance nor does it metaphysically necessitate the relations in which any other 
property instance stands. Jacobs (2010, 229) calls this requirement independence. The 
4-dimensional array of independent property instances is sometimes referred to as 
the Humean Mosaic (1986, ix–x; 1994, 474).   
Lewis describes Humean Supervenience as “another speculative addition to 
the thesis that truth supervenes on being”(1994, 474); any truths must be made true 
by the thoroughly contingent spatiotemporal arrangement of perfectly natural, 
intrinsic properties of, or instantiated at, space-time points. This includes truths 
about modality and truths about the laws of nature.  
The Humean’s supervenience base, however, seems to lack enough stuff to 
properly account for the metaphysics of modality. This famously led Lewis  to 
outsource modality to other concrete, but spatiotemporally and causally isolated 
worlds (e.g., 1986). Heil makes this point: “Such a universe [i.e., a Humean one] 
would seem to want the resources needed to make modal truths true. In response to 
this deficit, Lewis introduces the apparatus of possible worlds…”(2015, 42). Vetter 
makes a similar point: “Possible worlds provide a viable way for the Humean to 
‘outsource’ modality: it is still a matter of deeply non-modal facts; we simply need 
enough such facts.” (2015, 7). As does Jacobs: “…the defender of independence who 
thinks there are genuine modal facts about the world is forced to look elsewhere, 
beyond the concrete actual world and its inhabitants, for truthmakers for modality. 
In addition to this world, there are many other, merely possible worlds.” (2010, 
229). Humean ontology and Lewisian modal realism are thus intimately connected, 
the tether being the requirement to make sense of, by providing truth conditions 
for, modal propositions.   
Natural laws appear to carry modal force and hence appear to be in tension 
with Humean supervenience and its commitment to independence. A law 
according to which, say, “all Fs are Gs”, in virtue of its being a law, seems to imply 
that the properties F and G are not independent because F’s being instantiated 
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necessitates G’s being instantiated. The law seems to impose a necessary existential 
connection between the properties F and G.  
According to Lewis, however, laws of the form “all Fs are Gs” are nothing 
more than regularities in the pattern of independent property instances throughout 
the Humean mosaic. What distinguishes lawful from non-lawful regularities, 
according to Lewis, is the fact that the former, but not the latter, are axioms of the 
description of all property instances throughout the Humean mosaic, which 
maximizes the virtues of informativeness and simplicity. This is the crux of Lewis’s 
best system analysis of natural laws (BSA) (see, e.g., Lewis 1983, 1994, 2001; Earman 
1984; Loewer 1996). Natural laws are thus accounted for in a manner that the 
Humean finds metaphysically innocuous because no appeal is made to any 
mysterious governing forces or necessary connections between distinct existences. 
The criterion for law-hood, according to the BSA, that a regularity feature as an 
axiom of the best systematization of all property instances, does not violate 
independence. It follows that the laws are thoroughly contingent on Lewis’s 
account; had the contingent pattern of independent property instances been 
different, the laws would have been different too.   
Accounting for laws and modality presents a distinctive challenge for the 
neo-Humean defender of independence and on both fronts a cost is incurred; 
matters of fact beyond the actual world must be invoked to provide truthmakers for 
modal propositions,2 and the idea that the laws hold of any kind of necessity must be 
given up. One might thus wonder if the benefits, whatever they may be, of a 
Humean ontology justify these costs.  
The Humean is primarily concerned with defending (the tenability of) an 
ontology, which then informs and places restrictions on what can be said about 
laws and modality. However, one’s primary concern might just as well be with 
analysing the laws and, dissatisfied with regularity accounts, such as the BSA, one 
might be motivated to develop an alternative account of laws with its own 
distinctive ontological implications. Armstrong (1999) famously introduced second-
                                                     
2 Alternatively, the neo-Humean actualist may appeal to a plethora of actual yet abstract objects to account for 
modality. But this strategy is costly in its own way and, arguably, less theoretically fruitful than full-blown 
Lewisian modal realism (see, e.g., McMichael 1983; Lewis 1986).  
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order necessitation relations between universals (see also Dretske 1977; Tooley 1977) 
in an effort to capture the type of necessity distinctive of natural laws.  
According to Armstrongian accounts, a law of the form “all Fs are Gs” holds 
in virtue of a necessitation relation between the universals F-ness and G-ness. The 
necessity of the law “all Fs are Gs” is then understood as conditional upon the 
instantiation of the relevant higher-order necessitation relation. Alternatively, 
dispositional essentialists (e.g., Ellis 2001; Bird 2007), have argued that fundamental 
properties are best understood as essentially and irreducibly modal producers of 
certain behaviours. According to this account, the property charge, for example, is 
essentially such that any charged individual is disposed to exert a force on all other 
charged individuals and it is this fact about the nature of the property charge that 
then grounds Coulomb’s law. Dispositional essentialism thus renders laws necessary 
conditional upon the instantiation of the relevant properties. Novel ontological 
posits such as necessitation relations and dispositional essences have thus been 
invoked to account for laws of nature and to endow the laws with certain desirable 
features (such as necessity and explanatory power) that are arguably not captured 
by the BSA, or even capturable, within a sparse Humean ontology.  
Beebee (2000) has argued that many criticisms of the BSA, and hence 
motivations for alternative accounts of laws, such the Armstrongian view or 
dispositional essentialism, subtly beg the question by smuggling in conceptions of 
natural law explicitly rejected by proponents of the BSA. Another way of 
interpreting the situation might see it as a standoff between competing pre-
theoretical conceptions of laws. Those according to whom the laws must play a 
metaphysically substantial role in the unfolding of events in the universe will be 
unimpressed by the BSA and compelled to introduce whatever ontological elements 
are required to satisfy their conception of natural law. Hence, one’s pre-theoretical 
commitments to a certain conception of the laws of nature can just as well inform 
one’s ontology as the other way around.   
Similarly, convictions about the metaphysics of modality might inform one’s 
ontological convictions. A kind of extreme scepticism about the legitimacy of modal 
notions might seem naturally allied with something like a Humean ontology that 
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recognizes no necessity, or indeed related notions, like essences and dispositions, in 
nature. Lewis, however, was not this kind of sceptic; he believed in modal facts. His 
Humeanism then forced him to ground these facts outside of actuality, which led to 
his modal realism. However, one might share Lewis’s modal anti-scepticism but be 
less than impressed by the “non-standard cosmological theory” (Williamson 2013, 
xii) he invokes to account for modal truths. In this case, it might seem natural to 
modify one’s ontology appropriately such that the actual world may serve as a 
suitable ground for facts about modality. In this case, one’s convictions about 
matters modal might serve to inform one’s ontology more broadly.  
The point, then, is that issues concerning laws, modality and ontology are 
often closely related and what one wishes to say on any one of these issues will 
have implications for what one can or must say about the others. It would be too 
quick, however, to assume that questions about any one of these three issues must 
be settled prior to the settling of questions about the others.     
My concern in this thesis is with exploring the interactions between a cluster 
of specific views about ontology, modality and the laws of nature. The particular 
ontology I am interested in is unHumean in the sense that it admits necessary 
connections between properties and the behaviours that they confer because 
properties have non-trivial essences which ground certain behaviours. The account of 
laws is metaphysically thin for it conceives of the laws as merely descriptive, à la the 
BSA. And the metaphysics of modality that I am interested in roots modality firmly 
in the actual world.  
As it happens, I will first offer some preliminary reasons in support of the 
ontology under consideration (though the details will be developed in subsequent 
chapters), before then showing how that ontology naturally allies with the 
particular accounts of metaphysical modality and the laws of nature also to be 
considered. My discussion proceeds from ontological considerations to other 
metaphysical considerations, namely those concerning modality and natural law. In 
this respect, my inquiry might seem somewhat Lewisian in spirit, given that he tells 
us that much of his work “could be seen in hindsight as a campaign on behalf of 
“Humean Supervenience”” (Lewis 1994, 473; Lewis 1986, ix–xvi). However, as shall 
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become evident, many of the details are distinctly unLewisian for being distinctly 
unHumean.  
I do not take it to be the case that the order of explanation must be as it 
might appear from the structure of my discussion, particularly in the case of the 
ontology-modality pair; it is certainly not that I think that the metaphysics of 
modality must be thus and so just because it follows from what I think about the 
ontology. I find the views about ontology and modality to be discussed 
independently very attractive and hence I take them to be further strengthened by 
their coherence. When it comes to the laws of nature, the situation is not quite so 
clear. I certainly lack any strong, pre-theoretical views on what an analysis of the 
natural laws might look like. For example, I have no strong intuitions on whether it 
is part of the concept of laws that they govern/determine events (see, e.g., Mumford 
2004 who thinks that “real” laws have a governing/determining role. See also 
Beebee 2000 and Bird 2007, pp. 189-198 for discussion of the competing intuitions) 
as opposed to, say, merely describing them. So, the analysis of laws that I propose is 
probably best thought of as explanatorily posterior to the views about ontology and 
modality suggested, the features of which I use to inform the account of laws.  
My aim in this thesis is partly to defend the particular views about the 
metaphysics of properties, laws and modality, which I find independently 
plausible. My aim is also to build a case for this particular package of views by 
showing it to be more philosophically fruitful than the sum of its parts. It would be 
beyond the scope of the inquiry to provide a comprehensive treatment of all of the 
philosophical issues concerning laws, modality and ontology separately so, 
inevitably, interesting corners of the debates about these topics will be skimmed 
over or omitted all together at times. I think that this is justified, however, given 
that I am interested in developing one particular package of views of laws, ontology 
and modality and showing the kind of virtues that it is apt to yield. I don’t intend to 
argue that there are no other packages out there that would be worthy of 
consideration or even, perhaps, better than the package that I put forward here. I 
aim to develop a particular package and demonstrate its key features and virtues, 
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not to claim that it is superior to any alternative, for to properly scout out all the 
alternatives would be too big a task.  
Finally, although I suggested that my project, unlike, e.g., Lewis’s, is 
probably not best viewed as primarily a defence of an ontological stance, I do share 
with Lewis a certain methodological motivation. Lewis’s touted motivation for 
Humean Supervenience, defence of which inspired much of his subsequent 
metaphysics, was to “resist philosophical arguments that there are more things in 
heaven and earth than physics has dreamt of” (Lewis 1994, 474). In a similar vein, I 
am partly motivated to defend the aforementioned package deal by a desire to 
bring metaphysics and metaphysical inquiry into harmony with science and natural 
scientific inquiry. I agree with Callender that “metaphysics is best when informed 
by good science and science is best when informed by good metaphysics” (2011, 48) 
and have sympathy for “a view of metaphysics that is less guided by armchair 
speculation and…more intent on investigating, along with the natural sciences” 
(Contessa 2016, 1244). Ultimately, I will argue that the theoretical benefits of the 
package deal under consideration to a large extent inhere in its ability to satisfy 
these methodological scruples. I hope that this point will emerge as the discussion 
proceeds, but its proper defence will have to be postponed for chapters 6 and 7, 
once the package has been expounded in some detail.  
For the remainder of this chapter, I will introduce a crucial point of 
disagreement between Humean and unHumean ontologies – the metaphysics of 
fundamental physical properties. And I shall discuss how an unHumean 
metaphysics of properties, according to which properties are necessarily connected 
to the dispositions that they confer upon their bearers, stands in relation my 
favoured actualist modal metaphysics (hardcore actualism). In the next chapter I 
shall take up the issue of where the natural laws fit in. I shall rule out dispositional 
essentialism (Bird 2007) as a candidate theory of laws and offer a diagnosis of its 
failure. This shall lead, in chapter 3, to a defence of qualitative dispositional 
essentialism (QDE), according to which properties are qualities, which ground 
dispositions. Bird, by contrast, holds a structuralist view of properties according to 
which the essences of fundamental properties are exhaustively constituted by 
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dispositions. This structuralist ontology, however, raises various problems, which 
QDE can avoid. In chapter 4, I combine my favoured unHumean metaphysic of 
properties with what some might describe as a Humean account of laws, what I will 
call the Revised Potency-BSA – a variant on the traditional BSA, which incorporates 
the modal nature of properties. I then demonstrate how this package of view avoids 
the various problems raised for the dispositional essentialist account of laws and 
properties. In chapters 5 and 6, I’ll further discuss hardcore actualism and what 
results from its combination with the account of laws developed, namely, a highly 
unified account of laws and modality according to which facts about laws and facts 
about modality share a common metaphysical ground. The laws of nature then turn 
out to be particularly pertinent summaries of the space of metaphysical possibility 
with the result that scientific inquiry into the laws of nature is apt to yield 
metaphysical insights too. In chapter 7, I discuss the epistemological and 
methodological upshots of the view defended.  
 
1.2  Humeanism and Quidditism  
In this section, I’ll be concerned with the question, brought to the fore by a history 
of Humean constraints on ontology, of whether and to what extent the world should 
be thought of as containing any irreducible modality. Ought we think of the world 
as nothing more than a vast, 4-dimensional, array of perfectly natural, intrinsic, 
point-sized qualities and the spatiotemporal relations between them, or should we 
admit more structure in the form of, say, real essences and necessary connections?  
Now it might seem that this question could just as well be filed under the 
heading “the metaphysics of modality” as “ontology”. Perhaps this is so. As mentioned, 
this thesis is largely motivated by a concern with the tight relations between 
ontology and the metaphysics of modality. However, the respect in which I will try 
to prise apart questions about ontology and questions about the metaphysics of 
modality is this. When engaged with questions about ontology, I will be primarily 
concerned with what there is and the nature of what there is, whereas when engaged 
with questions about the metaphysics of modality I will be primarily concerned 
what it is in virtue of which propositions of the form necessarily x and possibly y, are 
14 
 
true. Answers to the what is there-type questions will often include terms like 
“necessary”, “essential”, “disposition” and other terms for modal notions. And 
conversely, the provision of grounds for modal truths will include appeal to 
features of our ontology. So, there is a sense in which the questions about ontology 
and modality with which I shall be engaged are related but also a sense in which 
they are distinct.     
After providing some reasons, in this section, for thinking, contra 
Humeanism, that the actual world is irreducibly modal in certain respects, I’ll show, 
in section 1.3, how this ontology is indeed a prerequisite for an independently 
plausible view in the metaphysics of modality variously dubbed dispositionalism 
(e.g., Vetter 2015; Borghini and Williams 2008) and hardcore actualism (Contessa 
2010) – I’ll use the latter term.  
As mentioned, I am sympathetic to Lewis’s desire to “resist philosophical 
arguments that there are more things in heaven and earth than physics has dreamt 
of” (ibid). However, in recent years much doubt has been cast on the idea that 
adherence to Humean strictures is the best way to achieve this (e.g., Cartwright 
1999; Hawthorne 2001; Bird 2007; Maudlin 2010; Demarest 2017). Lewis’s Humean 
ontological offering, Humean Supervenience, conceives of the world as:  
 
[A] vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing and 
then another […] an arrangement of qualities. And that is all. There is no 
difference without difference in the arrangement of qualities. All else 
supervenes on that. (Lewis 1986, ix). 
 
And central to Humean Supervenience is the absence of any necessary connections 
between distinct existences. What I want to focus on are the implications of this ban 
on necessary connections for the metaphysics of those properties that make up the 
supervenience base.3  
                                                     
3 Armstrong rejects Humean Supervenience by admitting primitive, higher order, necessitation relations between 
universals to account for natural laws. But like Lewis, he maintains a categoricalist view of properties according to 
which properties are quiddities (to be discussed shortly) that are only contingently connected to their 
causal/theoretical roles (e.g. 1983, 1989, 1997). Thus, much of the discussion that follows will be applicable to the 
Armstrongian view too.  
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To properly keep out necessary connections, the fundamental properties 
constitutive of the Humean’s vast “mosaic” must not themselves impose any modal 
restrictions. They must not stand in any necessary connections to each other or to 
the behaviours of individuals that instantiate them. As such, an understanding of 
fundamental properties as quiddities would thus seem to fit the bill here, where a 
quiddity is something like a primitive thisness or haecceity for a property.  
Smith (2016) discerns two (related) forms of quidditism, individuation 
quidditism, I-quidditism for short, and recombinatorial quidditism, R-quidditism for 
short. I’ll discuss each of these in turn before showing that R-quidditism entails I-
quidditism, but not vice versa, which means that it is only by upholding R-
quidditism that the Humean may be sure that no necessary connections between 
distinct existences are admitted.  
According to I-quidditism, what individuates properties is primitive and 
unanalysable. Thus, Black (2000, 92), uses the word ‘quidditism’ “for the acceptance 
of primitive identity between fundamental qualities across possible worlds.” 
According to Barker (2009, 242), “a property possesses a quiddity just in case its 
identity is fixed by something independent of the causal-nomological roles it may 
enter into”. And according to Schroer (2010, 833) “quidditism is the position that 
properties have a transworld identity that does not depend on their causal powers.” 
(See Smith 2016, 239). Thus, for any two distinct properties, p1 and p2, according to 
the I-quidditist, no more can be said about what individuates p1 and p2 than that p1 
is the property that it is and p2 is the property that it is and that it is not the case that 
p1 = p2.   
According to R-quidditism, “there are no restrictions on the recombination 
of properties in metaphysically possible worlds” (Smith 2016, 240). In other words, 
the connections between quiddities and the behaviours of those objects that 
instantiate them are thoroughly contingent. Quidditism, Lewis tells us, is to 
properties as haecceitism is to individuals (2009, 209). According to the haecceist, 
we can take two distinct individuals, a and b, swap around all of their properties 
such that a ends up with all the properties with which b started and vice versa, thus 
yielding a different, but qualitatively indistinguishable, situation from that with 
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which we started (see also Chisholm 1967 for an influential discussion of 
haecceitism). R-quidditism says a similar thing about properties.  
To get a better grip on R-quidditism, it helps to notice that properties have 
nomological roles, or dispositional profiles (for present purposes it is not necessary 
to distinguish these notions), which is just to say that properties are associated with 
certain behaviours. I’ll use the term modal profile to refer to the full range of 
behaviours with which a given property is associated and I’ll talk in terms of 
properties “having” modal profiles (later, in chapter 4, I’ll introduce and work with 
a more precise understanding of the term modal profile). Thus, the modal profile of 
the property charge says that like charges are disposed to accelerate away from one 
another and that opposite charges are disposed to accelerate towards one another in 
a very particular way which varies with the magnitude of the instances of charge, 
the masses of those instances of charge and their distance of separation.  Now take 
two distinct properties with distinct modal profiles. According to R-quidditism, it is 
possible to permute the fundamental properties associated with those modal 
profiles to yield a distinct, but qualitatively indistinguishable, situation from that 
with which we started (see Lewis 2009, 209–10). Consider, for example, charge and 
mass. In this world, charge disposes its bearers to interact in accordance with 
Coulomb’s law and mass disposes its bearers to warp spacetime – each has a 
different set of associated behaviours or modal profile. R-quidditism sanctions a 
distinct possibility in which these properties completely swap the behaviours 
towards which they dispose their bearers – a possibility in which charge and mass 
swap modal profiles (Bird 2007, 75 considers the example in detail).  
Quidditism is attractive to Humeans because its denial would seem to bring 
with it a commitment to necessary connections between property instances and 
certain behaviours, which makes the Humean squeamish. Anti-I-quidditism would 
surely require something substantial to be said about the identity of properties – 
something like non-trivial essences for properties would have to be posited. 
Dispositionalism offers what might seem like an obvious development of this idea. 
According to dispositionalism, fundamental properties are individuated on 
the basis of their modal profiles. Thus, according to dispositionalism, for a given 
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fundamental property, P, instantiated at the actual world, no property instantiated 
at any other world, w, will count as an instance of P, unless it has the same modal 
profile at w as that had by P at the actual world. Dispositionalists will typically 
claim that a fundamental property’s modal profile is part of its real, as opposed to 
merely nominal, essence (e.g., Ellis 2001; Bird 2007). Thus, for example, the 
association between mass and a disposition to warp spacetime is not merely an 
artefact of our usage of the word “mass”. Rather, the disposition to warp spacetime 
is part of the essence of the property mass itself. If a property, P’s, modal profile is 
part of P’s real essence, then an individual, x’s, instantiating P will imply that x is 
disposed to behave a certain way in accordance with the modal profile that is part 
of the essence of P. By making modal profiles part of the real essences of properties, 
the dispositionalist countenances necessary connections between property instances 
and the behaviours constitutive of their modal profiles. For example, if both x and y 
instantiate positive charge, x and y will be disposed to accelerate away from each 
other, and they will be so disposed of necessity (conditional upon their both 
continuing to instantiating positive charge). Another way of putting the point is that 
dispositionalism, which constitutes the denial of I-quidditism, imposes restrictions 
on how properties are possibly recombined. Mass and charge cannot swap modal 
profiles because they have their respective modal profiles essentially, and those 
modal profiles impose restrictions on the possible space-time distributions of 
instances of mass and charge.    
Now it seems plausible, as indeed Smith highlights (2016, 240), that R-
quidditism entails I-quidditism, and hence that the denial of I-quidditism entails the 
denial of R-quidditism. The example of dispositionalism, in the previous paragraph, 
attests to the latter; by making modal profiles part of the essences of properties and 
hence individuative of those properties, dispositionalism imposes restrictions on 
how properties are possibly recombined. Smith argues that in the complete absence 
of any restrictions on the possible recombination of properties, as per R-quidditism, 
fundamental properties “cannot be individuated on the basis of their [modal 
profiles] and (something akin to) I-quidditism must be true” (Smith 2016, 240). 




i) R-quidditism is true (assumption). 
ii) If properties are individuated via their modal profiles, then there are 
restrictions on how they are possibly recombined (as argued in the 
previous paragraph with reference to dispositionalism).  
iii) If there are no restrictions on how properties are recombined, then 
properties are not individuated via their modal profiles 
(contraposing premise ii). 
iv) Properties are not individuated via their modal profiles (i, iii, modus 
ponens).  
v) If properties are not individuated via their modal profiles, whatever 
individuates them must be primitive and unanalysable.   
vi) I-quidditism is true (iv, v, modus ponens). 
 
From the assumption that R-quidditism is true, it follows that I-quidditism is 
true. Two brief comments on Smith’s argument are in order. For one, this argument 
only shows that one version of I-quidditism is true (more on this shortly). And 
secondly, why should we believe v)? The idea behind v) is that if properties are not 
individuated by the behaviours/dispositions with which they are associated then 
whatever individuates them must be primitive and unanalysable because there are 
no other options. Properties are either individuated by the behaviours/dispositions 
with which they are associated, or property individuation is a primitive matter 
about which no more can be said than that properties A and B are distinct iff it is 
not the case that A and B are identical. The (plausible) thought behind v) is that 
these options for how properties are individuated are jointly exhaustive.   
 According to Smith, I-quidditism does not entail R-quidditism. This is 
because Smith distinguishes the view that she calls non-recombinatorial quidditism, 
according to which the identity and distinctness of properties is primitive and 
unanalysable, as per I-quidditism, yet those properties still impose restrictions on 
how they are possibly recombined. Hence the caveat above: R-quidditism implies 
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one version of I-quidditism, but there is also a version of I-quidditism that is 
incompatible with R-quidditism.  
The important point, then, is that for the Humean who is keen to excise 
necessary connections between properties and modal profiles and, hence, between 
property instances, it will not suffice to defend I-quidditism. To properly keep out 
necessary connections, the Humean must uphold R-quidditism, as indeed Lewis 
(2009) does. Lewis elaborates on R-quidditism in some detail. I present Lewis’s view 
in the next subsection before moving on to consider the plausibility of the quiddistic 
metaphysic of properties that the Humean seems forced to uphold.  
 
1.2.1 Lewis on R-quidditism 
Lewis (2009) explores R-quidditism in terms of the multiple realizability of a 
scientific theory. Imagine the (hypothetical) complete final theory of the world, T. 
We can assume, following Lewis (2009, 206), that the theory, T, consists of all the 
logical consequences of a sentence, which we might call the postulate of T. We can 
denote the postulate as follows: T(t1,…,tn). Where the t1,…,tn  are theoretical terms 
(T-terms), including, perhaps, ‘mass’, ‘charge’ and ‘spin’, among others sufficient to 
provide “a true and complete inventory of those fundamental properties that play 
an active role in the actual workings of nature” (Lewis 2009, 205).   
Lewis notes that scientific theorizing has gone hand in hand with the 
discovery of fundamental properties; “For instance the discovery of the phenomena 
of electromagnetism and the laws governing them was inseparable from the 
discovery of the previously unknown, and very likely fundamental, properties of 
positive and negative charge.” (2009, 205). The point, then, is that among the T-term 
referents will be all of the fundamental properties. The postulate is also made up of a 
lot of (what Lewis calls) old language (O-language), which suffices to express all 
possible observational evidence and which is available independently of our 
theoretical-term introducing theory T. The Ramsey sentence of our theory, T, replaces 
T-terms in the postulate with variables bound by existential quantifiers. Thus from, 
T(t1,…,tn) we get ꓱx1,…,ꓱxn,T(x1,…,xn). The result is a sentence, which defines the 
theory’s T-terms implicitly in terms of each other and the non-theoretical O-
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language. In other words, T-terms are defined by their position in the Ramsey 
sentence, which is tantamount to saying T-terms are defined in terms of modal 
profiles, viz., the behaviours of objects that instantiate the relevant properties. The 
Ramsey sentence says, further, that there are some things associated with those 
modal profiles.    
To illustrate the point with a simpler example, imagine that we were 
concerned, not with a complete final theory of the universe, but with the theory of a 
bicycle. Then we might construct a “bicycle postulate” along the following lines: 
 
B:  “the pedal is attached to the crank which turns the front gear…” 
 
And so on until we have a sentence sufficient to imply the complete workings of a 
bicycle. The terms ‘pedal’, ‘crank’ and ‘gear’ in B are T-terms in the context of a 
bicycle-theory. The Ramsey sentence of B replaces these T-terms with variables and 
prefixes with existential quantifiers:  
 
RB:  ꓱx1, ꓱx2, ꓱx3…(x1 is attached to x2 which turns the front x3…) 
 
RB, the Ramsey sentence of B, thus defines the theoretical terms in B implicitly in 
terms of each other and what they do, or the behaviours with which they are 
associated, in the non-bicycle-theoretic O-language. Furthermore, RB says that there 
are some things occupying the theoretical roles in the bicycle-theory. The Ramsey 
sentence of the complete final theory of the universe is like this, except it concerns 
the entire universe as opposed to a bicycle; it defines property terms such as ‘mass’ 
and ‘charge’ in terms of the behaviours associated with the denoted properties in 
relation to other properties. In other words, theoretical terms are defined in terms of 
modal profiles.  
According to Lewis, there are genuinely different possibilities corresponding 
to, qualitatively indistinguishable, different realizations of the Ramsey Sentence of 
the complete final theory. That is to say, properties are free to recombine with 
different modal profiles, as per R-quidditism. And since what individuates 
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properties is not their modal profiles, I-quidditism would seem to follow (see above 
and Smith 2016, 240). There is, then, a quiddistically different possible world in 
which wherever we would point to stuff engaged in what we, having been brought 
up in the actual world, would call distinctively massy behaviour, it will be whatever 
we would normally call charge at the actual world that is picked out, and vice versa, 
because the properties, charge and mass have swapped modal profiles. The 
possibility imagined is qualitatively indistinguishable from the situation at the 
actual world but nonetheless quiddistically different.  
Could there be a merely quiddistic difference in the bicycle case too? Could 
there be, say, a case in which a pedal plays the gear role and a gear plays the pedal 
role – that is to say, a case in which an individual instantiating the property pedal-
ness behaves like a gear, and vice versa. Such a possibility will likely strike us as 
very strange indeed. A pedal and a gear, in virtue of instantiating the properties 
pedal-ness and gear-ness respectively, just don’t seem to have the appropriate 
physical make up to play each other’s roles in the bicycle. We could, of course, melt 
down the respective individuals and recast them in a shape appropriate to play a 
new role. But once the pedal is cast into the shape of a gear and installed in the 
bicycle ready to do the work of a gear, it would seem very odd indeed to say that 
there is any sense in which this thing behaving in a way that we associate with 
being a gear is nonetheless still a pedal and hence that a pedal is playing the gear-
role. The question is not whether the individuals instantiating pedal-ness and gear-ness 
could swap properties and hence play each other’s role in the bicycle, but whether 
the properties themselves could switch roles. The latter suggestion seems 
implausible because nothing, it would seem, about the property pedal-ness is 
retained when the pedal is recast into a gear-shape and assigned the gear-role in the 
bicycle. But it is something analogous to this that the R-quidditist thinks is possible 
in the case of fundamental properties. Properties, according to R-quidditism, are 
quite independent from their modal profiles, independent, that is, from the 
behaviours of those objects that instantiate them. So, the property mass might be 
“recast” into the charge-role, because something, a quiddity, is common between 




1.2.2  Implications of Quidditism    
Lewis (2009) draws a sceptical conclusion from his discussion of R-quidditism; since 
all we can ever have epistemic access to are modal profiles – that is, what properties 
dispose their bearers to do in various circumstances – and since knowing a modal 
profile is insufficient to know what property has that modal profile, because 
properties can switch modal profiles, we are ineffably ignorant of the properties in 
themselves. Lewis embraces this conclusion, quipping that no one ever promised him 
that he was capable, in principle, of knowing everything. Others, however, have 
seen the ineffable ignorance ushered by R-quidditism as cause for concern.  
By highlighting the possibility that multiple properties have the same modal 
profile, Bird (2007, 77–78) presents an even more worrisome sceptical implication of 
R-quidditism . Given R-quidditism, it is possible that two or more properties have 
the modal profile that we associate with the term ‘mass’. Furthermore, we cannot 
know if such a possibility is indeed realized at our world because there would be no 
detectible difference between a world in which just one property plays the mass 
role and a world in which multiple distinct properties play the mass role. A 
plausible conception of mass as the property with such and such a modal profile and 
hence which occupies the mass role would be undermined if two or more properties 
occupied mass role. And since we cannot know whether or not two or more 
properties occupy the mass role, we cannot know whether this plausible conception 
of mass is undermined. Furthermore, if, as again seems plausible, we fix the 
reference of the term ‘mass’ via the definite description ‘the property that fills the 
mass role’, then the possibility that ours is a world in which multiple properties fill 
the mass role means that we cannot know if our term ‘mass’ refers to anything at 
all. An inability to know if our concept of mass is undermined or even if our term 
‘mass’ is referential presents a further sceptical worry in addition to an inability to 
know the property it itself. Such considerations, according to Bird, do “serious 
damage to our concept of a property” (2007, 77) and Bird concludes that since we do 
not want our metaphysics of properties to condemn us to necessary ignorance of 
those properties, we should reject quidditism (2007, 78).  
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Besides the potential sceptical worries that it ushers, quidditism conflicts 
with the intuition that there can be no distinctions without difference. As Lewis 
notes (2009, 209), to harbour this intuition is to feel some sympathy for nontrivial 
principles of identity of indisicernibles (see also Black 2000, 93). Furthermore, 
physics does not seem to need to recognise such things as quiddities, that is, 
properties which are thoroughly independent of their modal profiles, which brings 
with it a certain irony given that Lewis’ touted motivation for Humean 
Supervenience was to resist the temptation to posit any entities that physics can do 
without.  
Demarest (2017), following Cartwright (1999), argues that scientists look for 
“dispositional essences, or what it is that things do in different situations” (2017, 48). 
Experimental set ups are often designed to isolate and observe the characteristic 
behaviour produced by a single fundamental property. Demarest takes this as 
evidence for the claim that “physicists aim to discover the characteristic 
behaviour…of a specific kind of property…” (2017, 48) and she argues that such 
properties are best thought of as essentially connected with their characteristic 
behaviours because “Scientists need only perform a relatively small number of 
experiments on a single kind of particle before they feel confident that they have 
captured […] the essential dispositions of its potencies” (ibid) where “potencies” are 
fundamental properties that essentially dispose their bearers to behave in certain 
ways. This kind of argument, according to which all of the properties that science 
tells us about are essentially dispositional (see, e.g., Blackburn 1990, 63; Ellis and 
Lierse 1994, 32), has been particularly influential in the debate between quidditists 
and dispositionalists. Why, as Hawthorne puts it, “posit from the armchair 
distinctions that are never needed by science?” (Hawthorne 2002, 369). Quiddities, 
Hawthorne suggests, are in no way required to make sense of the world so we are 
best off without them. According to many, then, it is certainly beginning to look as 
if it is the Humean defender of quidditism who is guilty of supposing there to be 
more in heaven and earth than physics has dreamt of!    
Not everyone is convinced by the sceptical concerns (e.g., Schaffer 2005) nor 
by the considerations from scientific practice (Psillos 2006b; Locke 2012) that 
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purport to tell against quidditism. Perhaps, however, one should be less concerned 
with sceptical arguments and intuitive concerns about distinctions without 
difference that science can do without and more concerned with the thought that 
the rejection of quidditism is a natural way to imbue the world with modality, 
which can then be put to work in a variety of interesting and useful ways. Thus, a 
more robust motivation for denying quidditism may arise given the conjunction of 
whatever plausibility the above considerations against quidditism have with the 
theoretical utility that results from embracing something more akin to 
dispositionalism.  
Dispositional essentialists like Ellis (2001) and Bird (2007) have put the 
modality yielded by the disavowal of quidditism to work in providing an account 
of the laws of nature (though I shall criticize the dispositional essentialist account of 
laws in the next chapter before presenting my alternative account of the relationship 
between properties and laws in chapter 4). Others have used modal properties to 
provide an account of metaphysical modality more generally (see Borghini and 
Williams 2008; Jacobs 2010; Vetter 2015; Bird 2007, n. 146). Modality is a notion of 
central philosophical importance and I for one would rather embrace this notion as 
part of the actual world than either deny its intelligibility or “outsource” it to 
spatiotemporally isolated or abstract worlds, as would seem to be the primary 
options open to the Humean. My aim, in this thesis, is to explore the interactions 
between laws and modality given an account of each in terms of properties which, 
contrary to R-quidditism, are necessarily connected with their modal profiles. 
Importantly, it turns out that nothing abstract or otherwise unscientific is required 
to account for laws and modality once both are accounted for in terms of science-
friendly modal properties. The relationship thus yielded between laws and 
modality then has the potential to reconcile metaphysical and scientific inquiry, or 
so it shall be argued in chapters 6 and 7.  
I shan’t say any more, in this chapter, about the metaphysics of properties 
than that, contrary to R-quidditism, I do take properties to be necessarily connected 
with their modal profiles. A crucial point of debate concerns how this necessary 
connection arises. Dispositional essentialists, such as Bird (2007), take modal 
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profiles to be constitutive of the essences of properties. Another view, that I’ll refer 
to as qualitative dispositional essentialism (QDE) (Tugby 2012), holds that property 
essences are qualitative grounds of modal profiles. In chapters 2 and 3 I’ll discuss 
the subtleties of these anti-quiddistic views in detail and argue in favour of QDE. 
But for now, suffice it to note that contrary to R-quidditism, and partly motivated 
by the above concerns for R-quidditism, I take there to be necessary connections 
between properties and their modal profiles.   
For the remainder of this chapter, I shall further motivate this unHumean 
ontology that the rejection of R-quidditism avails us of by sketching out how it 
meshes with an independently attractive account of the metaphysics of modality 
that I’ll call hardcore actualism. In chapter 4, I provide an account of laws in terms of 
the unHumean metaphysic of properties that I further develop in chapter 3. And in 
chapters 5 and 6, I explore the resultant relationship between laws and modality 
given an account of each in terms of properties that are necessarily connected to 
their modal profiles because they ground those modal profiles.  
 
1.3  Hardcore Actualism 
In this section, I’ll briefly discuss actualism in the metaphysics of modality before 
introducing a recent development of this view, which Contessa (2010) has called 
hardcore actualism. I’ll outline some of the benefits of hardcore actualism and, linking 
back to the previous section, I’ll discuss the relationship between hardcore 
actualism and an anti-quidditist ontology. The discussion of this section thus 
constitutes additional grounds for rejecting R-quidditism in favour of the view that 
properties are necessarily connected with their modal profiles, for if one finds 
hardcore actualism attractive, then one should be further persuaded by the 
ontology required to make it work.       
 
1.3.1  Actualism and Possibilism 
Actualism in the metaphysics of modality stands in contrast to possibilism. The 
actualism vs. possibilism debate is a complex one with many nuances and plenty of 
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scope for confusion.4 I’ll thus keep my discussion here brief, hopefully saying just 
enough about actualism to provide a suitable entry point into a discussion of 
hardcore actualism.  
In a nutshell, actualists believe that everything is actual, where ‘everything’ 
is completely unrestricted. Possibilists, on the other hand, think that besides the 
actual things, there are some merely possible things. To get a better sense of what is 
at stake here, assume that a talking donkey is a metaphysical possibility, i.e., that 
the proposition possibly there exists an x such that x is a talking donkey is true and that 
there are, in the actual world, no talking donkeys. Actualists and possibilists have 
available to them different answers to the question: what makes it true that possibly 
there exists an x such that x is a talking donkey? Possibilists may say that there is some 
merely possible talking donkey, which could have been actual, and which makes it 
true that possibly there exists an x such that x is a talking donkey. Actualists deny that 
there are any merely possible individuals besides all the actual individuals, so this 
answer is not available to them. The actualist only has recourse to the resources of 
the actual world and so they might, for example, pick out a given non-talking 
donkey and say that it is metaphysically possible that it was a talking donkey and 
that this is what makes it true in general that there could have been a talking 
donkey.  
Difficulties arise for the actualist, however, when it comes to accounting for 
possibilities with no such witness in the actual world (see also Menzel 2017). 
Imagine, for instance, a species of aliens, so different from anything anywhere in the 
actual universe that there is no individual which is such that it could have been an 
alien any more than you or I could have been a poached egg (a plausible essentialist 
assumption). We might nonetheless want to say that it is possible that there were 
aliens. Now the possibilist can again say that possibly there exists an x such that x is an 
alien is true in virtue of the existence of some merely possible aliens. However, the 
actualist cannot employ a similar strategy to before of pointing to some actual life 
form and saying that it is possibly an alien because, by hypothesis, aliens are so 
                                                     
4 Williamson (2013) argues that it is so confused that it is best replaced by a contingentism vs. necessitism debate, 
that is, a debate over the truth of the proposition that everything is necessarily something.  
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different from anything in the actual universe that no actual individual is possibly 
an alien.  
Alternatively, if you find the example with aliens unconvincing, consider the 
proposition possibly there exist more individuals than there actually are. Again, the 
possibilist can say that this is true in virtue of the existence of some merely possible 
individuals, which could have been actual. But this answer is not available to the 
actualist and, what is more, none of the actual individuals are such that they could 
make it true that there could have been more individuals than there actually are. 
These sorts of cases have led some to appeal to abstract entities (e.g., Plantinga 1976; 
Stalnaker 2003, 2012)  and others to appeal to so-called contingently non-concretia 
(e.g., Linsky and Zalta 1994; Williamson 1998, 2013), as their modal truthmakers, 
where both abstract and contingently non-concrete entities nonetheless occupy the 
actual world. A particularly popular actualist strategy in this vein is to try to render 
possible worlds semantics actualistically acceptable by conceiving of possible 
worlds as abstract objects, such as maximal properties or maximally consistent sets 
of propositions (see, e.g., Adams 1974; Plantinga 1976; Stalnaker 2003), all of which 
are contained within the actual world. The actualist may then say that aliens exist 
according to some actually existing abstract possible world and that it is in virtue of 
this that possibly there exists an x such that x is an alien is true. So, where possibilists 
avail themselves of all manner of merely possible individuals in their modal 
metaphysics, actualists maintain that absolutely everything is actual and so are 
limited by the resources of the actual world when it comes to accounting for the 
truth of modal propositions.  
 
1.3.2  Further Restrictions and the Anti-Quidditist Connection  
Hardcore actualism imposes the further restriction that only concrete constituents of 
the actual world may serve as truthmakers for modal propositions. It is thus no part 
of the hardcore actualist’s ambitions to provide an account of abstract possible 
worlds. Possible worlds do not make modal propositions true, on this view, though 
they might provide a useful fiction or heuristic when considering matters modal.   
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Various articulations of HA all roughly start with the idea that dispositions 
are connected with possibilities, either via a link with counterfactuals (Borghini and 
Williams 2008; Jacobs 2010) or directly (Vetter 2015). Thus, if x is disposed to φ, then 
φ is possible. Since the connection between dispositions and possibility is 
conceptual, this is something that even the Humean R-quidditist can agree with. 
But we can distinguish dispositions from dispositional properties. Dispositional 
properties confer dispositions; thus, the dispositional property fragility confers on its 
bearers a disposition to break. Where Humeanism and hardcore actualism disagree, 
then, is over what explains what; do dispositional properties explain the presence of 
corresponding possibilities, or do possibilities explain the presence of 
corresponding dispositional properties?  
For HA, it is the dispositional properties of concrete individuals that explain 
possibilities. For example, it is possible that a given vase, v, breaks. And what 
makes this true, according to HA, is the fact that v instantiates the dispositional 
property fragility, whose manifestation is breaking. For, e.g., Lewis, by contrast, it is 
the fact that v breaks in some nearby possible worlds, i.e., some possibility, which 
explains v’s fragility. The general hardcore actualist idea can be captured as follows:   
 
HA schema:  Possibly φ iff there exists5 some x, which instantiates a 
dispositional property whose manifestation is, or includes, φ.   
 
Possibilities, according to HA, are made true by the dispositional properties 
of concrete individuals in the actual world. But if the connection between 
dispositional properties, such as fragility, and dispositions, such as the disposition to 
break, were thoroughly contingent, as per R-quidditism, then even granting the 
(conceptual) link between dispositions and possibility, dispositional properties 
themselves would not suffice to make the corresponding possibilities true. For the 
R-quidditist, v’s instantiating fragility need not make it the case that v is disposed to 
break, and hence need not make it true that it is possible that v breaks, because 
there is no necessary connection between the property and the disposition. So, v’s 
                                                     
5 Where all that exists is what actually exists.  
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being fragile would not in and of itself suffice to make true the corresponding 
modal claim that it is possible that v breaks. To explain the possibility that v breaks, 
the R-quidditist must appeal to more than just v’s fragility in order to fill the gap 
between instantiating some property and being disposed to φ and hence φ’s being 
possible – hence Lewis’s appeal to possible worlds. For Lewis it is possible that v 
breaks, not in virtue of the fact that v instantiates fragility, for, according to Lewis, v 
may instantiate fragility and yet not be disposed to break. Rather, it is possible that v 
breaks because there is some possible world in which v breaks. And this fact about 
possible worlds is what makes it true that v is disposed to break and hence makes it 
true that it is possible that v breaks. HA reverses this order of explanation – it is the 
property which explains the disposition to break and hence the possibility of 
breaking.  
In order to account for the truth of a disposition ascription, and hence the 
truth of a corresponding possibility in terms of a property, HA cannot allow that the 
connection between property and disposition is merely accidental, as per R-
quidditism. Rather, HA must posit a necessary connection between property and 
disposition in order to ensure that the instantiation of the relevant property suffices 
for the truth of the relevant disposition ascription and hence the truth of the 
corresponding possibility. Hence, HA must deny R-quidditism. Of course, the 
question remains as to what explains the necessary connection between property 
and disposition and different ways of denying R-quidditism will disagree on this. 
Dispositional essentialists (e.g., Mumford 2004; Bird 2007) will say that dispositions 
are contained within properties’ real essences, and hence that there is a necessary 
connection between a property and whatever dispositions constitute its real 
essence. Qualitative dispositional essentialism (QDE), on the other hand, maintains 
that properties ground dispositions. In chapter 3, I’ll argue in favour of the latter. But 
for now, suffice it to note, that if, as per HA, one wants to account for the truth of 
modal propositions in terms of dispositional properties of concrete individuals, one 
must admit that dispositional properties are necessarily connected to dispositions 




1.3.3  Vetter’s view and Implications for Metaphysical Inquiry 
To get a better grip on hardcore actualism, and its broader philosophical 
implications, it will help to briefly consider the details of Vetter’s particularly well-
developed version of the view. Vetter does more than anyone to explain how the 
hardcore actualist might capture the full range of modal propositions that we 
would like our modal metaphysics to capture. 
Vetter points out that dispositional properties constitute too narrow a class of 
entities to properly account for the full range of modal truths. According to 
hardcore actualism, the truth of, e.g., <possibly this vase breaks> may hold in virtue 
of a dispositional property (disposition for short from now on) of the vase, namely its 
fragility, whose manifestation is the state of affairs the vase’s being broken. But there 
are many other true modal propositions for which there appear to be no such 
dispositions grounding their truth. Consider, <possibly this brick breaks>, which is 
true even though we probably would not want to describe the brick as fragile. The 
brick surely can break and this is what makes the proposition <possibly this brick 
breaks> true, but it does not seem correct to say that the brick is disposed to break, 
that it is fragile. Vetter thus posits an ontology of modal properties that she calls 
potentialities, which are similar to the more familiar dispositions. Potentialities and 
dispositions are related in the following way: potentialities admit of degrees such 
that to qualify as possessing some disposition, an individual must possess the 
relevant potentiality to a sufficiently high degree (Vetter 2015, 81). So, dispositions, 
according to Vetter, constitute a subclass of potentialities. Both a vase and a brick 
have the potentiality to break. But only the vase possesses this potentiality to a high 
enough degree to count as being disposed to break.  
Vetter’s hardcore actualism then seeks to ground all truths about 
metaphysical modality in the potentialities of actually existing concrete individuals 
such that, roughly, a modal proposition <possibly p> is true iff something has the 
potentiality for it to be the case that p. It follows that <necessarily p> is true iff 
nothing has the potentiality for it to be the case that not-p. Vetter thus anchors all 
metaphysical modality in localized modalities, namely the potentialities of concrete, 
actual, individuals. The account is realist about modality in that it takes facts about 
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modality to be mind independent. Furthermore, it does not seek to reduce the 
modal to the non-modal, rather it seeks to explain all metaphysical modality in 
terms of a single modal notion: potentiality.  
To account for the full range of modal truths, Vetter extends the notion of 
potentiality in various ways. First, she introduces joint potentialities; Vetter does 
not herself have the potentiality to play a duet but she does have the relevant joint 
potentiality, with Jess, to play a duet. The truth of <possibly Vetter plays a duet> is 
then grounded in this joint potentiality. Furthermore, joint potentialities ground 
extrinsic potentialities and allow potentiality attributions of the form x has the 
potentiality to be such that p. Vetter’s potentiality to play a duet is extrinsic, because it 
concerns some individual external to her, namely Jess, and it is grounded in the 
relevant joint potentiality of Vetter and Jess to play a duet. But we might also 
attribute to Vetter the potentiality to be such that Jess plays a duet. This potentiality is 
also grounded in the joint potentiality of Vetter and Jess to play a duet but is of the 
form x has the potentiality to be such that p as opposed to x has the potentiality to F. 
Potentiality attributions of this form are important to Vetter’s formulation of the 
logic of potentiality. Finally, Vetter introduces iterated potentialities; Vetter does 
not now have the potentiality to have a piano-playing granddaughter but she does 
have the relevant iterated potentiality. Vetter has the potentiality to have a daughter 
who has the potentiality to have a daughter who has the potentiality to play the 
piano. The truth of <possibly Vetter has a piano-playing granddaughter> is then 
grounded in this iterated potentiality. Given that potentiality includes joint, extrinsic 
and iterated potentialities, the essence of Vetter’s hardcore actualism can be 
captured as follows: 
 
POSSIBILITY: It is possible that p =df Something has an iterated potentiality 
for it to be the case that p. (Vetter 2015, 247) 
 
Hardcore actualism is naturally wedded with a view of the world as imbued 
with irreducible modality as is the case once R-quidditism is rejected. Given an 
ontology of potentialities that are necessarily connected with various possibilities, 
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nothing more is needed – no possible worlds or sets of propositions – to account for 
modality. So, for anyone convinced by the arguments for rejecting quidditism, 
hardcore actualism presents a strikingly parsimonious account of the metaphysics 
of modality. Conversely, the promise of such a simple and sensible modal 
metaphysics should tempt one who was perhaps not yet ready to give up neo-
Humeanism into seriously considering rejecting quidditism and, hence, admitting 
necessary connections between properties and possibilities.  
Hardcore actualism also promises certain epistemological and 
methodological benefits, which should catch the eye of anyone with naturalistic 
sympathies. Contemporary metaphysics has largely concerned itself with the 
metaphysics of modality. For example, Conee and Sider observe that “Metaphysics 
is about the most explanatorily basic necessities and possibilities. Metaphysics is about 
what could be and what must be.” (2005, 205). Now insofar as the subject matter of 
modal metaphysics is taken to be abstracta or possibilia and the method of inquiry 
is taken to be purely a priori, those with a naturalistic conscience might question the 
legitimacy of metaphysics as a discipline – ought not metaphysics, if it claims to be 
about the most general features of objective reality, make some contact with science?  
Hardcore actualism vindicates empirical methods of inquiry into modality 
and, hence, brings metaphysics, more broadly, into harmony with science. Concrete 
objects and their properties are plausibly the sorts of things that science can tell us 
about and since the claim is that it is those very objects that ground facts about 
metaphysical modality, hardcore actualism places scientific methods at the centre of 
the epistemology and methodology of modal metaphysics. Modal metaphysics is no 
longer primarily concerned with abstracta or possibilia, which, by definition, are not 
accessible via empirical scientific methods. Hardcore actualism thus constitutes a 
significant step towards achieving continuity between natural science and 
metaphysics. But this is a substantial point, one which I intend to do no more than 
briefly flag here; indeed, it is the issue with which I shall be concerned most broadly 
in this thesis. Subsequent chapters will develop this point by showing how the laws 
of nature fit into the picture and interact with the modal metaphysics. Ultimately, 
I’ll argue that due to the intimate connection between facts about laws and facts 
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about metaphysical modality, scientific inquiry into the laws of nature also yields 
knowledge of metaphysical modality.  
 
1.4  Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have outlined my intentions in this thesis, which are to expound 
the virtues of a package of views about ontology, modality and the laws of nature. I 
have suggested that the package I propose is apt to vindicate a naturalistic 
approach to metaphysics because what grounds facts about metaphysical modality 
are the properties of familiar concrete individuals that we might reasonably expect 
to acquire knowledge of via natural scientific methods.  
 I discussed Humean supervenience and argued that the denial of any 
necessary connections between distinct existences that is characteristic of Humean 
supervenience carries a commitment to R-quidditism (and hence to I-quidditism). 
R-quidditism, besides being odd in its own right, risks doing damage to our concept 
of physical properties if, as seems plausible, they are understood in terms of their 
modal profiles – viz. the characteristic dispositional or nomological behaviours of 
their instances.  
I introduced hardcore actualism (HA), the view according to which modal 
propositions are made true by concrete property instances in the actual world. And 
I argued that the denial of R-quidditism is a necessary prerequisite for HA. The 
independent attractiveness of HA thus constitutes additional motivation for 
denying R-quidditism and, hence, for admitting that properties are necessarily 
connected to their dispositional roles. What remains to be explored in the following 
chapters is how, precisely, this necessary connection between properties and 
dispositions arises.  
The stage is now set for a thorough investigation of the ontology, modality, 
laws package that I wish to present. The first two components of the package – the 
ontology and the modal metaphysics –have been introduced in this chapter, but 
further details of these will emerge in subsequent chapters. In the next three 
chapters, I’ll discuss in more detail the laws of nature and the metaphysics of 
fundamental properties. Then, in chapters 5, 6 and 7, I’ll discuss in detail the 
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resulting interactions between laws and modality, and the methodological benefits 
































In the previous chapter I outlined my intentions in this thesis, which are to defend 
and explore a package of views about ontology, modality and the laws of nature. I 
offered some details of, and motivation for, the particular ontology and 
metaphysics of modality I wish to defend. The ontology is unHumean because it 
denies R-quidditism by positing necessary connections between properties and 
their modal profiles. This is partly motivated by sceptical concerns for, and the 
objection from science to, the Humean’s alternative quiddistic view of properties. I 
then proceeded to argue that the denial of quidditism is naturally wedded with a 
recent view in the metaphysics of modality called hardcore actualism (HA). Once we 
deny quidditism, HA is poised to provide a strikingly parsimonious account of the 
metaphysics of modality according to which concrete property instances are the 
truthmakers for all modal truths. Thus, these views about ontology and modality 
respectively enjoy independent plausibility and are strengthened by their 
coherence.  
I also want to explore the relationship between an anti-quiddistic view of 
properties and the laws of nature. Early in the previous chapter, I mentioned that 
the account of laws that I favour is metaphysically thin for it conceives of the laws 
as merely descriptive. Indeed, the view of laws that I defend is inspired by and has 
much in common with Lewis’s best system analysis (BSA). Where my account of laws 
deviates from the BSA is that it systematizes not just the actual distribution of 
properties throughout the 4D Humean Mosaic, but the actual and possible 
distributions of properties. Development of this account must be postponed for 
chapter 4.  What I wish to do here, on the way to motivating my favoured view of 
the laws, is critique what might seem to be a natural account of the laws of nature 
given an anti-quidditist metaphysic of properties, the view that Bird (2007) 
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develops and does much to defend and calls Dispositional Essentialism (DE).6   
 Here is how I’ll proceed. First, I’ll outline the dispositional essentialist 
account of natural law found in Bird (2007). This highlights how an anti-quidditist 
view of properties can inform an account of the laws of nature. Second, I’ll present 
Vetter’s critique of DE according to which it fails to account for functional laws. 
Third, I’ll present Corry’s (2011) Cartwrightian critique of DE according to which the 
ubiquity of ceteris paribus laws poses a problem for DE’s explanatory aims. I’ll then 
suggest that these two problems for DE are related to a very general, and 
independently questionable, feature of DE according to which laws are supposedly 
constitutive of the essences of properties which, in turn, are supposed to ground those 
very laws. Hence, I suggest that the relationship between laws and properties 
requires a radical rethink, which will occur over chapters 3 and 4. 
 
2.2 The Dispositional Essentialist Account of Natural Law 
Dispositional essentialism (DE) comprises an account of the metaphysics of 
properties according to which property essences are constituted by dispositions, 
and an account of laws of nature in terms of those essentially dispositional 
properties. In the previous chapter I noted that simply denying quidditism by 
positing a necessary connection between properties and their modal profiles (viz. 
the dispositions/behaviours with which they are associated) leaves open the 
question of how this necessary connection between properties and dispositions 
arises. Bird’s dispositional essentialist (2007) answer to this question is that 
properties are necessarily connected with dispositions because dispositions are 
constitutive of the essences of properties. Bird calls fundamental properties with a 
dispositional essence potencies – I will follow Bird’s usage of “potencies” in this 
chapter.  
The dispositional essentialist account of laws involves deriving a universal 
generalization from a statement about the dispositional essence of a potency – any 
individual that instantiates potency, P, will be disposed to behave in a certain way as 
                                                     
6 See also Ellis (2001). 
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prescribed by P’s dispositional essence. This derivation is central to the 
dispositional essentialist account of natural law according to which, roughly: 
 
(DE) L is a law if, and only if, L is derivable from the essence of a potency.  
 
Let’s look at the account in a bit more detail. 
According to the simple, conditional analysis, for x to possess the disposition 
to yield manifestation M in response to stimulus S, let’s denote this “D(S, M)”, is for x to be 
such that if it were S then it would be M:  
 
(CA) D(S, M)x ↔ (Sx □→ Mx) 
 
For example, if x is disposed to accelerate when in close proximity to negatively 
charged bodies, then if x were in close proximity to a negatively charged body, e 
(stimulus), then x would accelerate (manifestation). Bird does not endorse (CA) as 
an analysis of dispositions. Rather, Bird takes (CA) as a necessary equivalence 
between dispositions and conditionals (2007, 43), which he writes as:  
 
(CA□) □(D(S, M)x ↔ (Sx □→ Mx)) 
 
So instead of analysing away the disposition, D(S, M)x, in terms of a conditional, 
(CA□) ought to be read as stating the necessary truth that whenever the disposition, 
D(S, M)x, is instantiated, the conditional  (Sx □→ Mx) is true, and vice versa.  
As mentioned, Bird calls fundamental properties with a dispositional 
essence, potencies. According to Bird, the claim that a property has a dispositional 
essence can be understood in contrast with categoricalism about properties:  
 
Essentially dispositional properties are ones that have the same dispositional 
character in all possible worlds; that character is the property’s real rather 
than merely nominal essence. Categorical properties, on the other hand, do 
not have their dispositional characters modally fixed, but may change their 
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dispositional characters (and their causal and nomic behaviour more 
generally) across different worlds. (Bird 2007, 44) 
 
Categoricalism about properties is tantamount to R-quidditism because it says that 
properties are free to recombine with different dispositional characters that is, they are 
free to recombine with different casual and nomic behaviours. Or, as I prefer to put 
it, properties are free to recombine with different modal profiles. According to 
dispositional essentialism, by contrast:  
 
[T]he real essence of some potency P includes a disposition to give some 
particular characteristic manifestation M in response to a characteristic 
stimulus S. (Bird 2007, 45). 
 
Since dispositions are part of the real essences of potencies, on this view, potencies 
are not free to recombine with different modal profiles and hence R-quidditism is 
denied.  
Bird makes an inference from the above claims about the real, as opposed to 
nominal essence of a potency to a necessary truth: from the claim that P, has a 
dispositional essence he infers that for any world, w, and individual, x, such that x 
instantiates P at w, x will be disposed to yield manifestation M in response to 
stimulus S (Bird 2007, 45): 
 
(DEp) □(Px → D(S, M)x)    
 
The truth of (DEp) thus rests on the assumption that essentialist truths give rise to 
metaphysical necessities à la Fine (1994).   
Combining (CA□) and (DEp) by substituting D(S, M)x  in (DEp) for (Sx □→ Mx) 
then gives us: 
 




Where (I) says that, in all possible worlds, if x instantiates P, x would yield 
manifestation M if it were to acquire stimulus S. Now assume (for conditional 
proof) that x instantiates potency P and acquires stimulus S: 
 
(II) Px & Sx 
 




It thus follows, by conditional proof, from the assumption in (II) that:  
 
(IV) (Px & Sx) → Mx 
 
And finally, since x is arbitrary, we can generalize, producing: 
 
(V) ∀x((Px & Sx) → Mx) 
 
(V) Is a universal generalization derived from a claim about the dispositional 
essence of potency. Furthermore, since the reasoning (I) through (V) holds in an 
arbitrary world, (V) is necessary (for additional details see Bird 2007, 43–48):  
 
(V□) □∀x((Px & Sx) → Mx).  
 
Thus, DE explains the universal generalization in (V) in terms of a claim about the 
essence of a potency. According to the dispositional essentialist, the laws are those 
universal generalizations, or regularities, which can be so explained in terms of the 
essence of some potency.   
To the extent that they take the laws to be universal regularities, the 
dispositional essentialist might find themselves in agreement with David Lewis 
about the nature of natural laws. Disagreement, however, will be over what explains 
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those regularities. For Lewis, all regularities in the world, including the laws, are 
brute, contingent, facts, and the lawful regularity/non-lawful regularity distinction 
is metaphysically thin. According to Lewis’s best-system analysis (1983; 1986; 1994; 
2001), the lawful regularities are those whose inclusion as axioms in the best 
systematization of the distribution of properties throughout all of space-time 
maximizes informativeness and simplicity of that systematization. Since, according 
to Lewis, the space-time distribution of properties is a thoroughly contingent 
matter, the laws themselves are thoroughly contingent. The dispositional 
essentialist, on the other hand, provides an explanation of the distinction between 
lawful and non-lawful regularities in terms of the dispositional essences of 
potencies, with the result that the laws are metaphysically necessary. DE claims 
explanatory utility because it distinguishes lawful from non-lawful regularities such 
that the laws meet certain standards, such as the ability to support counterfactuals 
and explain their instances, arguably not met by the Lewisian regularity theory. 
Later in his book, Bird is more explicit about what the laws are: 
 
(L) The laws of a domain are the fundamental, general explanatory 
relationships between kinds, quantities, and qualities of that domain, 
that supervene upon the essential natures of those things. (2007, 201). 
 
Where, plausibly, (V) schematically expresses the general explanatory relationships 
holding between the kinds/qualities/quantities P, S and M and which supervene on 
those things’ essential natures, as demonstrated in the derivation of (V) from (I).   
Of course, strictly speaking, the conditional characterization of dispositions, 
(CA□), from which (V) derives, is false. The possibility of finks and antidotes means 
that there are all manner of counterexamples to (CA□) because an individual, x, can 
be disposed to yield M in response to S, acquire S and yet fail to manifest M. I’ll 
turn to this point in more detail when I discuss Corry’s (2011) critique of 
dispositional essentialism. For now, however, suffice it to note that Bird turns this 
fact to his advantage. The falsity of (CA□) requires modification of (V) along the 




(V*) ∀x((ceteris paribus Px & Sx) → Mx) 
 
But we knew that the laws were ceteris paribus all along! Like charges, for example, 
will only accelerate away from each other in accordance with Coulomb’s law in the 
absence of countervailing forces pushing them closer together. Thus, Bird argues 
that his account has the additional explanatory advantage of showing how the 
falsity of (CA□) can explain the ceteris paribus nature of laws.     
Now there is a very general feature of the above account of laws that I think 
is perhaps implausible, but, more importantly, I take it to be at the root of the 
criticisms of DE that I shall present in the rest of this chapter. That feature is the idea 
that particular potency instances fully encode laws of nature, such that a single 
instance of, say, charge suffices to fully ground the associated Coulomb’s law. 
Plausibly Coulomb’s law is a law and hence the sort of regularity that the 
dispositional essentialist should seek to ground in some potency, the most likely 
candidate being charge. Thus, charge must have a dispositional essence from which 
Coulomb’s law derives. More precisely, a true description of the essence of charge 
must permit the derivation of a statement of Coulomb’s law.  
Letting C stand for the potency charge and substituting P for C in (I) above, it 
follows that □(Cx →(Sx □→ Mx)). Now what might we fill in for S and M in the case 
of charge? Whatever we choose must allow for the derivation of Coulomb’s law in 
accordance with steps (I)-(V) above, so perhaps we could substitute S for something 
along the lines of …is in close proximity to another charged individual and M for 
…exerts a force proportional to the two charges and inversely proportional to the square of 
the distance between them. As it stands, these candidate substitutions for S and M in 
the case of charge are imprecise, certain problems emerge once we attempt to fill in 
the details, but these will be discussed in the next section of this chapter. For now, I 
just want to observe the very general point that plausible ways of filling in S and M 
in the case of charge look very much like the statement of Coulomb’s law itself. 
Thus, Coulomb’s law, it seems, is supposed to be constitutive of the essence of the 
property charge, according to DE.  
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My broad concern is that this seems perhaps too easy and unexplanatory. It is 
not clear that one can first build, e.g., Coulomb’s law into the essence of charge and 
then claim to explain Coulomb’s law in terms of charge’s essence. There is a whiff of 
circularity here. In other words, it is not clear that it really serves to explain the fact 
that a certain regularity is a law to just stipulate that those potencies regularly 
distributed contain the regularity at issue in their essence. This is just a rough sketch 
of the concern at this stage, but I hope to crystalize the issue by examination of some 
recent critiques of DE. In the next chapter, I shall defend an alternative 
understanding of the metaphysics of properties which does not simply build 
laws/dispositions into property essences but which instead maintains that 
properties are qualitative grounds of dispositions.  
 
2.3 Vetter on Functional Laws 
Barbara Vetter (2012) provides an incisive criticism of Bird (2007)’s account of the 
natural laws as grounded in fundamental dispositional properties. In a nutshell, the 
concern is that DE seems to rule out the possibility of fundamental functional laws, 
which relate quantities. Coulomb’s law, for example, relates the quantities force, 
charge and distance not simply in an on/off manner, rather it says how determinate 
magnitudes of these quantities vary with one another.  
In the previous section, we saw what is meant by the claim, central to DE, 
that the laws are just those regularities that are grounded in potencies. Steps (I) 
through (V) show how to derive a universal generalization:  
 
(V)  ∀x((Px & Sx) → Mx) 
 
From a claim about the essence of a potency:  
 
(I) □(Px →(Sx □→ Mx)).  
 
Thus, as Vetter puts it, “the grounding of the laws, and the explanation of 
regularities, is achieved in a most simple and elegant manner: by entailment.” 
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(2012). A universal generalization will count as a law, according to DE, if, and only 
if, it is so entailed by a claim about the essence of a potency.  
Cracks begin to appear, however, when we try to fill in the schematic 
derivation presented in steps (I) through (V) with an actual example. Consider 
Coulomb’s law (CL), and the corresponding potency charge, in which it is plausibly 
grounded. We will assume for the sake of argument that <charge, Coulomb’s law> 
really is a fundamental property-law pair.  According to DE, we should thus be able 
to derive (CL) from a proposition about the essence of charge in accordance with 
steps (I)-(V). However, (CL) as generally stated: 
 





looks rather different from (V). (V), but not (CL), is a universally quantified 
conditional. Thus, if there is to be any hope of deriving (CL) in accordance with the 
schematic steps (I) through (V) and hence of accommodating its status as a law 
within the framework of DE, we must reformulate (CL). We can begin to make (CL) 
and (V) resemble each other by articulating (CL) in conditional form. As a first 
approximation, we might offer something like: 
 
(CL*) If x instantiates charge e and is a distance r from another charged individual 





The schematic “law” (V) tells us only that if x satisfies some conditions (P and S) it 
will also satisfy some further condition (M); (V) relates P, S and M in a simple on/off 
manner. However, implicit in (CL*), and absent from (V), is multiple quantification 
over determinate values of quantities, in this case charge, force and distance. This is as 
should be expected of an attempt to capture (CL) which is a function that relates 
continuous quantities not merely in an on/off manner but via a mathematical 
operation. For any instance of determinate charge, (CL) tells us exactly how much 
force it will exert on a distinct instance of exactly how much charge at how great a 
distance. The challenge, then, is in fleshing out the details of how we are to integrate 
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the quantitative nature of (CL) into the derivation of (V) from (I) (see Vetter 2012, 
211).   
We can apply a sort of reverse engineering strategy to this task: first we can 
attempt to find an instance of (V) that appropriately captures the quantitative 
nature of (CL) – (CL*) is an informal first shot. From there, we can work out what 
sort of characterization of charge, i.e., what instance of (I) might allow us to derive 
the relevant instance of (V). As emphasized, (CL) is a function that relates several 
quantities. So, an instance of (V) apt to capture this quantitative nature of (CL) will 
itself have several variables ranging over quantities – (CL*) implicitly quantifies 
over charge, force, and distance. Now, as Vetter notes, since we don’t want any free 
variables, we are presented with two options. Either we fill the variables in with 
determinates of the quantities related, or we have one, multiply quantified, 
conditional. For simplicity, Vetter focuses on the derivation of Coulomb’s Law from 
a particular determinate charge: electric charge, or charge e: (1.6 x 10-19 C). This 
yields two candidate formalizations of the informal (CL*):  
 
(V-1) ∀x((x has charge e & x is 5.3×10-11m from a charge of 1.6×10-19C) → x 




(V-∀) ∀x∀ri∀qi ((x has a charge e & x is at a distance ri from charge qi) → x 





(V-∀) looks more like (CL) than (V-1). However, due to its multiple quantification, 
(V-∀) isn’t an instance of (the singly quantified) (V). Thus, (V-1) but not (V-∀) may 
be derived from an instance of (I) as the dispositional essentialist would like. The 




(I-1) □(x has charge e → (x is 5.3×10-11m from a charge of 1.6×10-19C □→ x 
exerts a force of 8×10-8N)) 
 
Whereas to derive (V-∀) we would require: 
 
(I-∀) □(x has charge e → ∀charges qi ∀distances ri  (x is at distance ri from qi 





The tension now is that (I-∀) but not (I-1) adequately characterizes electric 
charge, due to its greater generality. But (I-∀) is not an instance of (I), whereas (I-1) is 
an instance of (I). To see this, consider the following: in both (I) and (I-∀) it is the bit 
after the first arrow ‘→’ that characterizes charge e. But now we can see the 
difference between (I) and (I-∀) is that the main connective in the characterizing 
clause in the former is the counterfactual conditional, whereas in the latter it is the 
universal quantifier (see Vetter 2015, 52). So, the latter, but not the former, permits a 
derivation of an instance of (V) in accordance with the dispositional essentialist 
account of natural law. We are thus forced to choose between sticking with Bird’s 
account or adequately capturing the relationship between electric charge and (CL), 
but, according to Vetter (2012, 212), we cannot do both.   
Now we might ask the dispositional essentialist, as Vetter does, which is the 
fundamental property (I-1) or (I-∀), and which is the law to be derived (V-1) or (V-
∀)? Bird suggests an answer to this question when he expresses the view (2007, 22) 
that fundamental essentially dispositional properties, that is, potencies, should be 
characterizable in terms of a single stimulus-manifestation pair linked by the 
counterfactual conditional. Now the disposition constitutive of the essence of the 
property (I-∀), is not expressible in terms of a single conditional linking stimulus 
and manifestation. The disposition essential to (I-∀), namely:  
 







is equivalent to an infinite conjunction of highly specific dispositions, like that 
constitutive of the essence of (I-1), namely:  
 
(x is 5.3×10-11m from a charge of 1.6×10-19C □→ x exerts a force of 8×10-8N).  
 
But, as Bird notes (2007, 22), a conjunction of conditionals is not equivalent to a 
single complex conditional. The disposition constitutive of the essence of (I-∀) is 
irreducibly multi-track because it can be analysed in terms of no single conditional 
linking stimulus and manifestation conditions. So, given Bird’s preference for 
single-track dispositions at the fundamental level (Bird 2007, 22–23), he must 
consider the property (I-1) more fundamental than (I-∀), because the former, but 
not the latter, has as its essence a single conditional linking stimulus and 
manifestation conditions. Bird must thus consider ‘(I-1) & (V-1)’ the fundamental 
property-law pair. But beside his scepticism about multi-track dispositions at the 
fundamental level, more simply, Bird must take ‘(I-1) & (V-1)’ to be the fundamental 
property-law pair in order to vindicate the schematic derivation of a law from a 
potency in accordance with steps (I) through (V).   
This is an unhappy position for the dispositional essentialist. As we’ve seen, 
(I-1) doesn’t adequately characterize electric charge and (V-1) doesn’t adequately 
characterize Coulomb’s law. Coulomb’s law is best captured by (V-∀), which may 
be derived from (I-∀). But if, as Bird suggests, (I-∀) is not a fundamental property, 
Coulomb’s law is not a law, according to DE, which maintains that the laws are 
grounded in fundamental properties, viz. potencies. The same point can be put a 
different way; the simple fact that Coulomb’s law cannot be derived from electric 
charge in accordance with steps (I) through (V) would seem to preclude it from 
enjoying the status of a law, according to DE. DE thus seems to imply that 
Coulomb’s law is not a law after all.  
Regardless of one’s opinion on the status of so-called Coulomb’s law, one 
should not be too eager to bite the bullet here. The problem arose because of a very 
general feature of Coulomb’s law, namely, the fact that it is a function relating 
various quantities. Any functional law will similarly fail to be derivable from a 
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corresponding potency in accordance with steps (I) through (V), as DE would like. 
Perhaps we could say that Coulomb’s law is not really a law because it is eliminable 
in favour of some more fundamental laws. But since the problem was the 
quantitative nature of Coulomb’s law, the dispositional essentialist could fully 
dismiss the concern only by claiming that there are no functional laws at the 
fundamental level. And this seems like an implausibly strong empirical prediction 
for a metaphysic of laws to make.  
Vetter diagnoses Bird’s reluctance to take the property (I-∀) as fundamental 
as stemming from his adherence to the conditional characterization of dispositional 
properties, according to which the dispositional essence of a fundamental property is 
characterized by a single conditional linking stimulus and manifestation conditions. 
But as we have seen, this conception of dispositions seems inappropriate for 
characterizing the dispositional essence of the property electric charge for the very 
general reason that electric charge confers on its bearers the disposition to exert a 
range of manifestations in response to a range of stimuli. In other words, electric 
charge is irreducibly multi-track. The dispositional essentialist thus seems forced 
either to predict that all potencies will be single track, i.e., characterizable along the 
lines of (I-1), or to give up (DEp) □(Px → D(S, M)x), i.e., to sever the connection 
between potencies and conditionals. The former is an implausibly strong empirical 
prediction whereas that latter is central to the derivation of (V) from (I), and hence 
to the dispositional essentialist account of laws, its rejection would thus seem to 
constitute the rejection of DE itself. 
 
2.4 A Cartwrightian Concern  
Dispositional essentialism distinguishes lawful regularities from non-lawful 
regularities on the grounds that the former, but not the latter, are grounded in the 
dispositional essences of potencies. In this section I want to consider the implications 
for DE of the line of thought, typically associated with Nancy Cartwright (1983), but 
also discussed by Lange (1993), among others, according to which there are really 
very few regularities in nature which conform to the grammar of the natural laws. 
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In section 2, I noted that the falsity of the simple conditional analysis of 
dispositions, (CA□): □(D(S, M)x ↔ (Sx □→ Mx)), required modification of the 
schematic law statement (V) along the following lines ∀x((ceteris paribus Px & Sx) 
→Mx). This allowed Bird to claim additional explanatory utility for DE, because the 
falsity of (CA□) provides an explanation of the ceteris paribus nature of laws. The 
fact that the truth of law statements requires ceteris paribus qualification is a datum 
that an account of laws should be able to explain (my own explanation of this fact 
comes in chapter 4 and requires some work to build up to). Bird explains the ceteris 
paribus nature of laws by showing that law statements derive from instances of 
(CA□), which themselves require ceteris paribus qualification for their truth. So, the 
ceteris paribus nature of (CA□) is transmitted to the laws that derive from it.  
The law of thermal expansion, for example, describes how metals expand 
with temperature. More precisely, it tells us that when a metal bar of length L0 
undergoes a change in temperature T, the length of the bar changes by L = kL0T, 
where k is a constant.7 This law, however, is clearly far from exceptionless. Any 
number of external factors may conspire to make it the case that, although a bar is 
heated, it fails to change length by L = kL0T. Someone might hammer in the ends of 
the bar at the same time as it is heated, or it might be heated while contained within 
a rigid box, which perfectly fits the bar’s length and which itself does not change 
shape when the bar is heated, etc. And in such cases, the bar, though heated, would 
not change length by L = kL0T. The truth of L = kL0T thus requires a ceteris paribus 
clause to rule out all such circumstances in which a bar is heated and yet fails to 
expand as the law describes.  
Consider again Coulomb’s law, 𝐹 = 𝜖
𝑄𝑞
𝑟2
, which (in conjunction with 
Newton’s second law of motion, F=ma) implies that like charges will accelerate 




 is false. For example, a child might decide to push together two negatively 
charged balloons, b1 and b2, in which case b1 and b2 would fail to accelerate away 
from each other, as Coulomb’s law implies. The acceleration of charges implied by 
                                                     
7 The example in this context is due to Lange (1993).  
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Coulomb’s law can also be hampered at the subatomic level too. Two electrons in 
complete isolation, for example, might be expected to quite regularly manifest their 
dispositions to behave in accordance with Coulomb’s law, but add to the situation a 
large mass and the electrons will behave in a way that is not accurately describe by 
Coulomb’s law. In fact, Coulomb’s law will not even truly describe a closed system 
consisting of just two electrons. This is because electrons instantiate charge and mass; 
so, electromagnetic and gravitational forces will influence their behaviours. For any 
given “lawful regularity” it seems that we can multiply examples of cases in which 
the regularity at hand would fail to obtain. There is a plethora of provisos required 
for laws such as Coulomb’s law and the law of thermal expansion to even come 
close to being true.  
Considerations along these lines have led Cartwright (1983) to argue that the 
laws of physics lie, by which she means that there are exceedingly few 
generalizations in nature that conform to the grammar of natural laws. To be 
precise, Cartwright’s arguments would seem to establish that there are very few 
regularities in the course of events, where the course of events is made up of facts 
about the “actual values of properties such as position, velocity, mass, charge, etc.—
the kinds of properties generally acceptable to a Humean” (Corry 2011, 269). It has 
been suggested, however, that regularities between entities not within the course of 
events would be consistent with Cartwright’s arguments, e.g.(Earman, Roberts, and 
Smith 2002). Such views are then ontologically committed to entities somehow 
outside the course of events, whatever they may be. I will not be concerned here 
with the possibility of regularities between entities that are outside of the course of 
events. This is because such views introduce additional controversial metaphysical 
postulates and do not even help the dispositional essentialist to overcome the issue 
that Corry (2011) argues is posed by the Cartwrightian considerations outlined. 
Hence, when I talk about regularities, I will mean regularities within the course of 
events.   
I began this section by mentioning Bird’s claim that the strict falsity of (CA□) 
afforded DE additional explanatory utility because it allowed for an explanation of 
ceteris paribus laws. However, the Cartwrightian considerations outlined suggest 
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that ceteris paribus laws are no mere exceptions to be explained, they are ubiquitous. 
Corry (2011) has argued that the scarcity of regularities which conform exactly to 
the grammar of natural laws spells trouble for DE. DE purports to show that the 
instantiation of a potency entails a regularity, that was the point of the derivation in 
steps (I) through (V) (see sect. 2 above), and that any regularity so derivable counts 
as a law. But given an abundance of potencies, the deductive steps (I) through (V) 
would seem to imply an abundance of lawful regularities, which is contrary to the 
Cartwrightian observation. So, for DE to embrace the Cartwrightian position would 
require, Corry argues, the concession of one of the following: 
 
(1) At least one of (CA□) or (DEp) is false. 
(2) The antecedents of (CA□) and/or (DEp) are rarely satisfied – which is to 
say that dispositional properties are rarely instantiated.  
(3) The antecedents of (V) are rarely instantiated.  
 
(Corry 2011, 269) 
  
Let’s take a moment to get clear on how conceding any one of the claims (1) - 
(3) would help DE to accommodate the Cartwrightian position. The derivation of a 
lawful regularity (V) from a claim about the dispositional essence of a potency (I) 
was crucially dependent on the association between a potency’s dispositional 
essence and a conditional, as expressed in (CA□) and (DEp). If, in accordance with 
(1), (CA□) or (DEp) were false, then there might be an abundance of potencies but 
very few regularities because the inference from a statement about a potency’s 
essence to a regularity in accordance with steps (I) through (V) crucially depended 
on the truth of (CA□) and (DEp). In other words, conceding (1) would render the 
inference from a claim about the essence of a potency to a regularity unsound. If, in 
accordance with (2), dispositions were rarely instantiated, there could be very few 
lawful regularities, even granting the soundness of the deduction of (V) from (I). 
Finally, if, in accordance with (3), the antecedents of (V) were rarely realized, which 
is to say, if it were the case that individuals rarely both instantiated potencies and 
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acquired the appropriate stimuli such as to yield their characteristic manifestations, 
there might be very few lawful regularities of the type expressed in (V). So, options 
(1) - (3) each make room, in slightly different ways, for the possibility that there are 
exceedingly few regularities that conform to the grammar of laws, and hence each 
seeks to render DE consistent with the Cartwrightian considerations outlined. The 
question, then, is whether any of (1) - (3) really is compatible with DE. Following 
Corry (2011), I’ll consider these options in turn as ways the dispositional essentialist 
might accommodate the observation that ceteris paribus laws, far from being 
interesting exceptions, are ubiquitous.  
Corry quickly dismisses option (2), the suggestion that essentially 
dispositional properties are rarely instantiated. This option, he argues, “would spell 
doom for the dispositional essentialist project, since it would imply that 
dispositions play little role in the workings of the everyday world” (Corry 2011, 
269). And Corry argues that option (3) fares no better because to concede option (3) 
would be to admit that much of what goes on in the universe is not governed by 
natural laws. In which case, much of what goes on would be entirely 
(metaphysically) independent of potencies and their dispositional essences (Corry 
2011, 270). For similar reasons, conceding (2) or (3) would be antagonistic to my 
interests in this thesis, which are to account for both laws and modality in terms of 
dispositional properties and to explore the resultant relations between these 
phenomena. If there were very few dispositional properties instantiated throughout 
the world, or if dispositional properties were very rarely manifested, then the idea 
that all facts about laws and modality (of which there would seem to be a great 
many) and the interactions between laws and modality could be explained in terms 
of such properties would lack plausibility. Options (2) and (3) both render DE, (or 
indeed any attempt at a metaphysical explanation of the goings on in the world in 
terms of dispositional properties) trivial and unexplanatory; they concede the 
soundness of the dispositional essentialist’s derivation of a lawful regularity from 
the essence of a potency in steps (I) through (V), while maintaining that the 
conditions for such regularities’ obtaining are rarely (if ever) met. Option (1), 
however, deserves some more detailed consideration. 
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Option (1) would seem to be the obvious concession for DE to make, after 
all, and as already mentioned, (CA□) is in fact false. (CA□) is false because of the 
possibilities of finks and antidotes, (see Bird 2007, sec. 2.2 and Vetter 2015, sec. 2.2).  
An individual x is said to be finkishly disposed to M if it is such that in the 
time between its acquiring stimulus S and its manifesting manifestation M, it 
changes in some way such that the causal basis for the disposition is lost and hence 
M is not manifested. A live wire, for example, may be finkishly disposed to deliver 
an electric shock. This would be the case if the wire were such that when it is 
touched it ceases to be live before the shock can be delivered; perhaps there is some 
safety mechanism installed in a broader system of which the wire is a part. In such a 
case, it is true that the live wire has a certain disposition – it is live – but the 
corresponding counterfactual according to which it would shock a person if they 
were to touch it, is false.  
Antidotes work, not by changing the causal basis of a disposition, but by 
changing the environmental conditions such that although an individual that is 
disposed to yield M in response to S acquires S, it fails to yield M. A fragile vase, v, 
for instance, is disposed to break when dropped. If, however, v were wrapped in 
bubble wrap and dropped onto a foam mattress, it would not break. Again, it is true 
that the vase is disposed to break and false that it would break if it were dropped.  
More concisely, for any individual, x, instantiating disposition, D(S, M), finks 
work by altering the casual basis of D in the time between x’s receiving S and 
yielding M such that x receives S but fails to yield M. Antidotes work by creating an 
environment in which, although x instantiates  D(S, M), other factors prevent x 
yielding M in response to S. Finks and antidotes thus provide counterexamples to 
the necessary equivalence between dispositions and the truth of counterfactual 
conditionals expressed in (CA□). 
Now Corry argues that to properly embrace the Cartwrightian position, DE 
would have to admit that the potencies, which ground laws, are plagued by finks 
and/or antidotes (Corry 2011, 270).  For recall that the claim is not that ceteris paribus 
laws are mere exceptions to be accommodated, rather it is that there are exceedingly 
few regularities in nature of the type described by natural laws.  
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Let us first consider the idea that finks may be ubiquitous at the 
fundamental level. In this case, instances of, for example, charge may frequently 
receive their characteristic stimulus: being in close proximity to distinct charges. 
However, more often than not, in the time between an instance of charge receiving 
this stimulus and yielding its manifestation, the causal basis of charge is lost and 
hence no characteristic manifestation is yielded. But this description is perhaps 
implausible. Bird has argued that there are no finks at the fundamental level. This is 
because, on the one hand, potencies, that is, fundamental essentially dispositional 
properties, by hypothesis, have no distinct causal basis with which a finkish 
intervention could interfere. And on the other, while a potency might be lost 
directly, that is, without interference with a causal base, it seem implausible that, at 
the fundamental level, a potency could be lost after receiving its characteristic 
stimulus but before yielding its manifestation (2007, 60–62).  
What about fundamental antidotes, then? Even if potencies have no distinct 
causal base with which a finkish intervention could interact, it does seem possible 
that factors external to, say, a given instance of charge, e, could conspire to make it 
the case that e consistently fails to manifest acceleration in response to being in close 
proximity to other instances of charge. Plausibly, something could consistently “get 
in the way” of a charged body so that it cannot accelerate anywhere. The important 
point is that the possibility of antidotes at the fundamental level allows for the 
possibility that there are exceedingly few regularities of the kinds described by laws 
of physics, if such antidotes are ubiquitous. However, according to Corry, the 
suggestion that antidotes at the fundamental level are ubiquitous spells trouble for 
DE.  
From the supposition that the manifestation of some potency, P, is plagued 
by antidotes in a wide variety of circumstances, Corry derives an epistemological 
problem and a metaphysical problem. According to the epistemological problem, 
we would have no good reason to believe that P is instantiated anywhere in the 
universe, which, in turn implies that P should play no role in our formulation of the 
laws of nature. According to the metaphysical problem, if P is consistently 
hampered and so hardly ever manifest, it cannot be the source of any of the 
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regularities that we do observe and hence cannot be responsible for any observed 
law of nature (Corry 2011, 268). From these observations, Corry concludes that  
 
[I]t is vital for the dispositional essentialist project that fundamental 
antidotes are not very common. Dispositional essentialism only makes sense 
if the fundamental laws are strict, not ceteris paribus. Thus Cartwright’s claim 
that all laws are ceteris paribus laws poses a challenge to the dispositional 
essentialist. (Corry 2011, 268).  
 
According to DE, potencies ground the laws because it is part of their 
essence to dispose their bearers to interact in accordance with laws. Furthermore, 
according to DE, potencies are individuated according to the laws in which they 
feature. The potency charge, for example, essentially disposes its bearers to interact 
in accordance with Coulomb’s law and this distinguishes charge from, say, mass. But 
if all DE says about charge is that it disposes its bearers to interact in accordance 
with Coulomb’s law, then the epistemological and metaphysical problems do 
indeed rear their heads. If Coulomb’s law is hardly ever exemplified, and if all we 
know about charge is that it disposes individuals to interact in accordance with 
Coulomb’s law, then it seems that we lack any reason to believe that charge is 
instantiated. And, on the metaphysical side, if all charge does is dispose its instances 
to interact in accordance with Coulomb’s law, and if Coulomb’s law is rarely, if 
ever, exemplified, then it would seem that charge has little to nothing to do with 
what goes on in the universe. In short, if potencies can bear metaphysical 
responsibility only for behaviours that conform to the grammar of natural laws, 
then the ubiquity of ceteris paribus laws poses a problem for DE’s explanatory aims.  
The obvious response to these concerns is to maintain that potencies can 
bear metaphysical responsibility for behaviours that do not conform to the grammar 
of laws. So, while charge, for example, might, under very specific circumstances, 
produce behaviour that conforms to the grammar of Coulomb’s law – under tightly 
controlled lab conditions, say – charge can also act in other circumstances to produce 
behaviours that do not strictly conform to the grammar of Coulomb’s law. The idea, 
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then, is that potencies are multi-track because they dispose their bearers to behave in 
a variety of ways depending on the details of the situation. If potencies are 
understood as multi-track in this way, it is no objection to the claim that potencies 
bear metaphysical responsibility for what goes on in the universe to note that, 
strictly speaking, laws, such as Coulomb’s law, are very rarely exemplified.  
Corry discusses this response but argues that this way of understanding 
potencies, as diversely multi-track, raises a new epistemological problem. Plausibly, 
if, say, charge, ever produces behaviour that does conform to the grammar of 
Coulomb’s law, it will be under the tightly controlled conditions of the lab. But if 
outside the lab, charge is responsible for all sorts of behaviours that don’t conform to 
the grammar of Coulomb’s law, then it seems that our practice of applying what we 
learn in the lab to real world situations lacks justification; we have “no justification 
for using our knowledge of how the disposition works in one situation to make 
predictions in another” (Corry 2011, 272). So, while perhaps among the many tracks 
of charge is a disposition to behave in accordance with Coulomb’s law, and this is 
what is exposed under lab conditions, it is nonetheless a mystery why we should 
apply this particular fact to predict how charges will behave outside the lab. The 
ubiquity of ceteris paribus laws thus threatens to undermine either DE’s ability to 
metaphysically explain what goes on in the universe or DE’s ability to explain our 
practice of applying what goes on in the lab to real-world settings.  
This section highlights the difficulty faced by DE in making sense of the 
multifarious interactions between potencies. The Cartwrightian considerations of 
this section suggest that, for the most part, the universe evolves in accordance with 
many, many different potencies all interacting with each other. The result of this is 
that very little of what goes on in the universe conforms to the grammar of the laws 
of physics. DE, however, says nothing about the various interactions between 
potencies. Rather, it seeks to explain the temporal evolution of the universe by 
appeal to the contributions made by particular potency instances considered in 
isolation from each other. But since the contributions made by, say, charge and mass 
are often thoroughly mixed up in a causal nexus of many different potencies all 
interacting with each other, DE lacks a story about precisely how these potencies 
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contribute. All that DE offers by way of characterization of, say, charge, is the law, 
Coulomb’s law, which individuates charge. Thus, when the contribution made by 
charge to the causal nexus of potencies that determines the evolution of the universe 
does not conform to the grammar of Coulomb’s law, DE is at a loss to explain what 
goes on in terms of charge. The account of laws that I present in chapter 4, by 
contrast, is built around the idea that the universe temporally evolves in accordance 
with the many and varied interactions between all potency instances considered 
collectively.  
 
2.5 Tying the Problems Together  
In section 2.2, I presented Bird’s (2007) dispositional essentialist account of natural 
law, which consists in deriving a universal generalization from a statement about 
the essence of a potency in accordance with steps (I) through (V). However, it seems 
that for the dispositional essentialist strategy of accounting for the laws in terms of 
potencies to work in any particular case of a law, L, and potency, P, whereby P 
grounds L, L must constitute the essence of P so that the characterizing statement of 
P’s essence allows for the logical deduction of a statement of L. But this explanation 
of L in terms of P doesn’t seem particularly satisfying if we must first build L into 
the essence of P – the “explanation” now has a whiff of circularity (at the very least).  
Jaag (2014) offers a formal presentation of the above concern. He points out 
that, according to DE, natural modalities (be they laws, counterfactuals, dispositions 
or whatever) pertain to the essences of potencies, because they constitute those 
essences. But potencies are then supposed to ground those very natural modalities 
that are constitutive of their essences. However, Jaag argues that, given some 
plausible assumptions about essential dependence, metaphysical priority and 
grounding, nothing can ground that which pertains to its own essence, hence a 
potency, P, cannot ground a law, L, if L pertains to the essence of P. The details of 
Jaag’s argument can be left aside for present purposes, for now it suffices to note 
that Jaag’s arguments constitute a formalization of the intuition that it is not 
particularly satisfying to build a law, L, into the essence of a potency, P, only to then 
claim that P metaphysically explains, or grounds, L.  
57 
 
In section 3.5, I present my own more formal account of this concern, which 
shows that, according to DE, properties and laws symmetrically ground each other, 
which means that the former cannot be invoked in a non-circular metaphysical 
explanation of the latter. For the rest of this section, I’ll be concerned just with 
showing that the previous two concerns of this chapter, Vetter’s concern about 
functional laws and Corry’s Cartwrightian concern, seem to be closely related to 
this suspicious feature of DE according to which potency essences are constituted 
by the very laws that they are supposed to ground.  
Recall the issue raised by Vetter (2012), and discussed in section 2, was that 
functional laws, such as Coulomb’s law, which relate quantities, cannot be derived 
from the essence of a potency in accordance with steps (I) through (V) (see Bird 
2007, 46, or section 2.2 above for the derivation that is at the core of DE's account of 
laws). The implication was that there are no functional laws at the fundamental 
level, which is an implausibly strong empirical constraint for a metaphysic of laws 
to impose.  
The first step of the dispositional essentialist’s derivation of a law, L, from a 
claim about the essence of a potency, P, involves characterizing the essence of P 
with a counterfactual conditional: 
 
(I) □(Px →(Sx □→ Mx)) 
 
However, there is no characterization of P’s essence in terms of a single 
counterfactual conditional, which allows for a derivation of anything like 
Coulomb’s law (or any other functional law for that matter). This was the nub of 
Vetter’s argument. We can, however, offer the following characterization of the 
essence of potency charge e: 
 
(I-∀) □(x has charge e → ∀charges qi ∀distances ri  (x is at distance ri from qi 







From which we may derive: 
 
(V-∀) ∀x∀ri∀qi ((x has a charge e & x is at a distance ri from charge qi) → x 





Where (I-∀) is a plausible characterization of the essence of electric charge and (V-∀) 
seems pretty close to Coulomb’s law. But (I-∀) is not an instance of (I) and (V-∀) is 
not an instance of (V), so any derivation of the latter from the former does not count 
as a dispositional essentialist account of natural law, in Bird’s sense.  
 The problem that Vetter raises comes about for two reasons: i) potency 
essences must be characterizable in terms of a single conditional and ii) for any 
potency, P, and law, L, such that (according to DE) L is grounded in P, the essence 
of P must be constituted by L, such that a characterizing statement of the essence of P 
permits a logical derivation of a statement of L. But, Coulomb’s law, for example, 
cannot be built in to the essence of P in such a way that a statement characterizing 
P’s essence permits a logical derivation of a statement of Coulomb’s law in 
accordance with DE’s steps (I) – (V). The problem arises because DE must, on the 
one hand, build laws into essences, but on the other, it is restricted to characterizing 
those essences in terms of counterfactuals. What Vetter has shown is that these two 
requirements are in tension in the case of functional laws.  
Vetter diagnoses the problem primarily in terms of the requirement that the 
dispositional essence of a potency be characterizable in terms of a single 
conditional. She suggests that the difficulty of deriving Coulomb’s law from the 
essence of electric charge in accordance with DE’s steps (I) – (V) is a symptom of the 
fact that electric charge, among other potencies, is irreducibly multi-track and hence 
not characterizable in terms of the counterfactual, which connects a single stimulus 
with a single manifestation. What I have sought to add is that the independently 
suspicious feature of DE, according to which potency essences must comprise the 
very laws that they supposedly ground, also plays a role in generating Vetter’s 
problem about functional laws.  
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Vetter advocates an alternative, possibility conception of dispositions, 
according to which: 
 
1. A disposition is individuated by its manifestation alone: it is a 
disposition to M, full stop 
2. Its modal nature is that of possibility, linked to or best characterized (to a 
first approximation) by ‘x can M’.  
 
(Vetter 2015, 65) 
 
Elsewhere, Vetter argues that dispositionality is a matter of degree and that what is 
distinctive of the nomological dispositions is that they are possessed to the (near) 
maximal degree (Vetter 2015, chap. 3). This means that the disposition associated 
with the potency electric charge is not merely such that some individual, x, that 
instantiates electric charge can yield characteristic manifestation M, rather, in some 
qualified sense that needn’t concern us for present purposes, if x instantiates electric 
charge, then it is necessary that x M’s. What do we substitute M for in the case of 
electric charge? Vetter’s suggestion is, roughly, that if x instantiates electric charge, 
then necessarily x exerts “a force F whose value stands to the surrounding charges q 
and their distance r in the precise mathematical relation F  = 𝜖
𝑒𝑞
𝑟2
” (Vetter 2015, 285). 
That is to say, if x instantiates electric charge, then necessarily x exerts a force in 
accordance with Coulomb’s law. Hence, Vetter replaces Bird’s characterization of 
the potency P   
 








Where built in to M is whatever law is associated with P. What I have argued, 
however, is that insofar as we are interested in metaphysically explaining the laws 
of nature in terms of potencies, we should be reluctant to build those very laws to 
be explained into the essences of the potencies that are supposed to do the 
explaining. More work needs to be done, then, on the metaphysics of laws and 
properties such that we may properly explain the former in terms of the latter; this 
work I do in chapters 3 and 4.  
In section 3, I discussed how Cartwright’s observation that the laws of 
nature lie risks placing much of what goes on in the universe, as well as our 
scientific practice of applying what we learn in the lab to real-world situations, 
beyond the explanatory purview of DE. Again, I want to suggest that the feature of 
DE according to which laws constitute the essences of potencies causes the 
problems here. Recall, Corry (2011) argues that in order to accommodate the 
Cartwrightian observation that there are exceedingly few regularities in the 
unfolding of events in the universe of the kind described by laws of nature, it must 
be conceded that antidotes are pervasive. The argument proceeded along the 
following lines.  
 
1. Potencies are ubiquitous and essentially such that they dispose their bearers 
to interact in accordance with laws of nature (DE’s essentialist core claim). 
2. There are exceedingly few regularities of the type described by natural laws 
(Cartwright’s arguments). 
3. To accommodate 1 and 2, it must be conceded that antidotes consistently 
hamper the dispositions to behave in accordance with laws that are 
characteristic of the essences of potencies. 
4. But if the dispositions conferred by potencies are consistently hampered, 
then much of what goes on in the universe must not be explicable in terms of 
the dispositional essences of potencies – contra DE’s explanatory aims.   
 
The dispositional essentialist could maintain, however, that the dispositional 
essences of potencies dispose individuals instantiating those potencies to do more 
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besides behaving in a manner that conforms to the grammar of natural laws. So, 
while the presence of antidotes might hamper an instance of charge’s disposition to 
behave in accordance with Coulomb’s law, that same antidote might be thought of 
as facilitating that instance of charge’s behaving in other ways that also 
metaphysically depend on the essential nature of charge. In other words, charge, and 
other potencies, might dispose their bearers to behave in a variety of ways 
depending on which other potencies are instantiated nearby, where very few of 
these behaviours conform to the grammar of laws.  
Point 4 only follows if it is held that natural laws exhaustively constitute the 
dispositional essences of potencies such that potencies only dispose their bearers to 
behave in accordance with laws. 1 - 3 above would be consistent with the denial of 4 
if it were admitted that potencies dispose their bearers towards a whole range of 
behaviours including behaviours not described by any specific law. Corry explores 
the possibility that the essences of potencies dispose their bearers to do more than 
just behave in accordance with particular laws, and hence that potencies are multi-
track. The “tracks” must then be as diverse as the range of behaviours we want to 
explain in terms of potencies. The concern with this suggestion, however, is that if 
potencies dispose their bearers to such a variety of behaviours it is not clear how we 
can be justified in applying what we know about potencies in one scenario, the lab, 
to other scenarios in the real-world (Corry 2011, 272).  
The problems here seem to stem from the crude (and as I have suggested, 
unexplanatory) model of the relationship between potencies and laws whereby the 
latter are constitutive of the essences of the former. On this model, either laws 
exhaust the dispositional essences of potencies, or they partly constitute the 
dispositional essences of potencies. If we think laws exhaust the dispositional 
essences of potencies, and in the absence of a theory about potency interactions, 
potencies cannot explain much of the goings on in the universe that do not conform 
to the grammar of the laws. If, on the other hand, we think that laws partly 
constitute the essences of potencies, along with dispositions for other behaviours 
too, then we lack an explanation for applying what we discover about the lawful 
component of a potency’s essence to scenarios outside of the lab setting in which it 
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was discovered. Either way, the position is not a comfortable one for the 
dispositional essentialist.  
My suggestion, then, is that if we do away with DE’s crude model of the 
relationship between laws and potencies whereby the former “contain” the latter, 
the present problems will dissolve. In chapters 3 and 4 I motivate and defend a 
metaphysic of properties and an account of laws in terms of those properties, which 



























3.  QUALITATIVE DISPOSITIONAL 
ESSENTIALISM 
 
3.1  Introduction  
In chapter 1, I presented some reasons for denying quidditism and maintaining 
instead that there are necessary connections between fundamental properties and 
the dispositions/behaviours (I use these terms interchangeably) with which they are 
associated. I opted to call the collection of dispositions with which a given property, 
P, is associated P’s modal profile (though in section 4.5 I will introduce and work 
with a more precise definition of this term). Hence, the suggestion is that there exist 
necessary connections between fundamental properties and their modal profiles.  
It was noted in chapter 1 that this anti-quidditist picture perhaps has some 
theoretical advantages, including the potential to avoid certain sceptical results for 
quidditism and the fact that it paves the way for an attractive metaphysics of 
modality namely hardcore actualism (HA). What remains unexplained, however, is 
how the necessary connections between properties and their modal profiles arise. 
The previous chapter touched on the dispositional essentialist explanation of these 
necessary connections according to which properties and dispositions are 
necessarily connected because the essences of properties are constituted by 
dispositions. It was noted that the dispositions that constitute the essences of 
properties, according to DE, are dispositions to behave in accordance with laws. 
Hence, DE simultaneously builds laws into the essences of properties and purports 
to explain those laws in terms of those property essences. This, it was argued, is 
intuitively unsatisfying and also connected to two more specific problems – Vetter’s 
problem of functional laws and Corry’s Cartwrightian concern.  
In this chapter, I look in more detail at the specific metaphysics of properties 
associated with dispositional essentialism, where I use “dispositional essentialism”, 
or “DE”, to refer to a package deal comprising a metaphysic of properties and an 
account of the laws of nature in terms of those properties. Not merely is it the case, 
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according to DE, that some property essences are partially constituted by 
dispositions, or that some property essences are exhaustively constituted by 
dispositions or that all property essences are partially constituted by dispositions. 
Rather, DE holds that all property essences are exhaustively constituted by 
dispositions. What this view entails is that properties have their identities fixed by 
their place in a structure of relations among properties. Hence, I shall use the term 
“structuralism” to refer to this particular metaphysic of properties according to 
which all property essences are exhaustively constituted by dispositions – 
“dispositional essentialism” or “DE” will be reserved to refer to the package of a 
structuralist metaphysics of properties and the identification of laws with arcs in 
this structure (details in section 3.5).  
Various proponents of structuralism purport to explain the space-time 
distribution of property instances in terms of those properties’ dispositional 
essences. In this chapter, I present a problem for structuralism’s explanatory aims in 
this respect, due to Barker and Smart (2012), which is independent of any specific 
concern with accounting for laws of nature. I add to this concern a further worry 
according to which the dispositional essentialist account of laws as arcs in the 
structure is unsatisfactory because it implies that properties and laws symmetrically 
ground each other and, hence, that DE cannot provide a non-circular metaphysical 
explanation of laws in terms of properties. This symmetrical grounding worry 
constitutes a more precise articulation of the idea that DE’s strategy of building 
laws into the essences of properties which are then used to account for those very 
laws is unexplanatory.  
Tugby’s (2012) response to the problem for structuralism that Barker and 
Smart raise is to give up structuralism in favour of the view according to which 
properties have qualitative essences, which nonetheless ground dispositions – call 
this view qualitative dispositional essentialism (QDE). QDE thus constitutes an 
alternative explanation of the necessary connection between properties and their 
modal profiles, one which does not simply build dispositions into property 
essences. I argue that QDE is superior to structuralism in two other (related) 
respects: it is not committed to symmetrical grounding and it is committed to fewer 
65 
 
ontologically basic entities than structuralism. Finally, I attempt to soften a concern 
according to which the claim that qualities ground dispositions is opaque. The aim 
of this chapter, then, is to crystalize concerns with the dispositional essentialist 
package deal and to motivate my positive view of the metaphysics of properties. 
 
3.2 Essentially Dispositional Properties 
In this section, I’ll discuss Vetter’s alternative conception of dispositions according 
to which dispositions are individuated via their manifestations alone and allied 
with possibility. Vetter’s view is motivated by a strong argument against the 
standard conception of dispositions understood in terms of conditionals linking 
stimulus and manifestation conditions. Furthermore, it simplifies the ensuing 
comparison of the structuralist and qualitative dispositional essentialist 
understandings of the relationship between property essences and dispositions if 
dispositions are understood just in terms of their manifestations. 
 
3.2.1  Vetter’s Conception of Dispositions 
According to the standard conception, dispositions are understood in terms of their 
characteristic stimulus (S) and manifestation (M) conditions, linked by a 
counterfactual conditional. To say that an individual, x, has a disposition, D, to 
yield M in response to S is to say that if x were to receive stimulus S, then x would 
yield manifestation M (e.g., Lewis 1997; Bird 2007). The standard conception of 
dispositions was discussed in section 2.2.  
Vetter (2015, chaps 2–3) has forcefully argued against individuating 
dispositions via some stimulus-manifestation pair and, hence, against allying 
dispositions with conditionals. In a nutshell, Vetter’s concern is that all but the most 
contrived dispositions will be associated with infinitely many stimulus-
manifestation pairs and, hence, with infinitely many conditionals linking each 
particular stimulus-manifestation pair. A disposition to shatter, for example, is 
really a disposition to shatter into many or fewer pieces if dropped from a greater or 
lesser height; x’s being disposed to shatter will imply that x will break into n pieces 
if dropped from height h, n’ pieces if dropped from height h’ and so on. A 
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disposition (of an instance of positive charge) to exert a repulsive force on other 
positive charges is really a disposition to exert a greater or lesser force depending 
on the magnitude of the other charge and the distance of separation between the 
two charges. As Vetter puts it, the stimulus and manifestation conditions of all but 
the most contrived of dispositions exhibit great qualitative and quantitative 
diversity (Vetter 2015, chap. 2). To avoid characterizing dispositions in terms of 
infinitely many conditionals, Vetter recommends that dispositions are individuated 
via their manifestation conditions alone, which allows for them to be characterized 
in terms of a single possibility statement, which can take scope over a (potentially 
infinite) disjunction of manifestations (e.g., Vetter 2015, 60). According to Vetter’s 
conception of dispositions:   
 
1. A disposition is individuated by its manifestation alone: it is a 
disposition to M, full stop. 
2. Its modal nature is that of possibility, linked to or best characterized (to a 
first approximation) by ‘x can M’.  
 
(Vetter 2015, 65). 
 
We can thus begin to flesh out the claim that, e.g., fragility is an essentially 
dispositional property in accordance with Vetter’s conception of dispositions by 
saying that fragility is individuated by a characteristic manifestation, shattering 
(perhaps among others), that its bearers can yield. In all possible worlds, for an 
individual, x, to instantiate fragility is for it to be the case that x can shatter. 
But possibility would seem to be too weak to characterize fundamental 
dispositional properties, such as positive charge. It is more appropriate to say that if 
x is positively charged, then x must (perhaps in some restricted sense) accelerate 
towards instances of negative charge. That is to say, fundamental properties, such 
as electric charge, seem more closely allied with necessity than with possibility.  
For Vetter, potentiality is the basic, context insensitive backdrop for the 
context sensitive notion of dispositionality, where for x to have a potentiality to M, 
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is for it to be the case that x can M. All dispositional properties are potentialities, 
though not all potentialities are dispositional properties. Potentialities can be 
possessed to greater or lesser degrees; both a brick and a vase have a potentiality to 
break – both can break – but the vase possesses this potentiality to a greater degree.  
In order for an individual, x, to count as being disposed towards some 
manifestation, M, x must possess the potentiality for M to a sufficiently high degree, 
where what counts as “sufficiently high” will be determined by context. So, the vase 
is disposed to break (it is fragile for short) whereas the brick is not because the vase 
but not the brick possesses the potentiality to break to a sufficiently high degree to 
count as being disposed to break (in most contexts, anyway; the brick may count as 
being disposed to break in, say, the context of preparing the foundations for a 
skyscraper). In other words, we might say that (in most contexts) the vase’s 
potentiality to break is a dispositional property, whereas the brick’s potentiality to 
break is not. 
If a potentiality for M is possessed by x to the maximal degree, then x has no 
potentiality not to M, which is to say that necessarily x is M. As a potentiality is 
possessed to a higher and higher degree, the modality with which it is associated is 
closer and closer to necessity. Fundamental potentialities, such as positive charge, 
may then be understood as only being able to be possessed to a particularly high 
degree, and hence closer to the necessity end of the potentiality scale (Vetter 2015, 
84–95).  
Since my main concern here is not with how best to understand dispositions 
per se, I must omit a more thorough discussion of Vetter’s view. I will, however, 
often follow Vetter in talking in terms of the broader notion of potentiality, instead of 
dispositionality, where to be disposed to M is to have a potentiality for M to a 
sufficiently high degree. Furthermore, I will assume Vetter’s understanding of 
potentialities/dispositions (where nothing is at stake, I will not discriminate 
between potentialities and dispositions) in terms of the possibility of their 
manifestations. I do this for two reasons: for one, I find Vetter’s case against the 
standard conception of potentialities/dispositions in terms of a counterfactual 
linking stimulus and manifestation conditions convincing and for another, it will 
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simplify the following discussion to talk just in terms of manifestation conditions of 
dispositions as opposed to stimulus and manifestation conditions. However, 
nothing of substance in this chapter hinges on this choice. The critiques of 
structuralism and dispositional essentialism that I present would be unchanged if 
the dispositions constitutive of the structuralist’s property essences were 
understood in accordance with the standard conception.  
 
3.2.2  Structuralism and QDE 
Regardless of whether one understands dispositions in terms of a stimulus-
manifestation pair linked by the counterfactual, or in terms of the possibility of the 
manifestation alone, a distinct disagreement concerns how, precisely, to understand 
the relationship between the essences of properties and the dispositions that those 
properties confer upon their bearers.  
On the one hand, structuralists (e.g., Chakravartty 2003a; Mumford 2004; 
Bird 2007; Mumford and Anjum 2011) maintain that all properties are essentially 
and exhaustively relational: “the [structuralist] wants the essences and hence 
identities of her entities to be determined relationally rather than purely 
intrinsically”8 (Bird 2007, 139); a property is “nothing more than a set of connections 
to, and causal powers for, other properties” (Mumford 2004, 185).  
Consider, for illustrative purposes, the properties fragility and shattering.9 
The property fragility disposes its bearers to manifest shattering – thus (sticking with 
Vetter’s conception of dispositions) if x is fragile then x can shatter. Let us say, then, 
that fragility and shattering stand in the manifestation relation (M-relation for short).10 
Now to say that fragility is essentially and exhaustively relational, is to say that the 
essence of the property fragility is exhausted by the M-relations in which it stands to 
other properties. M-relations are internal to properties, according to the 
                                                     
8 Bird calls his structuralist view of properties dispositional monism.  
9 Since fragility is likely not a fundamental property, it would probably not be within the remit of Bird’s 
structuralism; Bird limits his attention to fundamental physical properties. Mumford, however, does not limit his 
attention to fundamental properties.  
10 If I were working with the standard conception of dispositions, I might talk about the three properties being 
dropped, fragility and shattering standing in the stimulus-response relation (SR-relation) (see, e.g., Barker and Smart 
2012). But nothing of significance hinges on this choice. In what follows “M-relations” could be everywhere 
substituted for “SR-relations” without altering the argument.   
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structuralist, and all natural properties have their essences, and hence identities, 
exhausted by the M-relations in which they stand to other properties. Properties 
and the M-relations that they enter into, make up a vast network, or structure. Any 
given property, P, is then metaphysically (as opposed to cognitively or 
epistemically) individuated by its position in the structure of relations among 
properties – what it is to be P is to occupy such and such a place in the structure.  
Structuralism implies the negation of R-quidditism – properties are not free to 
recombine with different dispositions, or M-relations, because dispositions 
constitute their essences. Hence, there exist necessary connections between 
properties and dispositions, according to the structuralist.  
An alternative account of the necessary connections between properties and 
dispositions maintains that properties are qualities. The essences of qualities are not 
constituted by M-relations, nor are qualities merely trivially self-identical and 
distinct from other properties. Qualities, rather than having their essences 
constituted by dispositions, ground dispositions and qualitative differences 
between properties account for differences in which dispositions they ground (see, 
e.g., Jacobs 2011; Tugby 2012). More recently, Smith (2016) has articulated the 
position that she calls non-recombinatorial quidditism, which, despite the name, would 
seem to have affinities with this view since it maintains that qualities ground, and 
hence are necessarily connected to, nomological roles (2016, 250). To say that a 
property has a qualitative essence is to say that its essence can be given in wholly 
non-dispositional terms – geometric properties are often cited as paradigm 
qualitative properties because they can be specified non-dispositionally in terms of 
the mathematical formulae that they satisfy. Call this view, according to which 
qualities ground dispositions, qualitative dispositional essentialism (QDE) (see Tugby 
2012). Since, according to QDE, the essences of properties are not constituted by 
dispositions, viz., by their manifestation relations (M-relations) to other properties, 
QDE does not individuate properties solely on the basis of their place in a structure 
of relations among properties. Rather, qualities are self-individuating; properties 
may be thought of as grounding a relational structure, according to QDE, but 
property essences are not exhausted by their place in that structure.  
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In light of recent work by Taylor (2017), QDE should be distinguished from 
the powerful qualities view of Martin and Heil (Martin and Heil 1999; Heil 2003; 
Martin 2007). According to Martin and Heil, properties are dispositional and 
qualitative. On the face of it, then, the Martin-Heil view would appear to be in the 
QDE camp. However, Martin and Heil are clear that the dispositionality and the 
qualitativity of a property are identical: “Our suggestion is that dispositionality and 
qualitativity are to be identified” (Martin and Heil 1999, 47). It is generally agreed 
that identity isn’t a grounding relation. In support of this, one may cite the fact that 
identity is reflexive, but grounding is not. Thus, if the dispositionality and 
qualitativity of property are identical, the latter cannot ground the former, as per 
QDE.  
But regardless of how we ought to interpret the identity view of Martin and 
Heil, the important distinction for present purposes is just that between 
structuralism and qualitative dispositional essentialism (QDE). That is, between a view 
of properties as exhaustively constituted by dispositions vs. a view of the essences 
of properties as qualitative grounds of dispositions.  
 
3.3 A Regress for Structuralism 
One of the motivations for structuralism is to provide an explanation of various 
facts about fundamental property instantiations at space-time regions in terms of 
the very essences of the properties themselves. For example: 
 
Modal properties are the grounds of the world’s necessity and contingency, 
and therefore of the world’s patterns and order. (Mumford 2004, 161, my 
emphasis)  
[I]f the essence of the property of being negatively charged is a disposition 
to attract positively charged objects, then all negatively charged objects will 
attract positively charged objects. (Bird 2007, 3).  
 
And again, in Barker and Smart’s words, according to dispositional essentialism 
(which we can understand as the package of structuralism about properties and the 
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account of laws sketched in section 2.2),  
 
[I]t is part of the essential nature of properties that they constrain how they 
are distributed in instantiation across the space-time continuum. (Barker and 
Smart 2012, 717)  
 
This is all well and good, but one is entitled to press the question: how, 
exactly, are we to understand the explanatory claim that the distribution of 
properties throughout space-time is constrained by the very natures of those 
properties? In what follows in this section, I present Barker and Smart’s “ultimate 
argument” (2012) against structuralism, modified to fit my understanding of 
dispositions along Vetterian lines and, hence, my understanding of the essence of 
properties in terms of M-relations.  
According to the structuralist, there is nothing more to the essence of a 
property than the M-relations in which it stands to other properties because all 
properties have their essences exhausted by M-relations. Hence, all that the 
structuralist may appeal to in answering the question about how properties, F and 
G, say, constrain how they are distributed across the space-time continuum are the 
M-relations in which F and G stand to other properties (Tugby 2012, 725, highlights 
this nicely). To clarify the point, it will help to introduce some abbreviations:  
M(F, G) = the fact that the M-relation holds between F and G 
R = the fact that if x is F then x is disposed to manifest G  
Where x’s being disposed to manifest G implies that possibly x is G. But keep in mind 
that where F is a fundamental property, the possibility associated with the 
disposition to manifest G will be a very “strong” possibility, perhaps closer to a 
restricted form of necessity, because fundamental dispositional properties, or 
potentialities, can only be possessed to a very high degree. In which case, R would 
imply that if x is F then x must, perhaps in some restricted sense, manifest G.  
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We can thus understand the structuralist as positing a necessary connection 
between M(F, G) and R to explain the spatiotemporal distribution of instances of F 
and G. It is no accident, according to the structuralist, that if M(F, G) holds then R 
holds, hence it is no accident that if M(F, G) holds then every x that is F will tend to 
be G. Thus, the spatiotemporal distribution of property instances is explained by 
M(F, G)’s holding.  
But now we may ask: what accounts for the necessary connection between 
M(F, G) and R? Why is it that in every possible world in which M(F, G) holds, every 
x that is F will tend to be G? Perhaps there is some third-order relation, M*, between 
the relational facts M(F, G) and R, which ensures that if M(F, G) holds then R holds 
too. We can denote the situation like this: M*[M(F, G), R]. But now we may ask 
what accounts for the connection between M*[M(F, G), R], M(F, G) and R? What 
ensures that if M*[M(F, G), R] holds at a world, w, then if M(F, G) holds R holds 
too? Is there some fourth-order relational fact, M**, such that M**[M*[M(F, G), R], 
M(F, G), R]? We are clearly off on a regress of higher and higher order M-relations. 
This is the nub of Barker and Smart’s “ultimate argument against dispositional 
monist accounts of laws” (2012), see also Barker (2013).11 
The regress just sketched is very closely analogous to what Bird calls “the 
ultimate argument” against Armstrong’s account of properties and laws (Bird 2005). 
According to Armstrong, fundamental properties are quiddities and hence impose 
no restrictions on their possible space-time distributions. The spatiotemporal 
distribution of quiddities is explained in terms of second order necessitation 
relations, Ns, holding between those properties (e.g., Armstrong 1997). Thus, 
according to Armstrong, a law such as all Fs are Gs, is analysed in terms of a second 
order necessitation relation, N, which holds between the first order (quiddistic) 
properties F and G. We can denote the situation like this: N(F, G). That is to say, the 
fact that N(F, G) is what makes it the case that it is a law that all F’s are G’s and 
hence explains the spatiotemporal distributions of Fs and Gs. N might have failed to 
hold between F and G – the laws are contingent on Armstrong’s view – but in all 
                                                     
11 The regress is modified slightly to fit my set up in terms of M-relations. Barker and Smart stick with the standard 
conception of dispositions in terms of stimulus and manifestation conditions, which they call SR-relations. Hence 
the regress they articulate is of higher and higher order SR-relations.  
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worlds in which N(F, G) holds, anything that is F is G too. N’s holding between F 
and G is what it means to say that it is a law that all Fs are Gs.  
The question that Bird poses for Armstrong is this: what makes it the case 
that if N(F, G) holds, then all Fs are Gs? Since, according to Armstrong, all 
properties are quiddities, it can be no part of the essence of N that whenever N(F, G) 
holds it is also the case that all Fs are Gs. Thus, according to Bird, Armstrong is 
impelled to say that there is some third order relation, N*, which holds between the 
first-order relational facts N(F, G) and every F is a G and which ensures that if N(F, 
G) holds then all F’s are Gs. But what explains that if N* holds and N(F, G) holds, 
then all Fs are Gs? Some fourth order relation, N**? Regress beckons, and in much 
the same way as it does for the structuralist. In both cases, second order relations 
between first order properties are posited to explain the spatiotemporal 
distributions of the first order properties. In both cases we may ask what accounts 
for the relation between the relational fact and the fact about which properties tend 
to be instantiated together, which pushes us to posit yet higher order relations to 
meet the explanatory challenge.  
Perhaps Bird and Armstrong can block their respective regresses by 
repudiating the initial explanatory demand. In Armstrong’s case, this would 
amount to the claim that it is just a brute fact that if the second order N relation 
holds between the first order properties F and G: N(F, G), then all Fs are Gs. If this 
fact is brute, there is no need to appeal to a third order N* relation and so on and, 
hence, the regress does not get going. Similarly, the structuralist might say that 
there is a brute necessary connection between the fact that the M-relation holds 
between F and G and the fact that for all x, if x is F then x is disposed to manifest G. 
That is to say, there is a brute necessary connection between M(F, G) and R such 
that in any world in which M(F, G) holds, R holds too. By maintaining that the 
necessary connection between M(F, G) and R is just brute, the structuralist needn’t 
appeal to higher order relations and the regress is blocked.  
However, appeal to brute necessary connections may seem antagonistic to 
the motivation for structuralism, which was to explain patterns of property 
distributions, not in terms of some brute necessary connections, but in terms of the 
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powerful essences of properties. As Tugby puts it, “One of the main intuitions 
behind dispositionalism is that the properties of things are not inert: they pack a 
powerful punch; they give a causal ‘biff’ to their possessors.” (2012, 726). But if it 
turns out that all the work is being done by brute necessary connections between 
higher-order relational facts and facts about property instantiations, then this 
motivation for structuralism seems not to have been satisfied. On the other hand, 
Bird’s structuralism was in no small part motivated by a desire to move away from 
the Armstrongian view and the problems that it faced. What the above 
considerations show, however, is that Bird and Armstrong are in the exact same 
boat: they must either posit brute necessary connections or embrace regress (see 
Barker and Smart 2012, 721). 
The fact that, according to the structuralist, higher-order M-relations 
between properties constitute the essences of those properties is of no help here. As 
Barker and Smart highlight (2012, 720), the M-relations play two roles: i) a 
governing role – M(F, G) makes it the case that if x is F, then x is disposed to 
manifest G – and ii) a constitutive role – M’s holding between F and G enters into 
the constitution of these properties. The identities of F and G are fixed by their 
entering into the M-relation (perhaps among other relations to other properties). 
But the fact that M plays a constitutive role is irrelevant to the problem at hand. All 
that is relevant is that M plays the governing role. The governing role is what gets 
the regress going because, whether M constitutes the essences of F and G or not, we 
can still ask how it is that M does the governing work that it does. Positing a yet 
higher order relation sets us on the road to regress, so instead we might say that this 
fact about M is brute. That is, we might say that M just brutely necessitates that if x 
is F then x will be disposed to yield G. We could say this, but to do so would be to 
give up on the structuralist’s explanatory aim, which was to explain such necessities 
in terms of the very natures of the properties involved, as opposed to just fixing 




3.4 Tugby’s Proposal 
According to the diagnosis offered by Tugby (2012, 725), at the heart of the regress 
outlined above is the fact that the structuralist’s properties exhibit no qualitative 
differences that could account for the different behaviours that those properties 
confer. For the structuralist, all differences in conferred behaviours must be 
accounted for in terms of differences in relations between properties, that is, in terms 
of higher-order M-relations between properties, because the essences of properties 
are exhausted by the M-relations in which they stand to other properties. Thus, 
Tugby proposes that “properties do have a qualitative nature, which is such as to 
essentially confer certain dispositions upon their possessors”(2012, 727). This is 
what Tugby calls qualitative dispositional essentialism (QDE). QDE makes available 
qualitative, that is non-relational, non-trivial, differences between properties to 
account for the differences in behaviours conferred by different properties. Hence, 
QDE can avoid appeal to M-relations between properties to account for behavioural 
differences and avoid the regress that this strategy ushers.  
According to QDE, properties differ qualitatively, which is to say they differ 
not merely with respect to the relations in which they stand to other properties. It is 
the qualitative differences between properties that account for the different 
dispositions that they confer upon their bearers. Once qualitative differences are 
introduced, there is no need to appeal to higher-order relations between properties 
to account for the different behaviours conferred by different properties – all the 
explanatory work can be done by the qualities themselves. While the essences of 
qualities are to be understood non-relationally, it is not obvious whether qualities 
are best understood as wholly non-modal. Perhaps we can understand a quality as 
non-modal in the same sense in which, say, the property of being human is non-
modal, or the property of being spherical is non-modal; each of these properties can 
be specified independently of any dispositions or other modal notions. However, 
the claim, central to QDE, is that qualities (which you can call non-modal, in the 
previous sense, if you wish) ground relations between themselves and other 
qualities – this is the dispositional aspect of qualities. And, furthermore, a given 
quality, Q, could not possibly fail to ground the dispositions that it does, because its 
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qualitative nature is essential to it – a property instance would not be an instance of 
Q if it did not have Q’s very nature and it is Q’s qualitative nature which grounds 
the dispositions that Q confers upon its bearers (see Tugby 2012, 728).  
To give a further sense of the flavour of QDE, Tugby draws attention to the 
typical association between dispositions and counterfactual conditionals. E.g., x’s 
being fragile implies, roughly, according to, e.g., Lewis and Bird, that if x were 
dropped x would shatter. We might thus understand the idea that qualities ground 
dispositions in terms of those qualities being truthmakers for certain counterfactual 
conditionals. According to Tugby: “a thing’s property instantiations entirely 
constitute the truthmakers for certain counterfactuals true of that thing.” (Tugby 
2012, 728, my emphasis). Since truthmaking is plausibly a grounding relation (e.g., 
Correia 2005; Schnieder 2006), I’ll talk in terms of qualities grounding the truth of 
modal propositions.12 Qualities, according to Tugby, confer certain dispositions 
upon their bearers because they ground counterfactual conditionals. Thus, if x is 
positively charged, the quality, positive charge, grounds a counterfactual along the 
following lines: if x were in close proximity to an instance of negative charge, y, 
then x would accelerate towards y. Tugby puts the idea schematically as follows: 
 
QDE schema:  where P is any natural property, necessarily, if x has P, 
then in virtue of x’s being P, if x were F, then x would 
be G (ceteris paribus). (Tugby 2012, 728) 
 
Since I advocate Vetter’s conception of dispositions over the standard 
conception, I’ll make a slight departure from Tugby and understand the claim that 
qualities ground dispositions in terms of qualities grounding possibilities, as 
opposed to counterfactuals. I thus propose the following modification of the QDE 
schema:  
 
                                                     
12 If you think that grounding can only hold between entities of the same ontological category, then “quality Q 
grounding the truth of modal proposition P” can be read as “the fact that Q exists grounds the fact that P is true”.  
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QDE schema◊:  where P is any fundamental property, necessarily, if x 
has P, then in virtue of x’s being P, x is possibly G. 
 
The crucial point to emphasize is that, according to QDE, properties are 
qualities (and hence differ from one another qualitatively, that is, non-relationally), 
which ground possibilities/dispositions and this obviates the need to appeal to 
governing relations between properties to explain the behaviours conferred by 
properties, which blocks the regress discussed in section 3.3. The controversial 
claim, then, is that qualities are capable of grounding possibilities. Just as we may 
reasonably ask what explains the necessary connection between the facts M(F, G) 
and R, we may ask how, exactly, qualities ground possibilities. In section 5, I’ll 
attempt to add further plausibility to the latter suggestion, despite its apparent 
opacity. But before doing so, I would like to highlight a further benefit of QDE over 
structuralism.  
 
3.5  QDE, Structuralism and Symmetrical Grounding 
In this section, I argue that on a plausible and attractive interpretation of 
structuralism, the structure is ontologically dependent upon properties. 
Furthermore, the central tenet of structuralism is that properties are metaphysically 
individuated by their place in a structure, so properties ontologically depend on 
structure. Hence, properties and structure symmetrically ontologically depend on, 
or are grounded by, each other. QDE, on the other hand, is not committed to 
symmetrical grounding. What this means is that structuralism requires more basic 
entities than QDE, namely, properties and structure, where QDE need only posit 
properties at the fundamental level. Even more problematic is the implication for 
dispositional essentialism, according to which properties and laws symmetrically 
ground each other. Symmetrically grounded laws and properties follow from the 
dispositional essentialist package deal, which comprises a structuralist metaphysics 
of properties and a view of laws as arcs in the property structure (that this is a 
plausible interpretation of dispositional essentialism is argued in section 3.5.3). This 
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result is antagonistic to the dispositional essentialist’s desire to metaphysically 
explain laws in terms of properties, and not vice versa.  
 
3.5.1  Properties Ground Structure 
Yates (2017) talks about properties, on the structuralist conception, as composing a 
structure: 
 
[Structuralism]13 require[s] that entities can be individuated by their places 
in a structure composed by the entities themselves. (Yates 2017, 19, my 
emphasis). 
 
In [structuralism], powers are fully individuated by their places in a type-
casual structure fully composed of powers. (Yates 2017, 20, my emphasis)  
 
But one might object to an understanding of structuralism according to which the 
structure is composed of properties. In other structuralisms, it would perhaps be 
inappropriate to talk in terms of some entities composing a structure, so why 
interpret structuralism about properties in this way? Platonist interpretations of 
mathematical structuralism and extreme versions of ontic structural realism would 
seem to be cases in point. I’ll briefly discuss these in turn before suggesting that to 
avoid saying that the structure is composed of properties (or otherwise 
ontologically dependent upon them), the property structuralist is pushed to either 
embrace Platonism or the controversial view that there exist relations without 
relata.   
 Mathematical structuralists hold that ‘mathematics investigates structure’ 
(Cole 2010, 689). What is important to mathematics, on this view, are not the 
internal natures of its objects but the relations in which its objects stand to one 
another.14 Call a collection of objects standing in various relations to each other a 
                                                     
13 Yates actually uses the term “PPO” here, for “pure powers ontology”, but the idea is the same – that all 
fundamental properties are essentially and exhaustively dispositional and so have their identities fixed by the 
relations in which they stand to other properties, viz. place in a structure.  
14 Note here the similarity to property structuralism according to which the internal natures of properties are 
exhausted by their relations to other properties. 
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system. Arabic numerals, Roman numerals and Zermelo numbers are systems in this 
sense, which all have a common structure – the natural number structure – and it is 
this structure which is the subject matter of arithmetic, according to the 
mathematical structuralist.  
 A mathematical structure can thus be understood as a kind of one-over-
many universal, though where a traditional universal holds of individual objects, a 
structure holds of systems (see, e.g., Shapiro 2008, sec. 4). Systems, such as the 
various number systems listed above, may be thought of as instantiating the natural 
number structure in a way analogous to how roses, London buses and robins 
instantiate redness. Thus, any of the standard philosophical views about universals 
can be applied to structures. Shapiro (1997), for example, advocates an ante rem 
version of mathematical structuralism according to which structures are Platonic 
entities, ontologically independent from any systems which may instantiate them. 
Terms for mathematical entities, on this view, refer to places in the structure. 
Aristotelian in rebus mathematical structuralism, by contrast, construes structures as 
universals which exist only in the concrete systems that instantiate them. Structures, 
on this Aristotelian view, ontologically depend upon concrete systems. Finally, 
eliminativist mathematical structuralists deny, contrary to both ante rem and in rebus 
structuralism, that structures, qua universals, really exist. Instead, they maintain that 
talk of structure is just shorthand for generalizations over various concrete systems 
with structural properties in common.  
  As will become evident later in this section, Yates’ claim that properties 
compose a structure is only relevant insofar as it implies that the structure 
ontologically depends upon the properties. Hence, I will rephrase the original 
question thusly: in other structuralisms, it would perhaps be inappropriate to talk 
in terms of structure ontologically depending on some entities, so why interpret 
structuralism about properties in this way? Of the three versions of mathematical 
structuralism briefly outlined above, only the Aristotelian in rebus version makes 
the structure ontologically dependent upon some entities (though as Shapiro notes, 
no one seems to have developed this view in detail). It is hard to see how to answer 
the question with respect to eliminativism since, strictly speaking, according to the 
80 
 
eliminativist there are no structures to ontologically depend on anything. In 
Shapiro’s ante rem structuralism, however, it is made explicit that the structure is 
ontologically independent of anything that may instantiate it – ante rem structures 
are Platonic entities, which would exist whether or not there was anything to 
instantiate them. So, in a similar vein to the ante rem mathematical structuralist, the 
structuralist about properties may posit the structure as an ontologically 
independent Platonic entity that properties instantiate. On this construal, it would 
be false to say that the structure ontologically depends on properties (or anything 
else).  
 According to (extreme versions of) ontic structural realism (OSR), 
individuals are eliminated from the ontology in favour of an ontologically primitive 
relational structure (e.g., French and Ladyman 2003; Ladyman et al. 2007). Prima 
facie talk about individuals is then understood as merely abstracting from the 
fundamental relational structure. Since, on this view, structure is all there is, it 
certainly is not the case that the structure ontologically depends on anything else. 
Perhaps, then, the structuralist about properties could say something similar, 
namely, that a relational structure is all there is to properties, in which case it would 
be false to say that this structure ontologically depends on properties, or anything 
else. However, this interpretation of structuralism about properties would share 
with the extreme version of OSR a commitment to relations without relata, which is 
something that many have found objectionable (e.g., Chakravartty 1998, 2003b; 
Psillos 2006a).  
 What this brief survey of other structuralisms suggests is that talk of the 
structure being composed of, or otherwise ontologically dependent upon, some 
entities can be resisted. However, the structuralisms discussed that achieve this – 
Shapiro’s ante rem mathematical structuralism and extreme OSR – get ontologically 
independent structures only by incurring certain costs; the former is committed to 
Platonism and the second to relations without relata. It is open to the structuralist 
about properties to either embrace Platonism or relations without relata to secure 
the ontological independence of her structure, however, neither of these views, I 
suggest, is particularly attractive.  
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The unattractiveness of relations without relata straightforwardly depends 
on the idea’s affront to common sense. This is expressed, for example, by 
Chakravartty when he says that “one cannot intelligibly subscribe to the reality of 
relations unless one is also committed to the fact that some things are related” (1998, 
399). However, Bird himself expresses some sympathy for a Platonic conception of 
universals. He seems to think that Platonism is required for strong necessitarianism – 
the view according to which all possible worlds are identical with respect to the 
laws of nature (2007, sec. 3.2) – and he does not rule strong necessitarianism out as a 
viable position. Furthermore, Tugby (2013) argues that only when accompanied by 
Platonism can a dispositional essentialist account of properties properly respect the 
following platitudes:  
 
instantiation: a particular can instantiate a disposition even if that disposition 
is never manifest 
and 
intrinsic: many dispositional properties are intrinsic to their possessors.  
 
Unfortunately, it would lead me too far astray to thoroughly discuss these 
arguments of Bird and Tugby, I shall, however, offer some brief comments. Firstly, 
it is important to note that the attraction of dispositional essentialism in large part 
inheres in its ability to provide an account of fundamental properties, such as 
charge, mass, spin, etc., in a way that is continuous with science and to account for 
laws of nature in terms of those unmysterious, science friendly entities. But the 
introduction of Platonic transcendent universals – entities that are shrouded in 
mystery and which do not seem to be within the remit of science – would remove 
this selling-point. To concede Platonism would greatly compromise what many, 
myself included, perceive as the strongest motivation for dispositional essentialism. 
Hence, Bird should perhaps dial back his Platonist sympathies.  
In response to Tugby, one might argue that it is far from obvious that failure 
to respect (philosopher’s) “platitudes” about dispositions places sufficient pressure 
on the dispositional essentialist to embrace Platonism, where Platonism arguably 
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conflicts with commonplace, as well as scientific, intuitions about what exists and 
the nature of what exists. In other words, it is not obvious that a failure to respect 
instantiation and/or intrinsic comes at a greater intuitive cost than admitting that 
there exists a Platonic realm populated by necessarily existing, transcendent 
properties.  
So, in the interest of not lumbering the structuralist with either relations 
without relata or Platonism, it would seem reasonable to follow Yates’ 
understanding of structure as ontologically dependent upon the properties that 
“compose” it. Though it is perhaps not uncontroversial that composition is the 
appropriate notion with which to cash out this ontological dependence, to properly 
address this point would lead me too far astray. I shall thus follow Yates in talking 
of properties composing a structure but the minimum that is intended by this is the 
idea that the structure ontologically depends (in some way or other) upon the 
properties. In other words, it seems plausible that properties ground a structure.  
Grounding is widely understood as a metaphysical (that is, objective/non-
epistemic)  explanatory relation (Fine 2012a, 2015). The grounding relation is 
primarily expressed with the terms “in virtue of” (predicational view) or “because” 
(operational view) (Correia and Schnieder 2012, 10–11). Thus (assuming that the 
grounding relation can hold between entities) x grounds y iff y exists in virtue of x 
and it is metaphysically necessary if x exists then y exists (see Yates 2017, 19). For 
example, the set {Socrates} exists in virtue of the man, Socrates, and it is 
metaphysically necessary that if Socrates exists then {Socrates} exists too. Thus, we 
might say that the existence of Socrates metaphysically explains the existence of 
{Socrates} (but not vice versa). It is also widely held that grounding is transitive and 
irreflexive and that the ordering thus induced is a relative fundamentality ordering 
such that a grounded entity is less fundamental than its grounds; if x grounds y, 
then x is more fundamental than y. According to, e.g., Schaffer (2012, 125) it is 
useful to think of grounding as a relative fundamentality ordering in this way 
because it imposes metaphysical structure on the world and helps with the 
formulation of interesting philosophical theses such as physicalism – the thesis that 




3.5.2  Symmetrically Grounding Properties and Structure 
Properties, according to structuralism, are individuated by their positions in a 
structure grounded by those very properties. Now we may ask (as Yates 2017, 23 
does): which is more fundamental, the structure or the properties? Metaphysical 
individuation is a grounding relation; if A metaphysically individuates B, then B 
ontologically depends on A. And if grounding is a relative fundamentality relation, 
then structure must be more fundamental than properties because structure 
metaphysically individuates and hence grounds the properties. But, as argued 
above, unless one is happy to embrace either Platonism or the controversial thesis 
that there exist relations without relata, then structuralism seems to imply that 
properties ground the structure, which, again assuming that grounding is a relative 
fundamentality relation, implies that properties are more fundamental than the 
structure. We have thus arrived at the absurd result that properties are more 
fundamental than structure and structure is more fundamental than properties. This 
absurdity was yielded by the following premises: 
 
i) Ground is a strict partial order (it is transitive, irreflexive and 
asymmetric) from the more to the less fundamental; if a grounds b, 
then a is more fundamental than b. 
ii) Properties ground the structure. 
iii) The structure metaphysically individuates, and hence grounds, the 
properties. 
 
The structuralist is pushed to embrace premise ii) in order to avoid 
Platonism or a commitment to relations without relata (as argued above). And 
premise iii) is at the very heart of structuralism: to deny that properties are 
metaphysically individuated by their place in a structure because they are, say, self-
individuating (as per QDE), would just be to deny structuralism. According to Yates 
(2017), then, the best way for the structuralist to resolve the absurdity is to maintain 
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that properties and structure are equifundamental and symmetrically grounded in 
each other, which is to deny i).  
In support of this suggestion, Yates point out that, unorthodox though it 
may be, there is no purely ground-theoretical objection to the idea that ground is 
non-asymmetric and hence to the idea that i) is false. For example, Rodriguez-
Pereyra (2015) offers the following counterexample to the asymmetry of ground: if 
we let the proposition  E = <F is true> and F = <E is true> and assume both E and F 
are true, then the fact that E is true grounds the fact that F is true, and the fact that F 
is true grounds the fact that E is true (2015, 529) (see also Thompson 2016, 47). And 
Thompson (2016) suggests that an organism is partially constituted by its organs 
and that organs are identity dependent on the roles they play within the organism. 
On the assumption that constitution and identity dependence are grounding 
relations, it follows that the organism and its organs are symmetrically grounding 
(see also Yates 2017, 20). Furthermore, Yates argues that ontic structural realism is 
best understood in terms of objects and structure symmetrically grounding each 
other (Yates 2017, 22–23). Structuralism is thus not peculiar for implying the non-
asymmetry of ground.  
 
3.5.3  Symmetrically Grounding Properties and Laws 
Even if there is no purely ground-theoretic objection to denying premise i), I’d like 
to suggest that it forces the dispositional essentialist (where recall that dispositional 
essentialism includes a structuralist view of properties) into an uncomfortable 
position. Part of the attraction of anti-quidditist views in general is the promise of a 
metaphysical explanation of laws of nature. A thought common among anti-
quidditist metaphysics is (roughly) that if properties are powerful because they are 
essentially connected with the behaviours that they confer upon their bearers, then 
one can account for the most general patterns in property distributions – of laws – in 
terms of those powerful properties themselves. Dispositional essentialism is touted 
as superior to best systems analyses of laws (e.g., Lewis 1994; Lewis 2001) and so 
called nomic necessitation accounts (e.g., Dretske 1977; Tooley 1977; Armstrong 1999) 
because the former do not endow the laws with the metaphysical “oomph” and 
85 
 
hence explanatory power that we take them to have, and the latter render the laws 
mysterious external governing forces.  
Now consider the following remarks from Bird concerning the relationship 
between properties and laws:  
 
Since laws flow from the essences of potencies, they must hold in every possible 
world (Bird 2007, 5, my emphasis) (recall that by “potencies” Bird means 
fundamental, essentially dispositional, properties).  
 
If properties have a dispositional essence then certain relations will hold of 
necessity between the relevant universals; these relations we may identify with 
the laws of nature. (Bird 2007, 43, my emphasis)  
 
laws are general relations among properties (Bird 2007, 200, my emphasis)  
 
laws are general relationships (Bird 2007, 202, my emphasis) 
 
laws reflect the essential rather than accidental features of potencies and 
kinds (Bird 2007, 202)  
 
What is clear from these remarks is that Bird takes the laws to be general 
relationships between properties, which “reflect” or “flow from” the essences of 
those properties. Since M-relations are relations among properties, which constitute 
(according to structuralism and hence according to dispositional essentialism) the 
essences of those properties, M-relations would certainly seem to fit the bill here.  
To be clear, the claim is not that M-relations hold between particular 
property instances, rather, M-relations are general relations that hold between, and 
constitute the essences of, properties themselves and thus have implications for the 
behaviours of instances of those properties. What is eminently plausible, then, is that 
M-relations, that is, the manifestation relations in which properties stand to each 
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other, just are the laws, according to the dispositional essentialist – this is 
particularly consonant with the second of the quotes from Bird above.15  
Another dispositional essentialist who is even more explicit about the idea 
that laws are just relations between essentially dispositional properties is 
Chakravartty:   
 
[N]ot only are laws composed of relations between causal properties; they 
distinguish and identify properties as well. (2003a, 394) 
 
In a world inhabited by different causal properties, the relations we would 
there describe as causal laws would be, ipso facto, different as well. (2003a, 
402) 
 
Causal laws are never vacuous in principle, given that they are relations 
between causal properties. (2003a, 405)  
 
It would thus seem to be a popular dispositional essentialist move to identify M-
relations, which are arcs in the property structure, with the laws of nature.  
Now, if you fix the M-relations, viz. laws, at a world, w, you fix the property 
structuralist’s structure at w. If we let [M] denote the plurality of M-relations/laws at 
a world, w, and let S denote the property structure at w, then we may ask the 
following question: what is the relationship between [M] and S? Answer: identity. 
The plurality of M-relations at a world, w, just is the structure at w. 
If the collection of M-relations, [M], at a world, w, and the property 
structure, S, at w are identical, then anything true of S must be true of [M] too. 
According to structuralism, the structure, S, at w grounds the properties at w 
because it metaphysically individuates them. But if S grounds the properties at w 
then [M] must ground properties at w too, since S and [M] are identical. But M-
relations, I have argued, just are the structuralist’s laws. Thus, the collection of M-
                                                     
15 Of course, since Bird understands dispositional properties in terms of their stimulus and manifestation 
conditions, it would be more accurate to attribute to Bird the view that laws are three-placed relations between 
stimulus, potency and manifestation. But nothing of substance hangs on this.   
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relations at w, [M], is just a collection of laws. To say that [M] grounds properties, 
then, just is to say that laws ground properties, on the structuralist picture. To be 
clear, the argument runs as follows: 
 
i) S=[M] 
ii) [M] is a collection of laws  
iii) S grounds properties  (central tenet of structuralism) 
iv) [M] grounds properties   (from i, iii and Leibniz’s Law) 
v) Laws ground properties   (from ii and iv)  
 
But this is antagonistic to any explanatory aspirations that the dispositional 
essentialist may have to explain laws in terms of properties. As mentioned, 
grounding is plausibly understood as an explanatory relation distinct from, but 
analogous to, say, causation (Fine 2012a, sec. 1), see also Schaffer (2016); just as one 
may explain some fact A by saying that some temporally prior fact B caused it, one 
may explain A in terms of B by saying that B grounds A. An explanation of A in 
terms of B will not do, however, if in order to explain B, we must appeal to A – this 
kind of circularity of explanation is vicious. The type of explanation of the laws that 
the dispositional essentialist should seek to provide is a grounding explanation 
whereby essentially powerful properties ground laws. But if laws ground 
properties too, the explanation is circular and, thus, arguably fails to satisfy a key 
motivation for dispositional essentialism, which was to explain laws in terms of 
properties, not vice versa.  
Perhaps the most obvious response to the symmetrical grounding problem 
for DE would be to deny that laws are identical with M-relations and maintain 
instead that laws are universal generalizations of the form ∀x(Fx→Gx). Bird himself 
canvasses this option: “According to the regularity version of dispositional 
essentialism about laws, laws are those regularities whose truth is guaranteed by 
the essentially dispositional nature of one or more of the constituent properties” 
(Bird 2007, 46–47). While it is plausible that the plurality of M-relations grounds 
properties for the reasons discussed, it does not seem to be the case that a collection 
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of regularities of the form ∀x(Fx→Gx), that is, of linguistic entities, ground 
properties. Regularities are not identical with M-relations. The property structure 
can asymmetrically ground regularities, so by taking the laws to be identical with 
such regularities, the problem of symmetrically grounded laws and properties does 
not get going.  
As mentioned, Bird entertains the option of identifying laws with 
regularities. However, he entertains this possibility only very briefly in a single 
paragraph, which is directly followed by a more detailed examination of the option 
of treating laws as relations between properties. And in the quotes presented above, 
Bird certainly seems to lean heavily towards the view of laws as relations. Bird’s 
official statement of what the laws are comes near the end of his book when he says:  
 
The laws of a domain are the fundamental, general explanatory relationships 
between kinds, quantities, and qualities of that domain, that supervene upon 
the essential natures of those things. (Bird 2007, 201, my emphasis).  
 
Here Bird explicitly identifies laws with relationships, though the reference to 
supervenience perhaps complicates things a bit. If A supervenes on B, that just 
means that there can be no change in A without a corresponding change in B. M-
relations are general relationships between properties that constitute the essences of 
properties. This gives rise to necessary connections between properties and the M-
relations that constitute their essences. Since M-relations are necessarily connected 
with the properties that they relate and whose essences they constitute, there can be 
no change in the pattern of M-relations without a corresponding change in what 
properties exist, thus it is accurate (though perhaps not the full story) to say that M-
relations supervene on properties. 
Chakravartty (2003a) argues that the dispositional essentialist ought to 
identify laws with relations among properties as opposed to regularities on the 
grounds that doing so yields a response to the problem of vacuous laws. Many 
laws, such as the ideal gas law: PV = nRT, are vacuous because they apply to 
systems that do not exist – there are no ideal gasses anywhere in the universe. If 
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laws are identified with regularities, such as PV = nRT, then these laws will come out 
vacuous, which seems odd. But, if we identify laws not with regularities, but with 
relations between properties, we can avoid the result that idealisation laws, which 
are ubiquitous, are vacuous. This way, Chakravartty argues, vacuity can be 
understood as attaching to linguistic entities, viz. regularities, whereas the laws 
themselves, understood as relations between properties, such as M-relations, will 
not be vacuous because they will hold so long as the relevant property structure is 
instantiated at a world.   
To sum up this subsection: it is clearly very tempting for the structuralist to 
identify laws of nature with M-relations, that is, arcs in the property structure. 
Doing so, however, threatens to compromise the structuralist’s explanatory 
aspirations.   
 
3.5.4  QDE vs. Structuralism: Checking the Score 
Let’s take a moment to take stock and compare the merits of QDE and structuralism 
and the implications for dispositional essentialism. 
In section 3.5.2, I showed that the conjunction of three premises:   
 
i) Ground is a strict partial order (it is transitive, irreflexive and 
asymmetric) from the more to the less fundamental; if a grounds b, 
then a is more fundamental than b. 
ii) Properties ground the structure. 
iii) The structure metaphysically individuates, and hence grounds, the 
properties. 
 
leads to an absurdity according to which properties and structure are each more 
fundamental than the other. It was argued that the structuralist’s best option for 
avoiding this flat contradiction is to deny premise i) and maintain that properties 
and structure are equifundamental and symmetrically grounded in each other.  
Another option out of the absurdity is to reject structuralism in favour of 
QDE, the view that properties are self-individuating qualities that ground 
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dispositions and hence ground a structure of relations. This constitutes the denial of 
premise iii). Properties, according to QDE, are not ontologically dependent upon 
any structure of M-relations among properties, or dispositions, because they are not 
metaphysically individuated by their position in any such structure. Properties, 
according to QDE, are self-individuating – their essences can be specified 
independently of any relations or dispositions. This is much the same as the way in 
which the essences of geometrical properties, such as sphericity, can be specified 
independently of any relations or dispositions: “For an individual x to be spherical 
is for x to have a boundary surface all points on which are equidistant from a given 
point” (Lowe 2010, 19). Thus, QDE is not, where structuralism is, committed to 
symmetrical grounding. By rejecting premise iii) and endorsing QDE, one can retain 
the assumption that ground is a strict partial order. If one is particularly wedded to 
the asymmetry of ground, then this constitutes a reason to favour QDE over 
structuralism. Furthermore, these results show that QDE is committed to fewer 
ontologically basic entities than structuralism. Structuralism is at least committed to 
properties and structure, whereas QDE need only posit properties. Thus, given 
QDE, properties can be our sole primitive in terms of which other phenomena, such 
as dispositions, laws, and modality are explained.  
It was suggested that a commitment to symmetrical grounding is not 
devastating per se because various authors have proposed counterexamples to the 
asymmetry of ground. However, the symmetrical grounding ushered in by 
structuralism does have a devastating result for dispositional essentialism, where 
“dispositional essentialism” refers to the specific combination of a structuralist 
metaphysic of properties and a view of laws of nature as arcs in the structure, or M-
relations. Dispositional essentialism, it turns out, cannot non-circularly explain laws 
in terms of properties because laws and properties are symmetrically grounded in 
each other. QDE presents a way of rescuing something of the dispositional 
essentialist package. Plausibly, given QDE, properties ground a structure of M-
relations among properties without themselves being ontologically dependent upon 
that structure; properties, according to QDE, asymmetrically ground a structure. If 
we continue to assume that M-relations are laws, QDE, allows for properties to 
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asymmetrically ground and, hence, provide a non-circular metaphysical 
explanation of the laws.  
As it happens, I will present (in chapter 4) a different account of the laws of 
nature and how they stand in relation to basic properties. On my account, laws are 
not M-relations, rather, they are features of a strong, simple description of all 
possible property distributions. This, I will argue, captures the idea that there is a 
pragmatic dimension to the laws’ status as laws; laws are those true generalizations 
that are particularly useful to us in our practical and scientific pursuits. M-relations, 
by contrast, will often be highly specific and limited in scope.  
The considerations of this section thus constitute a case against dispositional 
essentialism understood very specifically as an attempt to explain laws in terms of 
properties and which endorses a structuralist metaphysic of properties and 
according to which laws are M-relations. The considerations of this section also 
constitute a case in favour of QDE over structuralism; they show that QDE avoids a 
commitment to symmetrical grounding, which while not a deal-breaker, is an 
oddity that is perhaps best avoided if possible. And relatedly, the considerations of 
this section also show that QDE is committed to fewer ontologically basic entities 
than structuralism. Structuralism is committed to properties and structure both 
being basic, whereas QDE need only be committed to properties at the ground-floor 
level.  
What I do not wish to claim, however, is that we should opt for QDE over 
structuralism on the grounds that the former, and not the latter, allows properties to 
asymmetrically ground laws qua M-relations. This is because, contra the 
dispositional essentialist, I do not think that M-relations are plausible candidates for 
laws anyway and so rescuing an account according to which M-relations are laws 
and are explained in terms of properties does not motivate me. Furthermore, it is 
open to the structuralist to deny that M-relations are laws. They might, instead, take 
laws to be descriptions of the property structure. Thus, while the properties and 
structure symmetrically ground each other, they might each be said to 
asymmetrically ground the laws qua descriptions. It’s important to emphasize, then, 
that the symmetrically grounded laws and properties concern targets only the 
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specific combination of views constitutive of dispositional essentialism and does not 
itself tell in favour of QDE over structuralism. As mentioned earlier, I take the 
symmetrically grounded laws and properties concern to be a more precise 
articulation of the vague sense of dissatisfaction with dispositional essentialism’s 
strategy of building laws into property essences and then claiming to explain the 
laws in terms of those very essences.  
 
3.6 Qualitative Dispositional Properties  
In this chapter, I have presented three reasons to favour QDE over structuralism as 
a metaphysic of properties:  
 
1. QDE is better placed than structuralism to provide an explanation of the 
spacetime distribution of property instances (argued in sections 3.3 and 3.4). 
2. QDE is not, where structuralism is, committed to the non-asymmetry of 
ground (argued in section 3.5). 
3. QDE is committed to fewer ontologically basic entities than structuralism 
(argued in section 3.5). 
 
It was also argued, in section 3.5, that dispositional essentialism, which incorporates 
a structuralist metaphysic of properties, cannot non-circularly explain laws in terms 
of properties. Though I concede that this argument does not necessarily tell in 
favour of QDE over structuralism, it only tells against the specific combination of 
views constitutive of dispositional essentialism. But for all that has been said in 
favour of QDE, perhaps there is still opacity to the suggestion that qualities ground 
dispositions.  
QDE, on my preferred construal, explains the space-time distribution of 
properties in terms of those properties grounding certain dispositions, which, I have 
suggested, is tantamount to their grounding certain possibilities for their bearers. 
For example, if x instantiates fragility, then possibly x instantiates shattering, or, if x 
instantiates positive charge, then possibly x instantiates the property of accelerating 
towards an instance of negative charge. The possibility in the latter case is 
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“stronger” than that in the former case because the relevant potentiality is a lower-
level potentiality and so only possessed to a particularly high degree (see section 
3.2). The opacity concern is a challenge to add plausibility to the claim that qualities 
ground dispositions/possibilities. As Tugby puts it “…opponents […] might object 
[…] that the alleged internal connection between qualities and dispositions is itself 
pretty opaque.” (2012, 729).  
Recall that the explanatory challenge for structuralism (section 3.3) was a 
challenge to say why it is that in all worlds in which, e.g., M(F, G) = the fact that the 
M-relation holds between F and G, holds, the regularity R = the fact that if x is F 
then x is disposed to manifest G, holds too (see Barker and Smart 2012). This 
challenge forced the structuralist to either embrace regress or say that it is just a 
brute fact that necessarily whenever M(F, G) holds, R holds. The latter option, it was 
complained, is unsatisfactory because to posit a brute necessary connection in this 
way is unexplanatory and against the spirit of dispositional essentialism (and 
besides, the same strategy would rescue the Armstrongian view, to which 
structuralism was proposed as a superior alternative). But is it really any more 
explanatory to say that, e.g., positive charge, qua quality in the QDE sense, grounds 
a disposition to accelerate towards instances of negative charge than to say that 
there is a brute necessary connection between the relevant properties? I’ll attempt to 
answer the latter question in the affirmative by adding independent plausibility to 
this grounding claim.  
There is, I suggest, a difference between merely stipulative grounding claims 
and grounding claims that are not merely stipulative because they enjoy some 
intuitive support too. Consider the following: 
 
a) Socrates grounds {Socrates} 
b) The fact that the ball is red and the fact that the ball is round ground the 
fact that the ball is red and round (Fine 2012a).  
 
The grounding claims in a) and b) are not merely stipulative, they needn’t just be 
taken on faith, because they are intuitively plausible. Now the concern according to 
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which the claim that qualities ground dispositions is opaque is, I suggest, a concern 
that this grounding claim is merely stipulative. Unlike a) and b), the claim that, e.g., 
positive charge (understood as a quality) grounds a disposition to accelerate 
towards instances of negative charge enjoys no intuitive support – it must just be 
taken on faith, or so the objection may go. And if we must take this grounding claim 
on pure faith, then QDE would seem to be in no better position than structuralism 
complete with brute necessary connections.  
However, the idea of qualities grounding dispositions is not opaque in 
general. Geometrical properties, such as sphericity, are generally taken to be 
paradigm qualitative properties. Sphericity can be individuated and understood 
completely independently of any dispositions it may confer or any relations in 
which it may stand to other properties. For an individual x to be spherical is for x to 
have a boundary surface all points on which are equidistant from a given point 
(Lowe 2010, 19). Sphericity also (partially) grounds possibilities for its bearers; x’s 
sphericity is a (partial) ground of the possibility that x rolls down an incline, that x 
casts an elliptical shadow, that x looks spherical under normal conditions (the 
ground is partial because x must also be heavy, rigid, etc. in order to roll and it must 
not be completely see-through in order to cast a shadow or be seen). The claim that 
sphericity grounds the possibility of rolling is completely transparent – we can just 
intuitively “see” how it is in virtue of x’s sphericity that x can roll. Thus, we may 
add to our list of grounding claims that are not merely stipulative, because they 
enjoy some intuitive support: 
 
c) The fact that x is spherical grounds the fact that x can roll. 
 
Now I suggest that the claim that, e.g., positive charge (qua quality in the 
QDE sense) grounds a disposition to accelerate towards instances of negative 
charge enjoys additional plausibility given that there are claims of ground obtaining 
between quality and disposition, which are very intuitive, as illustrated by c). There 
is no obstacle in principle to qualities grounding dispositions and indeed such 
grounding claims are eminently plausible when the quality concerned is a familiar 
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geometrical property. Since positive charge and sphericity are both qualities, and 
since the latter so clearly grounds a disposition, it seems at least plausible that the 
former ground dispositions too, as indeed QDE maintains it does. Compare this 
with the following grounding claim: 
 
PHYS: the physical grounds the mental.  
 
PHYS, I suggest, doesn’t enjoy the sort of eminent plausibility enjoyed by claims a-
c. Nor even is there any intuitively plausible grounding claim analogous to PHYS, 
which may indirectly lend support to PHYS. Sphericity grounding rolling is 
analogous to positive charge grounding acceleration towards negative charge 
because both are cases of qualities grounding dispositions and, hence, the intuitive 
plausibility of the former indirectly supports the latter. No such case can be made 
for PHYS. PHYS perhaps gains support via its various theoretical virtues, but aside 
from those, it is merely stipulative. And yet PHYS is widely accepted. The claim, 
central to QDE, that qualities ground dispositions, is in at least as good a state as 
PHYS –  both enjoy support from their theoretical virtues. However, the former 
gains additional support from the observation that it is analogous to a very 
intuitively plausible grounding claim. I thus suggest that any opacity there may be 
to the claim that low-level properties, such as positive charge, qua qualities, ground 
dispositions is not sufficient reason to reject such grounding claims outright. QDE 
gains support from its various theoretical virtues and from the observation that 
there are cases in which a quality grounding a disposition is utterly transparent.  
 Now reconsider the question above: is it really any more explanatory to say 
that, e.g., positive charge, qua quality in the QDE sense, grounds a disposition to 
accelerate towards instances of negative charge than to say that there is a brute 
necessary connection between M(F, G) and R? That is to say, is QDE really any 
better off than structuralism with brute necessary connections? I note first that QDE 
is at least dialectically superior. According to structuralism, it is ultimately the 
second order relational facts that do the work of governing first order property 
instantiations, which perhaps runs counter to the dispositional essentialist desire to 
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endow the first order properties themselves with this constraining power (see 
Tugby 2012, 726). Furthermore, it is just as open to the Armstrongian to posit brute 
necessary connections in response to the kind of regress discussed in section 2, so 
structuralism, it would seem, is really no better off than the Armstrongian view to 
which it was proposed as a superior alternative. What is more, it is not open to the 
Armstrongian to ground dispositions in the essences (qualitative or otherwise) of 
properties because he is committed to a version of quidditism according to which 
properties have no non-trivial essential natures capable of entering into any such 
grounding relations (see Tugby 2012, 729). Properties, according to Armstrong, are 
just primitively numerically self-identical and distinct from each other, thus there 
are no qualitative differences among properties, which could account for different 
properties being grounds for different dispositions. So QDE, unlike structuralism, is 
able to explain facts about property instantiations at space-time regions in a manner 
that is not available to the Armstrongian.  
But in light of the considerations of this section, I think it is fair to say that 
QDE is not merely dialectically superior to structuralism. The claim that, say, 
positive charge grounds a disposition to accelerate towards instances of negative 
charge is (slightly) more explanatory than the claim that there is a brute necessary 
connection between M(F, G) and the regularity R. This is because the former, unlike 
the latter, enjoys some (modest) indirect support from the fact that in there are other 
cases in which it is eminently plausible that a quality grounds a disposition, such as 
the case of sphericity grounding rolling.    
 
3.7  Scepticism  
In addition to the opacity concern, there is a potential sceptical worry for QDE 
which arises because QDE appears to be consistent with its being the case that two 
or more properties ground the exact same range of dispositions.  
QDE is reminiscent of what Hawthorne calls the ‘double aspect view’. (2001, 
362).  According to the double aspect view, properties are dispositional, but the 
dispositional aspect of a property, P, does not exhaust P’s nature. P has a non-
dispositional, or qualitative, aspect too. Hawthorne takes this view to be consistent 
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with the possibility that two qualitatively distinct properties, P and P’, both 
essentially confer the exact same dispositions. Similarly, according to Tugby, it is 
consistent with QDE that “two properties could confer certain powers essentially, 
yet also be distinct in virtue of some qualitative, categorical difference” (2012, 727). 
Smith (2016) considers the view that she calls non-recombinatorial quidditism, 
according to which: “distinct fundamental properties are qualitatively different 
despite the fact that those qualitative differences are primitive and unanalysable” 
and “qualitative differences between fundamental properties […] place restrictions 
on the ways in which instantiations of the fundamental properties can be 
recombined in space and time.”(2016, 249–50). This view differs from structuralism 
in that the identity and distinctness of properties is determined not on the basis of 
the dispositions they confer/their nomological roles, but by the distinct qualitative 
natures that they are. Nevertheless, qualities, according to non-recombinatorial 
quidditism, ground dispositions. (Smith 2016, 250–51). Smith’s non-recombinatorial 
quidditism is thus, I submit, very close to QDE, if not just the same view by another 
name. And, crucially, non-recombinatorial quidditism, according to Smith, does not 
rule out the possibility that distinct fundamental properties confer the exact same 
set of dispositions (Smith uses the term nomological profiles) (Smith 2016, 251, 256).   
The possibility that distinct properties are responsible for the same 
dispositions does “serious damage to our concept of a property”, according to Bird 
(2007, 77) (see also chapter 1, section 1.2.2).  We might take ourselves to understand 
the concept of, say, positive charge as the property responsible for a disposition to 
accelerate towards instances of negative charge. Hence, we plausibly fix the 
reference of theoretical terms, such as “positive charge” via dispositions – “positive 
charge” refers to the property in virtue of which individuals are disposed to 
accelerate towards instances of negative charge. But if it is possible that two or more 
distinct properties are responsible for the disposition to accelerate towards instances 
of negative charge, then, as Smith puts it, we would have no conception of the 
properties that satisfy the predicate “positive charge” (see Smith 2016, 256). In other 
words, if two or more properties are responsible for the disposition to accelerate 
towards instances of negative charge, then our theoretical term “positive charge”, 
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explicated as the property responsible for the disposition to accelerate towards 
instances of negative charge, will fail to get its reference fixed (compare the failure 
of reference of “the player on the pitch” when uttered by a fan in attendance at an 
11-a-side football match). Since we cannot know whether ours is a world in which 
two or more properties are responsible for the dispositions associated with positive 
charge, we cannot know whether our theoretical term “positive charge” is 
referential. And there is nothing unique about “positive charge” in this respect, the 
point will extend to other theoretical terms for fundamental properties. According 
to Bird:  
 
The possibility of reference-failure of theoretical terms is not itself a problem 
– we know this possibility to be actualized in some cases. What is worrying 
is the thought that we can never know that the possibility is not actualized 
for any theoretical term – we never know whether any such term refers. 
(2007, 77) 
 
 Plausibly, properties such as positive charge are responsible for various 
dispositions/behaviours/possibilities (I use these interchangeably in the present 
context). For example, a positively charged individual, x, can, in virtue of being 
positively charged, accelerate towards instances of negative charge, but x can also 
radiate electromagnetic radiation if accelerated. Call the set of all and only the 
possibilities grounded by a given property, P, the modal profile of P. Thus, included 
in the modal profile of positive charge are the properties of accelerating towards an 
instance of negative charge and emitting electromagnetic radiation. Beyond the 
possibility that distinct properties ground the same disposition, the considerations 
above would seem to suggest that two (or more) distinct properties, e.g. P and P’, 
could share the exact same modal profile because P grounds all and only the 
dispositions that P’ grounds. Hence, we could never know if we have found a set of 
dispositions uniquely grounded by a single property via which we might establish a 
conception of the property and the reference of a theoretical term. The scepticism, it 
would seem, is irremediable in principle because no matter how many dispositions 
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we associate with a property and how much better we take our conception of “that 
property” to be, we cannot know whether or not we are indeed dealing with 
multiple distinct properties. 
This sceptical worry is linked to the opacity concern. If the grounding 
relation between, e.g., quality, Q, and modal profile, MPQ, is opaque, which is to say 
that its holding must just be taken on faith, then granting that such a grounding 
relation does obtain does nothing to rule out the possibility that some distinct 
quality, Q’, also grounds MPQ. If, however, the grounding relation were more 
transparent, then perhaps we could discern some reason to rule out the possibility 
of distinct properties having the same modal profile. If no two properties could 
share the same modal profile, then we could at least hold out hope of discovering 
the full modal profile of a property and thereby settling our concept of the property 
and the reference of a theoretical term for the property via its unique modal profile. 
As discussed, the grounding relations between sphericity and the 
dispositions that constitute its modal profile are transparent in a way that the 
purported grounding relations between positive charge and the dispositions that 
constitute its modal profile are not (the arguments of this section apply equally to 
other low-level physical properties, such as mass, spin, etc.). We can just “see” how 
an individual’s sphericity is a ground of its possibly rolling down an incline, casting 
an elliptical shadow, looking spherical, etc. Hence, the opacity concern raised against 
QDE would not seem to apply to sphericity; there is nothing mysterious about a 
claim such as it is possible that x rolls down an incline in virtue of the fact that x is 
spherical. Is anything analogous to the sceptical concern for QDE applicable in the 
case of sphericity?  In other words, is it possible for two or more distinct properties 
to be have the exact same modal profile as sphericity? It certainly seems unlikely 
that it is. Other properties perhaps ground some of the dispositions that sphericity 
grounds; being egg-shaped or bagel-shaped perhaps ground possible rolling. 
Cylindricity perhaps grounds possible rolling, casting an elliptical shadow or even 
looking spherical – or at least circular (from the right angle anyway). But sphericity 
and cylindricity do not share the same modal profiles. A cylindrical object can also 
cast a rectangular shadow, depending on the position of the light source relative to 
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the cylinder and the surface on which the shadow is cast. Thus, cylindricity grounds 
a possibility that sphericity does not – sphericity and cylindricity have different 
modal profiles. It is, I suggest, difficult to conceive of a property having the exact 
same modal profile as sphericity without that property just being sphericity, and this 
at least lends some support to the idea that it is impossible for any property distinct 
from sphericity to have the same modal profile as sphericity.  
Now if “sphericity” is shorthand for “the property with such and such a 
modal profile” and if, as seems plausible from the above examples, no distinct 
property shares a modal profile with sphericity, then no sceptical concern arises for 
sphericity analogous to that raised for, e.g., positive charge, given QDE. It is 
eminently plausible that we are not irremediably ignorant of whether or not our 
term “sphericity” is referential.    
Why the difference between, e.g., positive charge and sphericity? Why is it that 
we can make sense of sphericity grounding rolling but not positive charge 
grounding acceleration towards negative charge? Why can we be relatively 
confident that no other property shares sphericity’s modal profile, yet we think it 
possible that multiple properties share the modal profile that we associate with 
positive charge? My suggestion is that these differences of opinion in each case are 
unfounded and should be rejected.  
In the case of sphericity, we can intuitively “see” how it grounds the 
dispositions constitutive of its modal profile and, hence, we struggle to conceive of 
a distinct property having the exact same modal profile as sphericity. Whereas in the 
case of positive charge we cannot intuitively “see” how it grounds the dispositions 
constitutive of its modal profile, so it appears to be possible that two or more 
properties have the exact same modal profile that we associate with positive charge. 
But we should not take this lack of intuitive (or optical) perception as conclusive 
evidence against the hypothesis that positive charge is nonetheless completely 
analogous to sphericity in these respects. On the contrary, it would be unfounded, I 
suggest, to admit that although sphericity and positive charge are both qualities, which 
ground dispositions, they are so different in this important respect. Just because 
positive charge is not accessible to our senses in the way that sphericity is, we 
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should not assume that it cannot, in virtue of its qualitative nature, explain the 
behaviours of positively charged individuals. Nor should we assume that it is 
possible that some quality distinct from positive charge grounded the exact same 
set of dispositions that positive charge grounds.  
The considerations of this section are far from knockdown arguments 
(though a piece of philosophy’s failing to constitute a knockdown argument should 
hardly count against it). Rather, they are merely intended to go at least some way 
towards quelling the concerns one may have with the idea that qualitative 
properties ground possibilities. This grounding claim is eminently plausible and 
does not lead to scepticism in the macroscopic case of sphericity, so why think 
things are different for low-level properties? The considerations of this section are 
thus intended just to add at least some plausibility to QDE. But in all honesty, if one 
takes the considerations of this section to add nothing at all, that is a shame but it is 
not devastating since the most important arguments for QDE came in earlier 
sections where it was shown how QDE avoids the explanatory regress and 
symmetrical grounding problems, which are faced by structuralism. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
I have bolstered the case for qualitative dispositional essentialism (QDE) by showing 
how it is superior to structuralism in three respects: i) it avoids Barker and Smart’s 
“ultimate argument” (2012) ii) it avoids commitment to symmetrical grounding and 
relatedly, iii) it is committed to fewer ontologically basic entities than structuralism. 
I have also used the examination of structuralism to show that dispositional 
essentialism cannot provide a non-circular explanation of laws in terms of 
properties. Finally, I attempted to dispel concerns that the claim that qualities 
ground dispositions is opaque and, hence, leads to scepticism, by showing that such 






4.  HUMEAN LAWS IN AN UNHUMEAN 
WORLD16 
 
4.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, I present the details of my positive account of the laws of nature 
and, hence, my positive account of the relationship between laws and properties. I 
suggest that we be Humean about the laws, in the sense of providing 
metaphysically thin, and partly pragmatic, grounds for what it is for some 
proposition to constitute a law of nature, while also embracing the unHumean 
metaphysics of properties defended in chapter 3 (namely, QDE). The present 
account is in large part motivated by the concerns, discussed in the previous two 
chapters, of simply building laws into the essences of properties and then 
purporting to explain those very laws in terms of those very properties, as well as 
by the idea that there is a certain pragmatic basis for some proposition’s being 
elevated to the status of law. The view is also motivated by considerations in favour 
of denying R-quidditism (discussed in chapter 1) and by the belief that a thin view 
of laws is all that is needed once an anti-quidditist, conception of properties is 
embraced (see Demarest 2017). Interestingly, then, the best account of laws might 
turn out to be one which combines elements of the Humean and the anti-Humean 
views which have for a long time been in fierce disagreement.    
My discussion in this chapter shall proceed as follows. Section 4.2 frames the 
debate by providing some background on Humean laws and ontology in contrast 
with unHumean laws and ontology with the intention of highlighting how one’s 
ontology (be it Humean or unHumean) may affect what one has to say about the 
laws of nature. Section 4.3 anticipates a concern according to which it would be ill-
motivated to combine Humeanism about laws with an unHumean ontology, which, 
in turn, allows me to identify two desiderata on an account of laws deserving of the 
                                                     




name “best-system account”.  Section 4.4 discusses Heather Demarest’s pass at 
combining a Humean account of laws with an unHumean ontology. I’ll argue that 
Demarest’s Potency-BSA risks making the laws epistemically inaccessible to us. 
Section 4.5 suggests a revision to Demarest’s Potency-BSA, which I’ll argue avoids 
scepticism and satisfies the desiderata identified in section 4.3. Furthermore, I’ll 
argue that the specific combination of views advocated here, namely, QDE and the 
Revised Potency-BSA, is superior to the alternatives. Section 4.6 discusses a 
potential further benefit of my Revised Potency-BSA according to which it might 
evade the “Big Bad Bug” (Bigelow, Collins, and Pargetter 1993) that afflicts Lewis’ 
Humean laws-ontology package. And in section 4.7, to conclude, I explicitly 
address how the present view can overcome the problems raised for DE in chapter 
2.  
 
4.2  Background: Laws and Ontology 
 
4.2.1  Humean Laws and Ontology 
David Lewis popularized the combination of a neo-Humean ontology that he called 
“Humean Supervenience” and the best-system analysis of laws (BSA). I’ll briefly 
discuss these elements in turn. 
 
Humean Supervenience is named in honor of the greater [sic] denier of 
necessary connections. It is the doctrine that all there is to the world is a vast 
mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing and then 
another. (Lewis 1986, ix) 
 
Lewis refers to the “vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact” as the Humean 
Mosaic, I shall use this terminology in subsequent discussion.  
The basic properties countenanced by Humean Supervenience are quiddities; 
the Humean’s properties bear no necessary connections to their causal or 
nomological roles. The property charge, in our world, occupies a certain role; it 
confers upon its bearers a disposition to exert a force on other charged bodies in 
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accordance with Coulomb’s law. But, according to the quidditist, this role 
occupancy is thoroughly contingent. There are worlds in which charge confers no 
causal role at all, and worlds in which it plays the role that we at the actual world 
associate with mass (see chapter 1, section 1.2 for details). It is these quiddistic 
properties of, or instantiated at, points, and their spatiotemporal relations that make 
up Lewis’s neo-Humean ontology. 
Now imagine that God wanted to convey to us all the facts about the 
Humean Mosaic. To this end he might give us a big book that listed the 
spatiotemporal location of every fundamental property instance. But this would not 
be very useful for us insofar as we were interested in having the information readily 
accessible to our finite intellects. A better option might be to provide us with fewer, 
more general statements about the distribution of qualities throughout the Humean 
Mosaic, from which we could deduce additional information, not explicitly given. A 
more informative such systematization will have more basic statements, more 
axioms if you like. A simpler systematization will have fewer axioms but will 
sacrifice informativeness. Hence, the virtues of informativeness and simplicity of a 
system compete. According to the BSA, the fundamental laws are the axioms of the 
system that strikes the optimal informativeness-simplicity balance.  
Balancing the virtues of informativeness and simplicity in this way will 
involve a collective consideration of the mosaic as a whole:  
 
[A]n adequate analysis must be collective. It must treat regularities not one 
at a time, but rather as candidates to enter into integrated systems. (Lewis 
1983, 367, my emphasis) 
 
Adding to the system a statement like “all electrons are negatively charged” might 
increase complexity at little to no informative gain if this regularity followed from 
some more general statement of, say, quantum theory. The point is that the BSA 
treats regularities collectively as candidates to enter into an integrated system 
because matters of fact far beyond those concerning any given regularity, or the 
participants in a regularity, considered in isolation, will be relevant to that 
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regularity’s status (or lack thereof) as a law. This is an important feature of the BSA 
to which I shall return in section 4.3 when I consider how an account of laws in an 
unHumean world might be deserving of the name “BSA”.  
 
4.2.2  unHumean Laws and Ontology 
Any ontology that admits modal properties or necessary connections that do not 
reduce to some non-modal features of the ontology is unHumean. Two, quite 
different, examples of unHumean ontologies, already encountered, are 
Dispositional Essentialism (DE), e.g., Bird (2007) and the Nomic Necessitation view, 
e.g., Armstrong (1999).  
According to DE, fundamental properties are not quiddities because their 
nomological roles constitute their real essences. In all possible worlds, the property 
charge, for example, disposes its bearers to exert a force on other charged objects in 
accordance with Coulomb’s law because Coulomb’s law is part of the real essence 
of charge. There is no possibility of charge switching roles with mass on this view. 
Hence, Dispositional Essentialists maintain that there are necessary connections 
between properties and the laws of nature that constitute their essences (see 
chapters 1 and 2 for details).  
Another quite different way in which Humean Supervenience has been 
rejected is by Armstrong (1999) (see also Dretske 1977; Tooley 1977), who upholds 
quidditism about fundamental properties but introduces primitive necessitation 
relations between universals to account for laws. On this account, laws of the form 
“all Fs are Gs” are analysed in terms of a necessitation relation, N, which in this case 
holds between the universals F and G. The fact that the higher-order universal, N, 
connects the universals F and G is what makes it a law that all Fs are Gs, on this 
account.  
In each case, giving up Humean Supervenience is closely connected to the 
provision of a non-Humean account of laws. DE accounts for the laws in terms of 
the essences of properties that contain those laws and the Nomic Necessitation view 
accounts for the laws in terms of primitive, higher order, necessary connections 
between universals.  
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Among the positions outlined, two broad conceptions of natural law have 
been employed: a governance conception and a codification conception. Armstrong’s 
Nomic Necessitation view is a governance conception. It conceives of the laws – N’s 
– as imposed “pushers and pullers” of the stuff in the world. In the previous 
chapter, certain similarities between DE and the Armstrongian view were noted. In 
particular, it was shown that the dispositional essentialist’s M-relations play the 
same governing role as Armstrong’s N’s, which is what made DE vulnerable to the 
very issue that Bird (2005) raises for Armstrong’s view (see Barker and Smart 2012). 
Where N’s are external to the properties that they govern, M-relations are internal to 
properties because they constitute the real essences of those properties, but this 
does nothing to change the fact that M-relations govern. Furthermore, I argued, in 
chapter 3, that M-relations just are the dispositional essentialist’s laws. Hence, DE is 
plausibly interpreted as a governance conception. The BSA, by contrast, conceives 
of the laws as merely describing or codifying matters of fact. The laws, according to 
the BSA, have no prescriptive power over events, rather they describe, in a 
particularly efficient way, what goes on in the universe.  
 
4.3 A Concern About Motivation 
To uphold the thesis of Humean Supervenience is to maintain that everything 
supervenes on the arrangement of point-sized instances of categorical properties 
and the spatiotemporal relations between them. Within the scope of “everything” in 
the previous sentence are facts about the laws of nature. The BSA is plausibly 
understood as Lewis’s attempt to reconcile the appearance of necessity in nature, in 
the form of natural laws, with the claim that all facts, including those about laws, 
supervene on a sparse base that is absent any necessary connections or primitively 
modal properties. Lewis develops Ramsey’s idea that the laws are: “consequences 
of those propositions which we should take as axioms if we knew everything and 
organised it as simply as possible in a deductive system” (Ramsey 1990, 150, my 
emphasis). Lewis modifies Ramsey by replacing “everything” with “as much of 
everything as admits of simple organization”, otherwise everything would count as 
a law (Lewis 1994, 478). The crucial idea is that, according to the BSA, the laws take 
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into account facts about the mosaic considered collectively so that they may describe 
it in a way that best balances the virtues of simplicity and informativeness.  
If, however, one were to admit primitive modalities into one’s ontology, 
then it might seem unclear why one would, or indeed how one could, also defend a 
Humean account of laws, such as the BSA. We might distinguish two strands to this 
motivation concern: 
 
i) Why bother with the BSA if we are happy to admit primitive necessary 
connections, which seem capable of doing the work of accounting for 
laws?  
ii) Why think that the laws should form parts of an integrated 
systematization of the mosaic once primitive modalities are admitted?  
 
Regarding i), the objector I have in mind here is one with the intuition that 
laws govern, as opposed to codify, matters of fact in the universe. That this is a 
relatively widespread intuition is evidenced in Beebee’s (2000) survey of certain 
critiques of the BSA, which she argues miss the mark for failure to understand that 
the BSA is a non-governance conception of law. Furthermore, Mumford (2004) takes 
the lack of a governance role for laws as evidence for the claim that there are no 
laws.  
The Nomic Necessitation view of Armstrong is a paradigm governance view 
of laws. Armstrong sacrifices Humean Supervenience and provides the laws with a 
governing role by introducing necessitation relations between universals. Now if 
one were of the belief that the laws govern, then it might seem odd to happily admit 
unHumean whatnots (to use Lewis’s phrase) but not the right whatnots to yield a 
governing role for laws. In other words, the proponent of governance might 
wonder why, if we gladly surrender Humean Supervenience, we wouldn’t include 
in our ontology (something akin to) Armstrongian “pushers and pullers” to account 
for the laws. Now this would constitute significant departure from the BSA, which 
is a codification conception, but the motivation concern is a challenge to say why or 
how we should preserve the essence of the BSA given an unHumean ontology.  
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The thought behind ii) is that once irreducibly modal properties are 
admitted, there would be no need (or scope) to think of the laws as forming parts of 
an integrated system because they would follow from particular property instances 
considered in isolation from the rest of the universe. Recall that DE gives up 
Humean Supervenience by admitting basic properties, whose essences are 
constituted by laws. What this means is that there need be no more than a single 
instance at a world, w, of a property, P, whose essence is constituted by the law, L, 
for it to be the case that L prevails at w. Armstrong, on the other hand, gives up 
Humean Supervenience with the introduction of necessitation relations between 
universals. An account of laws is then given in terms of these unHumean whatnots 
according to which if it is a law that all Fs are Gs then there is a higher order 
universal that connects the Fs and the Gs, i.e., which makes it the case that if 
something is F, then it is G also. But again, the unHumean elements of the ontology 
are capable of accounting for the laws independently of much else of what goes on 
in the universe. The necessitation relations, the Ns, considered in isolation suffice to 
account for the laws.  
On both the Dispositional Essentialist and the Nomic Necessitation account, 
the unHumean elements of the ontology suffice to account for the laws 
independently of vast swathes of the mosaic. The laws, on these accounts, are thus 
not integrated in the BSA sense.  
The motivation concern for an account of Humean laws in an unHumean 
world is a challenge to say how we might understand the laws such that they form 
an integrated description of the unHumean mosaic such that the view may be 
deserving of the name “BSA”. To allay the concerns expressed in i) and ii), I suggest 
that a Humean account of laws ought to satisfy the following desiderata:  
 
C(odification): The laws should be understood as descriptive, not 
prescriptive.  
I(ntegration): The laws should form an integrated systematization of 
the mosaic in the sense that as much of everything as admits of simple 
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organization should be relevant to any given law’s status as a law.    
 
Any account of laws that failed to satisfy C and I would not really deserve the name 
“BSA” because it would stray too far from the letter of Lewis’s development of 
Ramsey’s idea that the laws are: “consequences of those propositions which we 
should take as axioms if we knew everything and organised it as simply as possible 
in a deductive system” (Ramsey 1990, 150, my emphasis).  
  It’s all well and good to say that in order to deserve the name “BSA” an 
account of laws should satisfy C and I, but what, one might wonder, is so worthy 
about the BSA in the first place? Well, the BSA would seem to comport with actual 
scientific practice of devising strong and simple formulas, which are able to predict 
or accommodate a wide range of phenomena (see Demarest 2017, 40).  In Cohen and 
Callender’s words: “[The BSA] states that laws are generalizations that result from a 
trade-off between the competing virtues of simplicity and informativeness. 
Scientists certainly see themselves as engaged in the project of finding such 
generalizations” (2009, 3). Another way of putting this thought is that there seems 
to be a certain pragmatic element to the laws’ status as such. It is those true 
descriptions of the workings of nature that are particularly general in their 
application and useful to us in our scientific and practical endeavours that are 
elevated to the status of law. The BSA, by conceiving of the laws as informative yet 
simple integrated descriptions or codifications of various patterns in nature, 
accommodates these sentiments.  
Dispositional essentialism, on the other hand, by conceiving of laws as M-
relations does little to recognise that laws are those generalizations that are useful to 
us in our scientific and practical endeavours. It is likely that there are many M-
relations, which are highly specific and limited in scope and these will be next to 
useless for us insofar as we are interested in making predictions and manipulating 
our environment to serve our practical and scientific interests. To elevate all M-
relations to the status of law would thus seem to just fail to recognise that laws are 
tools of science, which is concerned with devising strong and simple formulas, 
which are able to predict or accommodate a wide range of phenomena.   
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Furthermore, desideratum I is relevant to the concern, raised against DE, 
with simply building laws into the essences of those properties that are supposed to 
explain those very laws. Building laws into property essences is antithetical to I 
because if, as per DE, the essence of some property, P, is constituted by a law, L, 
then no more than a single instance of P at a world w is required for it to be the case 
that L prevails at w. Conversely, then, respect for I precludes this strategy of simply 
building laws into property essences and thus perhaps constitutes a constraint on a 
more explanatory account of laws in terms of properties – at the very least, respect 
for I precludes one unsatisfactory metaphysical explanation of laws in terms of 
properties because it precludes DE.  
Thus, satisfaction of C and I is important not merely insofar as one wants 
one’s account of laws to be deserving of a name. Satisfaction of C and I is also 
valuable insofar as we are interested in making sure that our philosophical account 
of laws concurs with scientific practice and that it avoids certain pitfalls to which 
the dispositional essentialist’s attempt to explain laws in terms of properties 
succumbs.  
I’ll talk more about satisfying the desiderata in section 4.5, but as a prelude I 
turn to a discussion of Heather Demarest’s Potency-BSA, which shall form the basis 
for my Revised Potency-BSA. It might appear that my work has been done by 
Demarest. I’ll argue, however, that Demarest’s account requires modification 
because it risks rendering the laws completely epistemically inaccessible. With the 
additional details of my Revised Potency-BSA I’ll be able to overcome the concern 
raised for Demarest and I’ll be in a better position to say in more detail how the 
desiderata identified above can be satisfied.  
 
4.4 Demarest’s Potency-BSA 
Demarest posits an unHumean ontology of potencies, and she follows Bird’s 
definition of a potency as “A fundamental, sparse property with a dispositional 
essence”(Bird 2007, 45). Demarest elaborates on Bird’s definition accordingly: “The 
dispositional essence of a potency is the necessary connection between the property 
and the behaviour of objects that instantiate it” (2017, 46). Although I have argued 
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in detail against Bird’s structuralist metaphysics of potencies (and the associated 
dispositional essentialist account of laws), I can agree with Demarest that there is a 
necessary connection between potencies and the behaviours of those objects which 
instantiate them. It is important to keep in mind, however, that on my view the 
necessary connection between potencies and behaviours does not hold because laws 
or dispositions constitute the essences of potencies (as the structuralist would have 
it). Rather, on the view I favour (QDE), potencies are qualitative grounds of these 
behaviours, and the grounding relation implies a necessary connection between 
potencies and the behaviours that they ground. But this disagreement about how the 
necessary connection between potencies and behaviours comes about is 
inconsequential to Demarest’s account of laws; all that is important to that account 
is that such a necessary connection obtains. To be clear, then, I’ll follow Demarest in 
using the term “potency” to refer to fundamental, or at least suitably low-level, 
properties, such as charge, mass and spin, which are necessarily connected to the 
behaviours of their bearers. Though keep in mind that this necessary connection 
comes about, on my view, because potencies are qualitative grounds of these 
behaviours, as per QDE.  
Central to Demarest’s Potency-BSA is the idea that the laws at a world, w, 
systematize (à la the BSA) actual and possible distributions of those potencies 
instantiated at w:  
 
Potency-BSA: The basic laws of nature at w are the axioms of the simplest, 
most informative, true systematization of all w-potency-distributions, where 
a w-potency-distribution is a possible distribution of only potencies 
appearing in w. (Demarest 2017, 49). 
 
Demarest argues that systematizing possible potency distributions constitutes no 
additional cost because we have already admitted primitively modal properties into 
our ontology (2017, 49) and that by systematizing other relevant possibilities, the 
Potency-BSA avoids the impoverished world objection.  
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According to the impoverished world objection, the traditional BSA yields 
counterintuitive results about the laws of nature at “impoverished” worlds. The 
objection considers a world, call it I, whose sole inhabitant is a single massive 
particle travelling inertially for all time. Now according to the BSA, it is a law at I 
that all massive particles always travel inertially. But this seems wrong, so the 
objection goes, because we think that it is not a law that all massive particles always 
travel inertially at the impoverished world because if there were a second massive 
particle, then the two would accelerate towards each other.  
Setting aside concerns about how convincing or otherwise the impoverished 
world objection is; I note for now just that one of the reasons Demarest offers in 
favour of her Potency-BSA is that it provides a response to this objection. 
Furthermore, the details of Demarest’s response shed additional light on her view: 
 
Consider, again, a world with a single massive particle, traveling inertially 
for all time. The laws of this world will systematize not just this world, but 
all worlds that contain mass. Therefore, it will be a law that all massive 
particles attract each other, and NOT that they always travel inertially. 
(2017, 51).  
 
Inhabitants of an impoverished world would be unable to arrive at a correct account 
of the laws because they would be in a kind of sceptical scenario. Similarly, if our 
world turned out to be impoverished, we too would be in a sceptical scenario and 
so unable to know the laws. But this is acceptable, Demarest suggests, because there 
should be no guarantee that the laws are epistemically accessible. I argue, however, 
that the Potency-BSA faces a more pressing sceptical worry.  
 
4.4.1  A Sceptical Worry 
Call a world, w*, relevant to the laws at a distinct world, w, iff some element of w* 
partly determines w’s laws. Thus, if the distribution of, say, mass at a world w1 is 
systematized by the laws of w2 because mass is instantiated at both, then w1 is 
relevant to the laws at w2.  
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To see the sceptical worry, we must consider which worlds Demarest’s 
Potency-BSA deems relevant to the laws at a given world. Consider a simple world, 
w0, at which just mass and charge are instantiated. We can denote the situation like 
this: w0(mass, charge). According to the Potency-BSA, the laws of w0 systematize all 
w0-potency distributions, where a w0-potency distribution is a possible distribution 
of only potencies appearing in w0 (Demarest 2017, 49). The laws of w0 are thus 
partly determined by the distributions of mass and charge at worlds besides w0. 
Hence, worlds besides w0 are relevant to w0’s laws. For all that has been said, we can 
discern four options for the range of worlds relevant to the laws of w0(mass, charge):  
Option 1: worlds with ALL the potencies found at w0. This would include 
worlds with some potencies alien to w0 and would omit worlds lacking potencies 
instantiated at w0. For example, w1 would be included w1(mass, charge, schmass), 
but not w2(mass).   
Option 2: Worlds with ONLY the potencies found at w0. This would rule out 
worlds with alien potencies and include worlds absent some potencies instantiated 
at w0. For example, w2 would be included, but not w1.   
Option 3: Worlds with ALL AND ONLY those potencies found at w0. This 
rules out worlds with potencies that are alien to w0 and worlds absent any 
potencies instantiated at w0. For example, w3 (which has the same potency instances 
as w, though those potency instances might be differently distributed) would be 
included w3(mass, charge), but w2 and w1 would not.  
Option 4: Worlds with SOME of those potencies found at w0. This just rules 
out worlds that are absent all of the potencies instantiated at w0. For example, w1, 
w2 and w3 would be included, but not w4(schmass, schmarge).   
I suggest that Demarest may be interpreted as endorsing either option 2 or 
option 4. Option 4 seems to follow from Demarest’s explicit statement of the 
Potency-BSA (2017, 49) as well as perhaps from her response to the impoverished 
world objection (2017, 51). Saddling Demarest with option 4, however, might seem 
less charitable, since radical scepticism about the laws quickly follows from this 
option. Hence, the Potency-BSA could at least benefit from clearer articulation to 
avoid this interpretation. As it happens, however, option 2 also faces a sceptical 
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worry via a subtler route. I’ll discuss these different interpretations (and the 
sceptical threat to each) in turn before proposing a revision to the Potency-BSA that 
avoids these problems and satisfies the desiderata identified in section 3.      
Demarest is clear that the laws of a world, w, are unconcerned with possible 
distributions of potencies alien to w: “The basic laws of nature at w are the axioms of 
the simplest, most informative, true systematization of all w-potency-distributions, 
where a w-potency-distribution is a possible distribution of only potencies appearing in 
w.” (ibid, my emphasis). However, we cannot infer from this that only those worlds 
containing just the same potencies as w0(mass, charge) are relevant to w0’s laws 
because among the possible distributions of mass are those distributions of mass at 
worlds where, e.g., schmarge is instantiated too.  
Moreover, consider Demarest’s response to the impoverished world 
objection: “Consider, again, a world with a single massive particle, traveling 
inertially for all time. The laws of this world will systematize not just this world, but all 
worlds that contain mass.” (ibid, my emphasis). Relative to the impoverished world, 
potencies found at the actual world; charge, spin, etc. are alien, but Demarest seems 
to imply that the laws at the impoverished world nonetheless concern the 
distribution of mass at the actual world because “The laws of this world will 
systematize…all worlds that contain mass” and the actual world contains mass. On 
this reading, it seems that for Demarest all worlds with at least some of the potencies 
found at a world, w, are relevant to the laws at w, which is option 4.  
Scepticism about the laws quickly follows because inhabitants of w0(mass, 
charge) could not possibly know how alien potencies, like schmass, would affect the 
distribution of w0-potencies, namely mass and charge, so they couldn’t possibly 
come to know all w0-potency-distributions, the best systematization of which 
determines the laws at w0. The problem generalizes and makes the actual laws 
unknowable too. In essence, the problem is this: at worlds with alien potencies, 
familiar potencies, like mass and charge, might behave very differently. We cannot 
know how alien potencies will affect the distribution of, e.g., mass and charge, so if 
the actual laws concerning mass and charge are supposed to systematize their 
distributions in the presence of alien potencies, we cannot know the laws. It is 
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plausible, however, that we possess all sorts of knowledge about natural laws, or 
are at least capable in theory of acquiring such knowledge, so we are justified in 
rejecting any metaphysical view that would imply otherwise.  
Alternatively, we might interpret Demarest’s definition of a w-potency 
distribution: “a possible distribution of only potencies appearing in w”, to mean a 
distribution of all the potencies at some possible world, w*, where the only 
potencies found at w* are potencies that are also found at w. On this reading, the 
distribution of mass at a world containing schmass would not be a w0-potency 
distribution, where w0(mass, charge). But distributions of mass at worlds with just 
mass, for example, as well as other possible distributions of mass and charge at 
worlds with no other potencies besides, would count as w0-potency distributions. 
On this interpretation, Demarest goes for option 2. Accordingly, when Demarest 
writes, regarding the impoverished world: “The laws of this world will 
systematize…all worlds that contain mass”, she must be read as speaking 
elliptically for “all worlds that contain only mass”.17 If this were the intended 
interpretation, I’d suggest the following modification to the definition of the 
Potency-BSA: 
 
Potency-BSA*: The basic laws of nature at w are the axioms of the simplest, 
most informative, true systematization of all w-potency-distributions, where 
a w-potency-distribution is the distribution of all the potencies at a world, 
w*, where w* contains no potencies alien to w. 
 
However, just as, for all we know, the distribution of mass might be radically 
unfamiliar at worlds where schmarge is instantiated, for all we know, the 
distribution of mass might be radically unfamiliar at worlds absent, say, charge. We 
inhabit a world where both mass and charge are instantiated (as well as other 
potencies) and in our world mass is distributed as it is and we can make certain 
inferences about the possible distributions of mass. What we cannot know, I suggest, 
is how the absence of charge at a world would affect the behaviour of masses and 
                                                     
17 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer at the Journal of the American Philosophical Association for suggesting this.  
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this imposes a restriction on the range of possible mass distributions that we are able 
to know.  
This concern is driven, in part, by reflection on the apparent fine-tuned-ness 
of the universe. It is often suggested that had certain fundamental physical 
constants been even slightly different, a radically different universe would have 
resulted; one without any carbon-based life or even any coalesced matter, perhaps: 
 
…if the strength of gravity were smaller or larger by an estimated one part 
in 1060 of its current value, the universe would have either exploded too 
quickly for galaxies and stars to form, or collapsed back on itself too quickly 
for life to evolve. (Collins 2009, 215) 
 
Had the boundary conditions in the initial seconds of the big bang, and the 
values of various fundamental constants differed ever so slightly we would 
not have had anything like a stable universe in which life could evolve. 
(White 2001, 260) 
 
But if minor tweaks to physical constants would result in such a radically different 
universe, it seems plausible that a big change – the omission of a ubiquitous 
fundamental potency, such as charge – might result in a world that is utterly 
unrecognizable. These considerations might reasonably inspire a distinct lack of 
confidence in our ability to know much at all about what such worlds would be like, 
including with respect to, say, how mass is distributed.  Better, then, not to allow 
those likely unknowable possible distributions of mass in such radically different 
worlds to be relevant to the actual laws.  
One might respond that given the success science has enjoyed when it comes 
to isolating potencies from each other, we can be confident in our ability to make 
inferences about the possible behaviour of, say, massive bodies in the absence of 
charges. But, besides the physical implausibility of the idea that we might 
completely isolate mass from charge, we cannot ever make it the case that mass is 
instantiated in a world where charge is uninstantiated and that we are there to 
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observe the results. The sceptical concern is not that masses might behave oddly 
when isolated under lab conditions from the effects of charge at a world in which 
charge is nonetheless instantiated. The worry is that masses might behave oddly 
when instantiated in a world at which charge is nowhere instantiated – call this an S-
type hypothesis. No lab can create these conditions; we are all world-bound.  
There may be a temptation to dismiss S-type hypotheses as no more 
problematic than run-of-the-mill external world scepticism.18 However, S-type 
hypotheses are of a very different kind to run-of-the-mill sceptical hypotheses. A 
typical run-of-the-mill sceptical attack on knowledge argues that since I cannot 
know I am not a brain-in-a-vat (BIV), I cannot know all sorts of things about the 
actual world, like that I have hands, because having hands is inconsistent with being 
a BIV. S-type hypotheses, by contrast, do not threaten our knowledge of the actual 
world; they threaten our modal knowledge. The fact that I cannot rule out the 
hypothesis that mass is distributed very strangely in worlds absent charge limits 
what I can know about other possible worlds. Furthermore, reflection on the 
apparent fine-tuned-ness of the universe provides S-type hypotheses with at least 
some prima facie plausibility not enjoyed by, say, the run-of-the-mill sceptical 
hypothesis that I am a BIV.  
Given these differences, one would not necessarily expect responses to run-
of-the-mill scepticism to be effective against the sceptical threat posed by S-type 
hypotheses. Consider, for example, a typical externalist response to run-of-the-mill 
scepticism (e.g., Nozick, 1981), according to which a belief counts as knowledge just 
in case it is true and it tracks the truth at nearby worlds. Assume that I inhabit the 
actual, non-BIV-world and that I have a true belief that that I have hands. This belief 
counts as knowledge because in nearby worlds in which I am handless (perhaps due 
to some unfortunate accident) I do not believe that I have hands and in nearby 
worlds where I do have hands I believe that I do. Sure, my belief would fail to track 
the truth at the BIV-world, but knowledge does not require truth-tracking at such 
distant worlds, on this account. This type of response justifies the dismissal of run-
of-the-mill sceptical hypotheses by showing them to be compatible with much of our 
                                                     
18 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer at the Journal of the American Philosophical Association for raising this. 
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knowledge, as well as emphasizing the fact that run-of-the-mill sceptical hypotheses 
themselves enjoy no prima facie plausibility for being so distant.    
No such response is available to the threat posed by S-type hypotheses. It is 
consistent with my having hands that, say, mass is distributed very strangely in 
worlds absent charge. It thus does nothing to quell the sceptical threat of S-type 
hypotheses to show that everyday knowledge of the actual world is consistent with 
our inability to rule them out. Furthermore, and as mentioned above, S-type 
hypotheses enjoy at least some prima facie plausibility once we reflect on the fine-
tuned-ness of the universe. Unfortunately, it would lead me too far astray to survey 
all possible responses to run-of-the-mill scepticism. But plausibly the point will 
extend to other responses given the very different kind of threat posed by S-type 
hypotheses compared with that posed by run-of-the-mill sceptical hypotheses as 
well as the fact that the former, but not the latter, enjoy at least some prima facie 
plausibility. I thus take these considerations to show that S-type hypotheses should 
not be immediately dismissed as on a par with run-of-the-mill scepticism.     
On the other hand, it might be argued that the scepticism ushered in by S-
type hypotheses, if accepted, proves too much; for ought we not also to think that 
we cannot know how mass would behave in a world absent, say, Bill Clinton (BC)?19 
The obvious response is that we have lots of evidence to suggest that the 
distribution of mass is completely independent of BC and hence it seems reasonable 
to infer that the distribution of mass would be unaffected by his absence. Of course, 
we cannot rule out the logical possibility that BC’s existence plays some key role in 
the law concerning mass, but this hypothesis deserves being taken no more 
seriously than Russell’s Teapot.  
So why not employ a similar answer when charge is substituted for BC? (Of 
course, to do so would undermine my argument above). Well, I note first there is a 
weak sense in which BC is relevant to the law concerning mass. Insofar as BC is 
composed of massive particles, he is relevant to the overall cross-world distribution 
of mass and hence the mass-law. But BC’s negligible contribution to the distribution 
of mass is plausibly far from pivotal to the robustly best system of which the law 
                                                     
19 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer at the Journal of the American Philosophical Association for raising this. 
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concerning mass is an axiom. But whereas worlds absent BC would differ negligibly 
from the actual world, worlds absent any instances of charge whatsoever would be 
radically different from actuality. It at least seems plausible that in such a radically 
different world, the distribution of mass would be significantly affected and it is this 
prima facie plausibility that is lacking in the cases of hypotheses about BC and 
Russell’s Teapot. Charge is a ubiquitous, fundamental, potency. The concern is really 
that the possible distributions of ubiquitous fundamental potencies might be more 
tightly entwined than we could ever know. It would be a quite different matter to 
claim that any individual whatsoever might have some crucial, yet unobservable, 
impact on the possible evolution of the universe. BC is not a ubiquitous 
fundamental potency and so cannot be substituted for “charge” in, for example, the 
hypothesis that we cannot know how mass would behave in a world absent charge 
without significantly altering the claim.    
I thus suggest that we go for option 3, which avoids the sceptical problems 
by rendering only those worlds instantiating all and only the potencies instantiated 
at w relevant to w’s laws. But if, for all that has been said, you remain unconvinced, 
I offer one final consideration in favour of this option. Either S-type hypotheses 
pose no sceptical threat, for whatever reason, so we can embrace option 2: worlds 
with ONLY those potencies found at w are relevant to w’s laws. Or S-type 
hypotheses are a threat and so to ensure the epistemic accessibility of the laws we 
should go for option 3: worlds with ALL AND ONLY those potencies found at w 
are relevant to w’s laws. In a Pascal’s Wager-type move, I suggest that unless we can 
be completely certain that S-type hypotheses pose absolutely no threat, we should 
go for option 3. This is because we stand to lose relatively little, perhaps even 
nothing, by choosing option 3 over option 2 – maybe the laws of a world, w, will be 
slightly less informative than they might have been because they will systematize 
fewer possibilities. If, on the other hand, we go for option 2 and it turns out that S-
type hypotheses are problematic in the way described, we lose all epistemic access 
to the laws (which would plausibly count as infinitely bad in the context of an 
analysis of laws!). We cannot be absolutely certain that S-type hypotheses pose no 
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threat whatsoever, we can only have perhaps a relatively high degree of confidence 
that they are unthreatening, so option 3 is best.  
In the next section I suggest a revision to the Potency-BSA, which guarantees 
to avoid scepticism about the laws and which, as I shall argue in 4.5.1, can satisfy 
the desiderata set out in section 3.     
 
4.5  The Revised Potency-BSA 
Demarest’s Potency-BSA makes the innovative leap of systematizing a range of 
possible worlds. The sceptical concern arises, however, because too many worlds are 
systematized. My suggestion is thus to systematize fewer worlds.  
Of the four options for the range of worlds we deem relevant to the laws at a 
given world, w, I suggest option 3: just those worlds at which all and only the 
potencies instantiated at w are instantiated. I hence propose the following: 
 
Revised Potency-BSA: The basic laws of nature at w are the axioms of the 
simplest, most informative, true systematization of all w-potency-
distributions, where a w-potency-distribution is a distribution of only 
potencies appearing in w at a world instantiating all and only those 
potencies instantiated at w. 
 
By truncating the range of worlds deemed relevant to the laws at a given world, w, 
in this way, the sceptical concern is avoided. We cannot know how actual potencies, 
like charge, will be distributed in worlds instantiating alien potencies, or how they 
will be distributed in worlds that are absent actual potencies, but according to the 
Revised Potency-BSA such possibilities are irrelevant to the actual law concerning 
charge.  
 
4.5.1  Modal Profiles and Satisfying the Desiderata 
We might say that the laws at w, according to the Revised Potency-BSA, are a 
function of the modal profiles of all and only the potencies instantiated at w. Up until 
now, I have been using the term “modal profile” somewhat loosely to refer to the 
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full range of behaviours or dispositions with which a potency is associated, or 
which a potency grounds, and, hence, with which a potency is necessarily connected. 
In this subsection I shall present a more formal definition of “modal profile”, which 
will help me to show exactly how the Revised Potency-BSA can satisfy the 
desiderata outlined in section 4.3.  
The modal profile of a potency, P, is the range of properties with which P is 
possibly coinstantiated by a property-bearer. In possible worlds talk, the modal 
profile of P will specify, for any property X, if there is a world, w, at which some 
individual, x, instantiates P and X. Since we aren’t specifying that X is fundamental 
or sparse – X could stand for a conjunctive property – we capture the idea that the 
modal profile of P has to do with possible combinations of properties with which P is 
coinstantiated by a property-bearer. Furthermore, since we are not ruling out that 
the Xs with which P is possibly coinstantiated in virtue of P’s modal profile are 
extrinsic properties – they might be relational – we capture that P’s modal profile 
determines how instances of P might possibly be distributed in space and time. A 
particular brick, for example, might coinstantiate toughness and redness, but the brick 
might also instantiate such extrinsic properties as being in a wheelbarrow or forming 
part of the foundations of a house. We might say that the property toughness is possibly 
coinstantiated with the extrinsic property forming the foundations of a house. The 
modal profile of the property toughness allows for such possibilities. Similarly, the 
potency electric charge, in virtue if its modal profile, is possibly coinstantiated with 
the property of partially constituting an atom of carbon – electrons, for example, 
instantiate electric charge and can also instantiate the extrinsic property of partially 
constituting an atom of carbon.  
Talk of the behaviours or dispositions that a potency grounds and, hence, with 
which it is necessarily connected, is imprecise and can be substituted for the more 
precise notion of a modal profile. Potencies, then, are necessarily connected with 
their modal profiles, that is, with the range of properties (including complex and 
extrinsic properties) that their bearers possibly instantiate. And this, on my view, is 
because potencies ground their modal profiles.  
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The laws at w are thus a function of the modal profiles of all and only those 
potencies instantiated at w, according to the Revised Potency-BSA. The laws are 
efficient summaries of the facts about possible distributions of those potency 
instances, where the possible distributions of potencies at w are determined by 
those potencies’ modal profiles. We can understand what it is for a potency to 
figure in some distribution in terms of the properties, including extrinsic properties, 
with which it is coinstantiated. For a given world, w, we thus have a hierarchical 
grounding structure at the base of which we find the potencies, which ground their 
modal profiles. These modal profiles then ground the possible distributions of the w-
potency instances, which in turn ground the laws because the w-laws are 
summaries of the possible distributions of the w-potency instances that best balance 
the virtues of informativeness and simplicity.  
We are now able to say more precisely how the Revised Potency-BSA 
satisfies desideratum C. Given a world of potencies, fully capable of “pushing and 
pulling” things around, or determining their own distributions, in accordance with 
their modal profiles, we would seem to have no need for additional governing laws. 
The Revised Potency-BSA satisfies C because it says that the laws at w are the 
axioms of the system that best balances the virtues of informativeness and 
simplicity in its effort to convey all of the information about the distributions of the 
w-potencies in all possible worlds at which all and only w-potencies are 
instantiated. The potencies themselves might be thought to do some “pushing and 
pulling” because they metaphysically determine their possible distributions in 
accordance with their modal profiles, but the potencies are not laws, the laws are 
features of a description of the possible distributions of those potencies that best 
balances the virtues of informativeness and simplicity.     
The tougher task faced by any account of Humean laws in an unHumean 
world is that of satisfying I. Recall that according to Dispositional Essentialism, 
desideratum I is not satisfied because laws constitute potency essences which 
means that a single instance of a potency, P, at a world, w, suffices for the law, L, 
associated with P to hold at w. Particular laws, according to Dispositional 
Essentialism, hold independently of vast swathes of the fundamental mosaic of 
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potencies at a world. QDE does not automatically satisfy I either, for if particular 
potency instances fully grounded laws, then again, the laws would hold 
independently of much of what went on at a world and hence would not be 
integrated.  
In order to satisfy desideratum I, the Revised Potency-BSA must understand 
the laws not as codifying the essences of particular potencies considered in isolation, 
or otherwise as being true descriptions fully grounded in particular potency 
instances. Rather, the laws must be understood as codifying the possible 
distributions of all potency instances considered collectively. As we have seen, it is 
the potencies’ modal profiles that carry implications for their possible distributions; a 
given potency, by its very nature, grounds its modal profile, which in turn 
determines the range of properties with which that potency is possibly 
coinstantiated, including the distributions in which it can (metaphysically possibly) 
feature. So, talking in terms of modal profiles facilitates discussion of the present 
account of laws according to which the w-laws are parts of an efficient integrated 
description of the possible arrangements of the w-potencies. 
Crucially, the possible distributions of w-potencies across worlds 
instantiating all and only the w-potencies will have to do with the w-potencies 
considered collectively. The distribution of w-potencies across possible worlds will 
be determined by the various possible interactions between potency instances. We 
can illustrate the thought with a macroscopic example. Consider a vase encased in 
formaldehyde. Among the possible distributions of the stuff in a world, w1, that 
included vases and formaldehyde, there might be very few possibilities in which a 
vase encased in formaldehyde at one time, tearlier, is then shattered at a later time, tlater, 
but in which there is no time between tearlier and tlater at which the vase is not encased 
in formaldehyde. Put more simply, the point is that the possible interaction between 
the vase and the formaldehyde restricts how those things could possibly be 
distributed in space and time. In very few possibilities does an unbroken vase 
become broken in a timespan in which it is encased in formaldehyde. Plausibly, 
potencies, such as charge, mass, spin, etc. will exhibit analogous interactions. The w-
laws of the Revised Potency-BSA thus respect desideratum I by summarising all the 
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information about possible configurations of w-potency instances in a manner that 
accounts for the various possible interactions between the w-potencies. To best 
capture this information, we need to “zoom out”, so to speak, so that we may 
understand how the various potencies at a world, with their modal profiles, can 
possibly interact. No potency, or indeed cluster of potencies, considered in isolation 
from the entire distribution of potencies at a world could suffice to ground the laws, 
on this conception, hence I is satisfied.  
 
4.5.2  Ceteris Paribus Laws  
I have said that potency instances will interact in various ways, determined by their 
modal profiles. One way in which potencies might interact is by masking each other. 
The modal profile of the potency charge is such that distinct instances of charge can 
exert a force on each other. But this ability to exert a force conferred on an instance 
of charge, e, might be masked if extrinsic factors conspire to make it the case that e 
never manifests this ability. This is analogous to the way in which wrapping a vase 
in bubble wrap masks its disposition to break.  
It would seem to follow that there is at least one possible world at which all 
and only those potencies instantiated at the actual world are instantiated, and in 
which the instances of charge have their ability to exert a force on other instances of 
charge in accordance with Coulomb’s consistently masked. In this world, it so 
happens that distinct instances of charge never instantiate the property of exerting a 
force on each other in accordance with Coulomb’s law because something always 
gets in the way, so to speak.  
Why then, we might wonder, should Coulomb’s law be an axiom of the best 
systematization of the possible distributions of all and only the potencies at the 
actual world? The answer comes, I suggest, from reflection on the ceteris paribus 
nature of laws. It is implicit in the formulation of Coulomb’s law (and other laws) 
that intervening factors are absent. All Coulomb’s law says explicitly is that 
separated charges exert a force on each other proportional to the magnitude of their 
charge and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them. What 
is left implicit is that this is only the case in the absence of, say, a nearby black hole, 
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or indeed anything else that may negate the tendency of charged individuals to 
interact in accordance with Coulomb’s law. What Coulomb’s law tells us, on the 
current conception, is that in the absence of intervening factors, i.e. ceteris paribus, 
charged bodies will interact thusly and so-ly. Coulomb’s law so conceived seems 
like a good candidate for entering into a strong, simple systematization of the 
possible distribution of all and only the potencies in the actual world and hence a 
good candidate for a law even given its ceteris paribus nature. Indeed, it really should 
count as a benefit of the present account that it accommodates the ceteris paribus 
nature of the natural laws.  
The laws, on this account, form parts of an integrated description of possible 
potency arrangements; desiderata C and I are satisfied. No potency instance 
considered in isolation can suffice to ground any law because the laws at a world, 
w, are the axioms of the best systematization of the possible interactions between the 
totality of potency instances at w. Possible arrangements of all and only the 
potencies at w, which are systematized as part of the Revised Potency-BSA, depend 
on no potency instances considered in isolation, but rather on the potency instances 
at w considered collectively.  
 
4.5.3  Why This Combination of Views? 
Over the course of this chapter and the last, I have presented and defended the 
combination of QDE as a metaphysics of properties and the Revised Potency-BSA as 
a metaphysics of laws of nature. This was in large part motivated by the problems 
with the Dispositional Essentialist’s strategy of building laws into property essences 
and the associated structuralist metaphysics of properties. Structuralism, it was 
shown, is subject to an explanatory regress, which casts doubt on its ability to 
explain the spatiotemporal distribution of properties in terms of the essences of 
those properties themselves. Furthermore, on the plausible assumption that the M-
relations, that is, arcs in the structuralist’s structure, just are the laws, according to 
DE, it seems that DE cannot non-circularly explain the laws in terms of potencies 
(see section 3.5). One might wonder, however, if the problems for the Dispositional 
Essentialist’s package of views about laws and properties might be avoided by 
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either just giving up structuralism in favour of QDE and keeping the view of laws 
as M-relations, or just giving up the view of laws as M-relations in favour of 
something more like the BSA and keeping the structuralist metaphysics of 
properties. I’ll briefly show in this subsection why the combination of QDE and the 
Revised Potency-BSA is preferable to either of these two options.  
 Consider first a view according to which potencies are qualities, as per QDE, 
which (asymmetrically) ground a structure of M-relations and where those M-
relations just are the laws. This way, potencies need not be said to contain laws in 
their essences and, hence, laws and potencies are not symmetrically grounded in 
each other. The problem for Dispositional Essentialism’s explanatory aims (raised in 
section 3.5) would thus seem to be avoided by this package of views. The problem, 
however, is that M-relations are not particularly good candidates for laws. The 
laws, it has been suggested (in section 4.3), should be strong, simple generalizations, 
which help to explain and predict a wide array of phenomena. Particular M-
relations, however, are very specific and narrow in scope. Hence a philosophical 
account of laws as M-relations would not appear to be particularly consonant with 
actual scientific practice, which is concerned with strong, simple formulas with 
wide applicability. The Revised Potency-BSA does better on this score. 
 Alternatively, then, one might endorse structuralism as one’s metaphysics of 
properties and (something akin to) the Revised Potency-BSA as one’s metaphysics 
of laws. Perhaps this package can claim continuity with science and avoid the 
symmetrical grounding problem. For if laws were strong simple descriptions of the 
structure, as opposed to arcs in the structure, as M-relations are, then they would 
achieve the breadth of scope that science-friendliness would seem to demand. 
Furthermore, it would not seem to be the case that the laws, so understood, ground 
properties, because properties certainly do not ontologically depend upon 
descriptions of their actual and possible space-time distributions any more than 
anything ontologically depends on a description of itself. This package, however, 
does not remedy Barker and Smart’s regress for structuralism, which simply said 
that properties, on the structuralist understanding, cannot metaphysically explain 
how they are distributed throughout space and time without engendering an 
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infinite regress or positing brute necessary connections. Barker and Smart’s 
objection didn’t target an account of laws in particular, it targeted the more basic 
claim to metaphysically explain the space-time distributions of properties in terms 
of the very essences of those properties. Regardless of what one takes the laws to be 
on the structuralist picture, one should find Barker and Smart’s regress damaging to 
the structuralist’s explanatory aspirations. One could advocate structuralism and the 
Revised Potency-BSA as an account of laws, but this would do nothing to address 
the question of just how it is that properties, according to structuralism, can 
metaphysically explain the space-time distributions that are supposed to ground the 
laws, according to the Revised Potency-BSA.  
 If one wants to respect scientific practice and if one wants to properly 
explain the space-time distributions of potencies, and hence the laws, in terms of the 
essences of the potencies themselves, then the best option is to combine QDE with 
the Revised Potency-BSA.    
 
4.6  Chance 
To further motivate my view, I want to consider how the Revised Potency-BSA 
might handle objective chance – a notorious stumbling block for the Humean laws-
ontology package. In a nutshell, the problem is that the traditional BSA assigns non-
trivial chances to futures that would undermine those very chances. Let’s look in a 
little more detail at how this odd result arises before seeing how the Revised 
Potency-BSA might do better.   
According to the Humean Best Systems analyst, facts about chances, like all 
other contingent facts, must be made true by some feature(s) of the Humean mosaic. 
What’s more, by Lewis’s Principal Principle (PP), which says that our credence in a 
proposition given the chance of that proposition and any admissible evidence ought 
to just equal the chance, these “chancemaking” features must be the sorts of things 
that, if known, could constrain rational credence (Lewis 1994). After considering, 
and dismissing, symmetries and frequencies as the fundamental chancemakers,20 
                                                     
20 Symmetries can be defeated by frequencies but frequencies cannot account for single case chances of a unique 
kind, nor can finite frequencies yield irrational chances. (Lewis 1994) 
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Lewis suggests that single case chances follow from general probabilistic laws of 
nature  (Lewis 1994, 478). 
Just as “charged bodies exert a force on all other charged bodies” may be an 
axiom of the best system and hence a law, so might “tritium has a half-life of 12.3 
years”. The latter “law” is probabilistic in the sense that it implies, for any given 
tritium atom, that it will have a 50% chance of decaying in a 12.3-year time interval. 
Where previously the BSA was just concerned with trading off strength and 
simplicity, with the introduction of probabilistic laws comes a new criterion that 
must be balanced: fit. A systematization will fit a world, w, better to the extent that 
it assigns a higher chance to the entire history of w.  
The BSA treatment of chance simply says that the chances are what the laws 
of the system that strikes the best balance between strength, simplicity and fit says 
they are. Assuming “tritium has a half-life of 12.3-years” is a law, given these 
criteria, it will also be true that a particular tritium atom has a 50% chance of 
decaying in a 12.3-year time interval and this fact will be made true by the Humean 
mosaic in the desired way.  
Chances thus supervene on the entire 4-D mosaic of matters of particular 
fact, past, present and future. This means that different futures will determine 
different present chances. To see the “Bug”, reconsider the law which says tritium 
has a 12.3-year half-life and the associated single case chances that this law projects. 
This probabilistic law and the single case chances projected are consistent with a 
future in which vastly more tritium atoms come into existence than have existed 
thus far (maybe due to some cataclysmic colliding of galaxies or something) where 
these atoms all decay in well under 12.3-years. In this case, the mosaic would make 
it true that the half-life of tritium is far less than 12.3-years. Now there is a sense in 
which this alternative future could come to pass: it is assigned a non-zero chance by 
the actual probabilistic laws, but in another sense it could not because its coming to 
pass would contradict the fact of the matter about present chances (Lewis 1994, 
482).  
This odd result can be shown to yield a flat contradiction if we consider 
again the Principal Principle (PP). PP says that our credence, Cr, in a proposition, A, 
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given the chance, x, of A and all admissible evidence, E, ought to just equal x, the 
chance of A.   
 
PP:  Cr(A|x & E) = x  
 
Now take A to be the alternative future history in which vastly more tritium atoms 
come into existence than have ever existed so far, each of which decays within, say, 
5 years. And take E, our admissible evidence, to include the whole truth about the 
present actual chances. The present chance of this future obtaining, according to the 
best system, is > 0. So, by PP, our credence in this A ought to be > 0. However, we 
also know that this future is inconsistent with E, because if this future came about, 
our present chances would have been different than they actually are. And so it 
seems that our credence in A ought to be 0. Thus, we have a contradiction: (Cr>0) & 
(Cr=0). 
Lewis offers a solution to the bug whereby he claims that admissibility 
admits of degrees, relative to the proposition our credence in which is at stake. He 
argues that in the above instance of PP, the evidence about the present actual 
chances is not fully admissible and hence the derivation of the contradiction is 
spurious (see Lewis 1994 for details). Even if one were convinced that this strategy 
successfully blocked the contradiction, the very fact of present chances 
undermining themselves remains, and this seems very strange indeed. So let’s see if 
a potency-BSA can do any better.  
 
4.6.1  Revised Potency-BSA Chances  
The Revised Potency-BSA can account for non-trivial chances in much the same 
way as that suggested by Lewis: by showing them to follow from general 
probabilistic laws. But, as I’ll show, the Revised Potency-BSA blocks the credence=0 
side of the contradiction because it is consistent with the chances of a world, w, that 
the entire history of w diverges dramatically from what we would expect given 
those chances.  
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Consider again the distribution of tritium decay events throughout the 
actual world, @. Now, if we were to systematize all actual tritium decay events, we 
might find that close to 50% of tritium atoms decay within 12.3 years of coming into 
existence. Indeed, the traditional BSA might offer this sort of fact as part of an 
analysis of the probabilistic law according to which the half-life of tritium is 12.3-
years – the candidate law will increase the fit of a system. But, as we’ve seen, this 
probabilistic law assigns non-zero chances to futures, which are such that the actual 
present chances would be different; the bug bites.  
According to the Revised Potency-BSA, however, it is not enough to just 
systematize @. The laws of @ systematize tritium decay events across all worlds at 
which all and only those potencies instantiated at @ are instantiated. If, and only if, 
according to the best systematization of potency distributions across all relevant 
worlds, “tritium has a half-life of 12.3-years” is an axiom, then this fact will analyse 
relevant objective chances at @.  
The bug doesn’t bite this account. The @-law according to which tritium has 
a half-life of 12.3-years is consistent with an @-future in which vastly more tritium 
atoms than have ever existed previously come into being and all decay in well 
under 12.3-years – call this a recalcitrant future. It would not suffice to undermine 
the actual probabilistic law if a recalcitrant future were realized in @. This is 
because, according to the Revised Potency-BSA, the probabilistic law, which says 
that tritium has a 12.3-year half-life, is grounded in a relevant range of possible 
worlds and their entire histories. So, while in @ it may be turn out that most tritium 
atoms decay in well under 12.3-years, it can still be true that “tritium has a 12.3-year 
half-life” is an axiom of the best systematization of the potency distributions across 
all relevant worlds and hence a law at @. Since we cannot say that one’s rational 
credence in a recalcitrant future coming to pass conditional on the relevant 
probabilistic law must be zero, the credence=0 side of the contradiction is blocked. 
We can consistently maintain that our credence in a recalcitrant future ought to be > 
0.     
One might, at this point, wonder about the criterion of fit. The Revised 
Potency-BSA presents the following picture: all possible worlds are split up into 
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equivalence classes under the relation “…contains all and only the same potencies 
as…”. Hence, to each world, w, there corresponds one such equivalence class, the w-
class. The laws of w are then the axioms of the best systematization of potency 
distributions across all worlds in the w-class. Until now I have said that the best 
such system is the one that strikes the optimal strength/simplicity trade off. But 
with the introduction of probabilistic laws, fit must be maximised too. Furthermore, 
just as strength and simplicity of competing systems are evaluated at the inter-
world level, that is, we want the strongest, simplest systematization of potency 
distributions across all w-class worlds, so too should fit be evaluated at the inter-
world level.  
If fit were evaluated on a world-by-world basis, different systems would be 
best according to different w-class worlds, hence w-class worlds would differ with 
respect to their laws and chances and the bug would still bite.21 Assuming that fit is 
to be evaluated on a world-by-world basis, consider two worlds in a given w-class, 
w1 and w2 and assume that w1 and w2 have different chances because different 
systems fit best in each case. Furthermore, assume that some initial segments of the 
histories of w1 and w2, Hw1 and Hw2, match perfectly and that w2 contains finitely 
many chance events according to the laws of w1. Now let F be the proposition 
specifying the history of w2 after initial segment Hw2. As there are only finitely 
many chancy events occurring in F, the chance of F according to the laws of w1 is > 
0. So, a subject in w1 whose evidence includes the w1-laws and hence the w1-
chances ought to have a > 0 credence in F. But if F were to come to pass, the w1-
chances would be different because, by hypothesis, w2, whose entire history is 
given by Hw2+F (where Hw1 and Hw2 match perfectly), has different chances to w1. So, 
we can also infer that the agent in w1 who knows the w1 chances should have 0 
credence in F. The bug bites again. The salvage is to evaluate fit not on a world-by-
world basis, but at the inter-world level such that all w-class worlds agree with 
respect to their laws and hence with respect to their chances.     
How, then, are we to evaluate the fit of a system at the inter-world level? 
Sure, the law “tritium has a 12.3-year half-life” may fit the history of the actual 
                                                     
21 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer at the Journal of the American Philosophical Association for raising this. 
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world, @, well, but there are many worlds in the @-class for which this law will be a 
very poor fit indeed. There may well be worlds in which all tritium atoms decay 
within a nanosecond and others in which no tritium atom decays in under a million 
years and everything else in between and more extreme. The hope must be that a 
system including the law “tritium has a 12.3-year half-life” fits the overall 
distribution of tritium decay events across all @-class worlds better than any 
competing system. It thus seems that we will need some weighting function over 
possible worlds. This is a problem faced by any account of chance in terms of 
possible worlds. What the Revised Potency-BSA does, then, is shift the problem of 
chances undermining themselves onto the problem of devising a weighting function 
over possible worlds. If one were more optimistic about our prospects of solving the 
latter problem, then this could be seen as progress, but I leave further treatment of 
this issue for elsewhere. 
 
4.7  Doing Better than DE – Functional Laws and Ceteris Paribus 
Laws  
In this chapter, I have defended a novel account of the laws of nature which 
combines an unHumean metaphysic of properties with a Humean account of laws 
as efficient descriptions of how those properties are possibly distributed. The 
Revised Potency-BSA respects desiderata C and I and so earns the “BSA” part of its 
name. But more importantly than this, respect for the desiderata promised an 
account of laws that is consonant with actual scientific practice and ensured that the 
laws are not simply built into the essences of potencies, as they are according to DE, 
and hence that one particularly unsatisfying and unexplanatory account of the 
relationship between laws and properties is avoided. DE’s strategy of building laws 
into the essences of potencies is also related to two more specific problems, as 
argued in chapter 2. To conclude this chapter, then, I’ll briefly discuss how neither 
functional laws, nor the ubiquity of ceteris paribus laws pose any particular problem 
for the package of QDE and the Revised Potency-BSA. 
In section 2.3, it was shown that there can be no fundamental functional 
laws, according to DE. This is because not enough can be built in to the essence of a 
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potency, P, such that a functional law may be derived from a statement of P’s 
essence in accordance with DE’s steps (I) – (V). Fundamental functional laws are not 
precluded by the Revised Potency-BSA. Fundamental laws, according to the 
Revised Potency-BSA are the axioms of the simplest, most informative, true 
systematization of all w-potency-distributions. Nothing in this definition of 
fundamental laws of nature implies that functional laws, which say how some 
quantities vary with each other, could not be fundamental. Indeed, it is eminently 
plausible that functions will feature as axioms of the true systematization of all w-
potency distributions that best balances the virtues of simplicity and 
informativeness. Consider an imaginary functional law which says how the 
determinable quantities Q and R vary with one another. Surely this law would be 
far more tractable and useful to us than a (perhaps infinitely) long list of highly 
specific laws each of which tells us that some particular determinate value of Q goes 
with some determinate value of R. Functional laws, it seems, are well suited to 
presenting information about possible potency distributions in a way that is easily 
accessible to us and useful for our practical and scientific endeavours.  
In section 2.4, I presented a concern for DE, due to Corry (2011), according to 
which the Cartwrightian observation that very little of what goes on in the world 
conforms to the grammar of laws threatens to strip DE of much of its explanatory 
power. The problem is that, according to DE, potencies contain laws in their 
essences. Now we may ask: are potency essences exhausted by laws, or do potencies 
dispose their bearers to behave in ways besides those that conform to the grammar 
of laws? If the former, then DE cannot explain goings on that do not conform to the 
laws’ grammar in terms of potencies, if the latter, it is a mystery why what we learn 
in the lab about the lawful behaviours towards which potencies dispose their 
bearers, should have any application outside of the lab. Either way, DE’s explanatory 
aims are under threat (see sections 2.4 and 2.5 above for details).  
 The view developed in this chapter is clear on the fact that laws are not 
contained within potency essences. Rather, a potency, P, grounds a range of 
possible behaviours, what I have called a modal profile. Since, on this view, 
potencies ground a range of behaviours besides those that conform to the grammar 
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of the laws, the Cartwrightian observation that the laws “lie” is consistent with 
potencies nonetheless metaphysically explaining what goes on in the universe.    
The laws, according to the Revised Potency-BSA, emerge as higher-level 
descriptions of the various interactions between all potency instances considered 
collectively. A proposition’s status as a law, on this view, is partly determined by 
objective facts about potency interactions and partly by its usefulness to us. Some 
true proposition may meet these criteria for lawhood despite the fact that very little 
of what actually goes on in the universe conforms to its grammar exactly. The laws’ 
grammar is thus best understood as an artifact of the partly pragmatic grounds for 
certain propositions being elevated to the status of law – some proposition maybe 
very useful to us even if very little of what goes on in the universe conforms to its 
grammar exactly. Scientific lab work can then be understood as helping us to decide 
which propositions will be useful to us in this sense and hence good candidates for 
lawhood. The laws that we formulate based on discoveries in the lab are thus 
widely approximately applicable to real world settings.   
 
4.8  Conclusion   
I have argued that an account of laws in an unHumean world that deserves the 
name “best-system account” must conceive of the laws as descriptive and that those 
laws must form parts of an integrated systematization of the information about a 
world. More importantly, satisfaction of these desiderata ensures that an account of 
laws in an unHumean world does not succumb to the various problems raised 
against dispositional essentialism, which stemmed from that view’s questionable 
strategy of building laws into the essences of potencies, which those potencies were 
then supposed to metaphysically explain. To this end I propose the Revised 
Potency-BSA, which I have also argued overcomes the threat of scepticism raised 
for Demarest’s Potency-BSA. The Revised Potency-BSA is also poised to provide a 
better account of objective chances than the old Humean BSA, if, that is, we are more 
optimistic about the prospects of devising an appropriate weighting function over 








In this chapter, I argue that, given the package of views developed so far, and some 
further plausible assumptions, facts about laws of nature and facts about 
metaphysical modality share a common metaphysical ground, namely potencies. 
Potencies are fundamental properties that are necessarily connected with the range 
of dispositions that constitute their modal profiles because they ground those 
dispositions. Since I endorse Vetter’s possibility conception of dispositions, this is 
tantamount to claiming that potencies ground possibilities. Thus, I use 
dispositions/possibilities interchangeably (these points were developed in chapter 
3).  
What I will call the common ground thesis is the conjunction of the following 
claims:  
 
i)  the laws are grounded in potencies. 
ii)  all facts about metaphysical modality are grounded in potencies. 
 
I take the previous chapter to constitute a defence of the first conjunct. There I 
presented and defended the Revised Potency-BSA. Potencies, I argued, 
metaphysically determine their actual and possible distributions throughout space-
time in accordance with their modal profiles. The laws, according to the Revised 
Potency-BSA, are then features of a description of this information that best 
balances the virtues of simplicity and strength. Thus, potencies ground the laws of 
nature.22  
                                                     
22 To be precise, potencies partially ground the laws in conjunction with our standards of strength and simplicity. 
More on this in the next chapter.  
136 
 
This chapter will be concerned with defending the claim that all facts about 
metaphysical modality (henceforth modal facts, for short) are grounded in potencies. 
I will do this by defending the plausibility of the following line of argument:  
 
P1: All modal facts are grounded in potentialities (the central thesis of 
hardcore actualism). 
P2: All potentialities either are or are grounded in potencies.  
C: All modal facts are grounded in potencies. 
 
P1 is just the central thesis of hardcore actualism (HA), which I motivated in 
chapter 1 (in part) by showing how it meshed with the independently plausible 
denial of R-quidditism. The inference from P1 and P2 to C depends on the plausible 
assumption that grounding is transitive. Thus, my defence of the above argument in 
this chapter will primarily consist in defending P2. To do this, I’ll first discuss, in 
section 5.2, the relationship between a hardcore actualist modal metaphysics and 
necessary connections between properties and their modal profiles at every level of 
fundamentality. In section 5.3, I’ll discus metaphysical grounding, which plays the 
role of ordering potentialities from the less to the more fundamental. Then, in 
section 5.4, I’ll argue that the hardcore actualist metaphysic of potentialities all the 
way down, in conjunction with plausible definitions of “potency” and 
“fundamental”, implies that all potentialities that are not themselves potencies are 
grounded in potencies (i.e., P2). P2 in conjunction with P1 and the transitivity of 
ground, implies that all modal facts are grounded in potencies. 
 
5.2 Hardcore Actualism and ‘Potentialities All the Way Down’ 
According to hardcore actualism (HA), all modal facts hold in virtue of the concrete 
constituents of the actual world. HA stands in contrast to Lewisian modal realism, 
which grounds modal facts in concrete worlds that are causally and 
spatiotemporally isolated from actuality (Lewis 1986). HA also stands in contrast to 
various “softcore” actualist views, which ground modal facts in actually existing 
abstract objects such as sets of propositions (e.g. Plantinga 1976; Cameron 2008), or 
137 
 
uninstantiated properties of a world (e.g. Stalnaker 2003). HA derives appeal from 
its common-sense concrete object-property ontology; it makes no controversial 
assumptions about the existence of abstracta or a plurality of causally isolated 
worlds. By maintaining that metaphysical possibility and necessity ultimately 
concern how things are with the concrete constituents of the actual world, HA can 
also claim continuity with science. Science is well placed to yield knowledge of the 
various actual concrete objects and their properties and hence, given HA, to yield 
modal knowledge.  
In chapter 1, I provided further details of the workings of a hardcore 
actualist modal metaphysics with reference to Vetter(2015)’s particularly detailed 
and well-considered version of the view. According to Vetter, irreducibly modal 
properties that she calls potentialities, instantiated by actual, concrete individuals do 
the work of grounding modality. Potentialities are like the more familiar 
dispositional properties but form a broader class – all dispositional properties are 
potentialities but not all potentialities are dispositional properties. Thus, a vase has 
the disposition to break, it is fragile, whereas a brick is not disposed to break, though 
it can break – a brick has the potentiality to break. Whether an individual’s having 
some potentiality for M constitutes its being disposed to M is a context sensitive 
matter to which facts about individuals instantiating potentialities are a fully 
objective and context insensitive backdrop. I also presented, in chapter 1, Vetter’s 
extended understanding of potentiality, which includes iterated, joint, and extrinsic 
potentialities. With these various pieces in place, the essence of Vetter’s hardcore 
actualism is captured by   
 
POSSIBILITY: It is possible that p =df Something has an iterated potentiality 
for it to be the case that p. (Vetter 2015, 247) 
 
In what follows, I use “potency” to talk about fundamental level 
potentialities; potencies thus constitute an important subclass of potentiality. On my 
view, potentialities and potencies are modal in the sense that they ground, and 
hence are necessarily connected with, various dispositions/possibilities. Following 
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Vetter’s definition above, I use “hardcore actualism” or “HA” to refer specifically to 
the view according to which it is possible that p =df something has an iterated 
potentiality for it to be the case that p.  
But perhaps there are other ways of being a hardcore actualist if “hardcore 
actualism” is taken simply as dictating that all modal facts hold in virtue of the 
concrete (as opposed to abstract) constituents of the actual world. According to 
Armstrong’s combinatorialist modal metaphysics, for example, properties can 
recombine with concrete particulars which allows for different possible states of 
affairs (Armstrong 1989). Furthermore, Armstrong subscribes to an Aristotelian 
conception of universals, hence the properties that are able to recombine to yield 
alternative possibilities must themselves be instantiated by concrete individuals to 
exist. Nothing in this picture would seem to violate the hardcore actualist dictum.  
However, according to Contessa’s canonical definition of HA: “what makes 
modal propositions true are irreducibly modal features of the actual world (such as 
laws of nature, dispositions, or essences)” (2010, 342, my emphasis). It is the idea 
that the world contains some irreducible modality in the form of irreducibly modal 
properties (which enjoys some independent plausibility, as discussed in chapter 1) 
that really motivates the hardcore actualist to then put this modality to work in an 
account of metaphysical modality in general. What is not clear is that the properties 
that may be said to recombine, according to Armstrong’s modal metaphysics, can 
be thought of as doing the kind of work expected of them by HA because they are 
not irreducibly modal in the relevant sense. Armstrong’s quiddistic view of properties 
denies that there are any necessary connections between properties and 
behaviours/dispositions. On Armstrong’s view, then, the properties themselves do 
not seem to be doing any real work in constraining or determining what’s 
metaphysically possible. And this runs contrary to the spirit of HA. But regardless 
of the status of Armstrong’s view and others with respect to HA, to be clear: for 
present purposes, by “HA” I specifically mean Vetter’s potentiality view, which 
unambiguously gives properties a role in constraining or determining what’s 




Crucial to HA, then, is realism about the modal properties that ground modal 
facts.  Realism, in this sense, about modal properties can be understood in contrast 
with Humean reductionism. The Humean doesn’t disagree with the platitude that 
there are such things as potentialities, including the potentiality to break, or 
dispositions, including fragility and charge. Instead, the disagreement concerns the 
metaphysical explanation of such properties (see Vetter 2015, 24). The Humean 
typically seeks to explain these modal features of the world in terms of quiddities 
and the truth of counterfactual conditionals, where the latter, in turn, are analysed 
in terms of possible worlds (see, e.g., Stalnaker 1968; Lewis 2001 for possible worlds 
analyses of counterfactuals), such that all modal properties are everywhere 
eliminable. The realist, on the other hand, admits modal properties as irreducible 
primitives.  
Humeanism is one contrast point with the realism about modal properties 
central to HA. Armstrong (1997), for example, analyses away a vast majority of 
modal properties in terms of quiddities and the laws of nature, where he provides an 
unHumean account of the latter in terms of higher-order necessitation relations 
between universals (1999). The modality inherent to the necessitation relations 
remains an unanalysed primitive (hence Armstrong’s view is unHumean) in terms 
of which other modal properties, such as fragility and charge, are analysed. 
Armstrong, while admitting some irreducibly modal properties, nonetheless 
analyses away others, such as charge and mass, whose modal natures the hardcore 
actualist will admit as real and irreducible.   
Since the central thesis of HA is that modal facts are grounded in modal 
properties of concrete, actual individuals, which, following Vetter, I have been 
calling potentialities, the hardcore actualist must be a realist about these modal 
properties. If modal properties were understood in accordance with some form of 
reductionism, then, while strictly speaking something like POSSIBILITY might still 
be true, it would not tell the whole story. This is because the reductionist would 
further analyse “a potentiality for it to be the case that p” (the hardcore actualist’s 
definiens) in terms of something else; possible worlds, be they abstract or concrete 
(e.g., Lewis), or quiddities and primitive necessitation relations between universals 
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(e.g., Armstrong).23 It would then be that something else that was really doing the 
work of grounding modality.  
The hardcore actualist’s contention is that the something else is either more 
metaphysically suspect than potentialities (realistically construed) or else just not 
the sort of thing that is relevant to matters of metaphysical possibility and necessity. 
Possible worlds and Armstrongian necessitation relations certainly seem more 
mysterious than, say, the potentiality of an actual vase to break or the potentiality of 
an actual electron to exert a repulsive force, or so the hardcore actualist maintains. 
Furthermore, the fact that, for example, a vase is fragile, seems relevant to the 
possibility that it breaks in a way that the breaking of some other vase in some other 
possible world just does not (see, e.g., Jacobs 2010, sec. 3). The mysterious nature of 
the reductionist’s modal truthmakers also raises an epistemological problem – how 
do we come to know about these entities and, hence, about metaphysical modality? 
HA’s modal epistemology, by contrast, is strikingly elegant: science, and everyday 
empirical inquiry, can tell us about the potentialities of individuals and hence, 
according to HA, about metaphysical modality.  
Of course, in the case of a vase’s fragility, this high-level potentiality might 
be explicable in terms of lower-level potentialities of, say, the vase’s constituent 
molecules and atoms. But what is crucial is that at no point in any such chain of 
explanation is a potentiality explained in terms of or reduced to anything that is not 
itself a potentiality, else HA would be false. Borghini and Williams seem to be 
getting at this point when they say: 
 
What matters for our account is that dispositions have as their bases 
dispositional properties and not some alternative truthmaker; anything less 
would imply the falsity of our account. That is because we develop our 
account of possibility on the understanding that dispositionality is the 
source of [modality]; on all other treatments of dispositions, this [modality] 
                                                     
23 This imagined Armstrongian modal metaphysics is different to the combinatorialism that he actually endorses, 
which is touched on above.   
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is transferred elsewhere, either to the laws of nature, possible worlds, 
abstract realms, or what have you. (Borghini and Williams 2008, 24). 
 
And Vetter makes the point that while high-level potentialities may be explained in 
terms of lower level ones, the realism central to HA just maintains that at no point is 
a potentiality explained in terms of anything other than another potentiality:  
 
In explaining potentialities on the macro-level, we have to invoke 
potentialities again, though this time on the micro-level. The realist’s 
contention is not that every potentiality is irreducible or inexplicable. It is 
rather that, in reducing or explaining one potentiality, we always find 
ourselves saddled with new potentialities. Hence we can phrase realism 
about potentiality as the claim that as we progress from the less to the more 
fundamental levels, we will always find potentialities. It’s potentiality ‘all 
the way down’. (2015, 25). 
 
Thus, HA requires an ontology of modal properties – potentialities – all the way 
down to ensure that it is indeed these properties that are doing the work of 
grounding modality. Anything less would undermine HA’s ambitions to provide a 
common-sense account of modality as grounded in the properties of concrete, 
actual individuals because we would be forced to look elsewhere, the most obvious 
alternative being possible worlds, be they abstract or concrete, for the source of 
modality.  
Strictly speaking, HA may remain neutral on the question of whether there 
is an absolutely fundamental level of reality. As long as it is indeed potentialities 
that are grounding modal facts, it doesn’t matter how far “down” these 
potentialities go. Assuming, however, that the chain of potentialities from the less to 
the more fundamental does eventually bottom out (more on this 5.4.2), then the 
potentialities that populate the ground floor will be the familiar potencies discussed 
in previous chapters, since recall that potencies were defined simply as fundamental, 
irreducibly modal properties. Thus, plausible candidates for those potentialities that 
142 
 
populate the fundamental level will be the plausible candidate potencies previously 
discussed, such as charge, mass, spin, etc.  
 
5.3 Potentialities, Potencies and Grounding    
I’ve touched on a sense in which potentialities might be reduced or explained 
without thereby implying the falsity of HA. High-level potentialities, such as a vase’s 
fragility, may be reduced to, or explained in terms of, lower level potentialities of, in 
this case, the atoms and molecules that compose the vase. So long as we posit 
potentialities at every level of explanation, this type of reduction does not threaten 
HA because it is still ultimately potentialities that are doing the work of accounting 
for metaphysical modality. This picture then suggests a commitment to an objective 
relation of metaphysical grounding between potentialities at different levels and 
which is related to fundamentality in the following way: the grounded is less 
fundamental than its grounds (see Vetter 2015, 26–27). Certain facts about 
potentialities hold in virtue of or because of other facts about potentialities and we 
may call this relation ground. What it means to say that some less fundamental 
potentiality is reducible to or explicable in terms of some more fundamental 
potentialities, is that the latter ground the former. A relation of objective 
metaphysical grounding does the explanatory work.  
It is not uncommon to think of grounding as closely related to explanation in 
this way. Fine, for example, maintains that ground is an explanatory relation: “We 
take ground to be an explanatory relation: if the truth that P is grounded in other 
truths, then they account for its truth; P's being the case holds in virtue of the other 
truths' being the case.” (2001, 15). And Clark and Liggins cite examples of 
grounding, such as “the brittleness of the cup results from the way its constituent 
atoms are arranged” and “the truth value of a proposition is determined by how the 
world is” which “show that grounding is closely related to explanation” (2012, 812). 
In the former case, the cup’s brittleness is explained by its atomic and molecular 
structure. And in the latter case, the truth of the proposition that grass is green is 
explained by the greenness of grass. In these examples, grounding is understood as 
an explanation relation (perhaps among others, such as causation), which is 
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metaphysical in character; it doesn’t depend upon our interests or epistemic 
standing.   
There is an alternative account of the tight connection between grounding 
and explanation according to which grounding isn’t itself an explanation relation 
but it backs or underwrites explanations (see Bliss and Trogdon 2016, sec. 4). Audi 
expresses this view when he says:  
 
If we recognize [cases of non-causal explanation] and we agree that 
explanations require non-explanatory relations underlying their correctness, 
then we are committed to recognizing a non-causal relation at work in these 
explanations. (2012, 678–8). 
 
For Audi, the non-causal, non-explanatory relation is grounding, which may “back” 
explanations of a metaphysical or an epistemic variety.  
The contrast, then, is between a view of grounding as an explanation 
relation that is metaphysical in character and a view of grounding as not itself an 
explanation relation but as a non-causal relation that backs various explanations. 
HA needn’t commit one way or the other here. Either grounding is an explanation 
relation that holds between potentialities at different levels of fundamentality, and 
this is what it means to say that, e.g., a vase’s fragility is explicable in terms of its 
microstructure. Or grounding is some other non-causal, non-explanatory relation 
that holds between potentialities at different levels and underwrites explanations of 
the higher-level potentialities in terms of lower level potentialities.  
There are various nuanced debates about how best to construe the notion of 
ground, but the hardcore actualist seems able to rely just on some commonly held 
assumptions (see Vetter 2015, 27–28). Firstly, grounding is not supervenience. 
Supervenience is analysable in modal terms; A supervenes on B iff it is not possible 
that there be a change in A without a change in B. Grounding, on the other hand, is 
widely thought to be a primitive notion that is not understood in terms of any 
antecedent modal notions as in the case of supervenience. As a result, grounding 
can capture explanatory asymmetries where there is no modal asymmetry. For 
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example, the existence of Socrates and the set whose sole member is Socrates, 
namely {Socrates}, necessarily coincide. We might think, however, that the existence 
of Socrates explains the existence of {Socrates}, and not vice versa. Since it is the case 
that in all possible worlds in which Socrates exists, {Socrates} exists and vice versa, 
supervenience cannot be used to capture the intuitive explanatory asymmetry here. 
But if we think, as also seems plausible, that Socrates grounds {Socrates}, and not 
vice versa, then the primitive notion of ground can be invoked to capture this 
explanatory asymmetry not capturable by the modal notion of supervenience. In 
other words, grounding, like explanation, is hyperintensional, where supervenience 
is merely intensional. Secondly, grounding may be full or merely partial. So, for 
example, the existence of Socrates fully grounds the existence of {Socrates} whereas 
p only partially grounds p&q (see, e.g., Fine 2012b).    
A further assumption, that ground is a relative fundamentality relation, has 
already been touched on. Ground, it was suggested, does the explanatory work of 
ordering potentialities from the more to the less fundamental. But to properly induce 
this fundamentality ordering, and hence do its explanatory work, ground must be a 
strict partial order (SPO) – transitive, irreflexive and asymmetric (see, e.g., Raven 
2013, 193–94). This is noteworthy because the transitivity of ground is also required 
for the inference from P1: all modal facts are grounded in potentialities and P2: all 
potentialities either are or are grounded in potencies to the conclusion, C: all modal 
facts are grounded in potencies. Thus, the legitimacy of this part of my argument in 
this chapter requires no more than what the hardcore actualist is independently 
motivated to admit.  
Furthermore, it was argued in chapter 3 that QDE can, where structuralism 
cannot, retain the asymmetry of ground. Ground must be asymmetric (and 
irreflexive and transitive) if it is to do the work that the hardcore actualist would 
like it to do of explaining the relative fundamentality ordering of potentialities. 
Hence, the hardcore actualist has a reason to prefer QDE over structuralism as her 
metaphysic of properties.   
Reconsider, then, the potentiality of a vase, v, to break. This potentiality is 
grounded in the joint potentialities of v’s constituent molecules, which are in turn 
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grounded in the potentialities of those molecules’ constituent atoms and subatomic 
particles so on. A similar grounding story could be told about other potentiality 
attributions. Another (perhaps more contentious) example is Vetter’s potentiality to 
speak Finnish. This potentiality is grounded in her mental and physical make up, 
which are in turn grounded in the joint potentialities of molecules and atoms 
composing Vetter’s body. (Here I follow Clark and Liggins (2012, 813), among 
others, in assuming that mental states are grounded in physical brain states. I’ll 
return to this potentially controversial assumption in the next section). In short: 
grounding chains descend from high-level potentialities to lower and lower level 
potentialities.  
 
5.4 All Potentialities are Grounded in Potencies 
Given the claim, central to HA, that there are potentialities “all the way down” and 
two further, independently plausible, assumptions, it can be shown that all 
potentialities are grounded in potencies. The first of these assumptions, which has 
already been introduced, and which is endorsed by, e.g., Bird (2007), is the 
following definition of a potency: 
 
  POTENCY:  P is a potency iff P is a fundamental potentiality24 
 
The second assumption, endorsed by, e.g., Schaffer (2009), is the following attractive 
ground-theoretic definition of “fundamental”: 
 
 FUNDAMENTAL: X is fundamental iff X is ungrounded25 
 
For any potentiality, X, that is not itself a potency, there will be chains of 
grounding descending from X to lower and lower level potentialities. Wherever any 
such chain terminates will be some potentialities – because its potentialities all the 
                                                     
24 Though Bird uses the term “essentially dispositional property” instead of “potentiality”.  
25 According to, e.g., Schaffer “Part of what makes grounding a useful notion is that it can be used to define a cluster 
of useful metaphysical notions.” (2009, 373). Schaffer offers the following examples: x is fundamental =df nothing 
grounds x. x is derivative =df something grounds x. 
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way down – and since the grounding chain terminates, these potentialities will be 
ungrounded. According to FUNDAMENTAL, ungrounded entities are 
fundamental, hence these ungrounded potentialities are fundamental potentialities. 
And by POTENCY, fundamental potentialities are potencies. Hence, for any 
potentiality, X, that is not itself a potency, there will be chains of grounding 
descending from X to potencies. All potentialities which are not themselves 
potencies are ultimately grounded in potencies, which is P2 in my argument to the 
conclusion that all facts about metaphysical modality are grounded in potencies.  
 
5.4.1  An Anti-Physicalist Challenge? 
All of the putative examples offered of potencies so far have been the kinds of 
properties that are familiar to modern physics – things such as charge, mass and spin. 
An anti-physicalist may thus be tempted to try and resist P2 on the grounds that 
mental potentialities are neither identical with nor grounded in potencies. 
But P2 needn’t be denied to appease anti-physicalist sympathies. The anti-
physicalist might just deny that mental potentialities are either identical with or 
grounded in the kinds of potencies that are familiar to physics. A position consistent 
with P2 and that captures the anti-physicalist intuition might thus hold that there 
are mental as well as physical potencies. In this case, it could still be true that all 
potentialities are either identical with or grounded in potencies, but the mental 
potentialities would be identical with or grounded in mental potencies.  
For what it’s worth, I’d prefer to retain the physicalist line according to 
which all potentialities, including mental potentialities, are identical with or 
grounded in the kinds of potencies familiar to physics. But it is worth noting that P2 
itself is neutral with respect to physicalism. It would be beyond the scope of my 
present inquiry to properly address all of the debates about, e.g., physicalism, 
mind-body dualism and reductionism relevant to the issue regarding the status of 
mental properties. But by way of a very tentative defence of my preferred 
physicalist stance I’d like to briefly attempt to undermine one potential motivation 
for anti-physicalism.   
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The anti-physicalist may think that grounding the mental in the physical 
somehow diminishes the reality of the mental. In response to this, it is important to 
note that it is no implication of P2 that higher-level potentialities, be they fragility or 
irascibility, are any less real for ultimately being grounded in potencies. Grounding, 
as discussed, is an explanatory relation. So, if A grounds B, then A explains B, in a 
metaphysical sense. But this is not to say that B is any less real for being explicable 
in terms of B. The vase’s fragility is a real property of the vase, which is in no way 
diminished for being explicable in terms of the vase’s microstructure. Indeed, far 
from A’s being grounded in B suggesting the unreality of A, we should perhaps be 
more confident in the existence of grounded entities (Vetter 2015, 28, seems to share 
this view). After all, if it is granted that grounding is a real relation (as indeed I do), 
then surely its relata must at least exist for the relation to hold. So, to say that a 
grounding relation holds between mental properties and (physical) potencies 
should in no way be read as diminishing the reality of those mental properties, 
indeed the contrary would seem to be true.    
My aim is to provide a unified account of the laws of nature and 
metaphysical modality by showing that facts about laws and facts about 
metaphysical modality share a common ground, namely, potencies. Thus, if the laws 
of nature concern mental potencies as well as physical potencies, then the anti-
physicalist interpretation of P2 would be consistent with my broad project. If, 
however, there were such things as mental potencies which are different in kind 
from physical potencies and if those mental potencies were not the concern of laws 
of nature, then my unificatory project would be in trouble. But I think the burden of 
proof is on whoever would defend the remarkable package of claims that i) there 
are mental as well as physical potencies (i.e., mind-body dualism) and ii) the laws of 
nature do not concern the mental potencies. Aside from any incredulity that this 
package may inspire, I would hope that the competing views I defend here, 
according to which all potentialities (and hence all modal facts) are grounded in 
potencies and no potencies are beyond the remit of the laws of nature, combine to 
yield a more theoretically fruitful picture over all. Hence, one way of rebutting the 
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conjunction of i) and ii) is to present my own alternative and its theoretical virtues 
as convincingly as possible, which is what I do in the next chapter.  
 
5.4.2  Infinite Grounding Chains  
My discussion thus far has assumed that all grounding chains terminate. If, 
however, there were infinite grounding chains descending from some, or all, 
potentialities, then my argument for P2 at the beginning of this section would be in 
trouble. This is because if there were infinite grounding chains descending from 
some potentialities, then given POTENCY, those potentialities would not be 
grounded in potencies because potencies, by this definition, are ungrounded but 
every entity in an infinite grounding chain has some more fundamental ground.  
 Given that my aim in this thesis is to develop a theoretically fruitful unified 
account of laws and modality by building up from some plausible assumptions, I 
do not think that it would be unreasonable to simply assume that there are no 
infinite grounding chains for my purposes. This assumption enjoys some intuitive 
plausibility, and if a plausible assumption combines with some other plausible 
assumptions to yield an attractive view that is able to do good philosophical work, 
then this constitutes a good reason to accept that assumption. The virtues of the 
common ground view will be presented in the next two chapters.  
 But for what it’s worth, I am optimistic about prospects of the common 
ground thesis even in a world with infinite grounding chains. All that is important 
to the common ground thesis is that there exists some unified class of potentialities 
in which facts about laws and facts about metaphysical modality are grounded. 
And this is consistent with the potentialities that make up the common ground 
being grounded in further potentialities.  In other words, what is important is that 
laws and modality share a common ground, not that the common ground be 
fundamental or ungrounded. For the sake of simplicity, however, I will continue to 
assume that all grounding chains do terminate, hence the official argument for P2 is 





In this chapter, I have sought to add plausibility to the common ground thesis 
according to which facts about laws and facts about modality are grounded in 
potencies. I noted that the previous chapter constituted an argument for the claim 
that laws are grounded in potencies. This chapter was thus primarily concerned 
with defending the claim that all facts about metaphysical modality are grounded in 
potencies, which I motivated via a defence of the following argument:  
 
P1: All modal facts are grounded in the potentialities. 
P2: All potentialities either are or are grounded in potencies.  
C: All modal facts are grounded in potencies. 
 
P1 is the central thesis of HA, which I have argued is independently attractive. The 
majority of this chapter thus focused on defending P2. To this end, I argued that 
central to HA is the idea that there are potentialities “all the way down”. From this, 















6. CHARTING THE COMMON GROUND 
 
6.1  Introduction 
I have argued that facts about laws and all facts about metaphysical possibility and 
necessity are grounded in potencies because there are chains of grounding 
descending from all potentialities that are not themselves potencies to the level of 
potencies. 
To facilitate a more precise discussion of what this implies about the 
relationship between laws and modality I’d like to show that both laws and 
modality may be understood as concerning how potencies are possibly distributed 
throughout space and time. I will then explore the resulting philosophical landscape 
and conclude the chapter with some objections and replies. 
 
6.2  Laws and Possible Potency Distributions  
To facilitate the presentation and evaluation of my positive view of the laws, in 
chapter 4 I introduced a precise definition of the term “modal profile”. In previous 
chapters, I had used the term “modal profile” somewhat loosely to refer to the full 
range of dispositions or behaviours that a property grounds. But what is it for a 
property, P, to ground a range of behaviours/dispositions? I say that it is for P to 
ground facts about the properties, the X’s, with which P is possibly coinstantiated 
by a property bearer, x. P’s modal profile is then defined as the range of properties, 
the X’s, with which P is possibly coinstantiated by an individual property bearer, x.   
To see why this definition of “modal profile” gets at the intuitive idea that 
P’s modal profile has to do with the dispositions/behaviours with which P is 
associated, consider the following. It is allowed that the X’s be relational, 
conjunctive, time-indexed, or otherwise highly gerrymandered. So, the modal 
profile of P may, for example, specify that P is possibly coinstantiated with the 
property of occupying location L1 at time T1 and occupying location L2 at time T2. 
This, in turn, implies something about how any individual, x, that instantiates P can 
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behave/is disposed; x can occupy L1 at T1 and L2 at T2 (assuming, of course, that x 
instantiates no other properties that are incompatible with its behaving in this way). 
Since properties ground modal profiles that have implications for how individual 
property bearers can behave/are disposed, properties can thus be thought of as 
metaphysically constraining how they are possibly distributed throughout space 
and time.  
In chapter 4, I argued that potencies ground the laws because the laws are 
features of a description of (actual and) possible potency distributions, where possible 
potency distributions are metaphysically determined by potencies in accordance 
with their modal profiles. Hence, the laws of nature are grounded in possible 
potency distributions.26  
 
6.2  Modality and Possible Potency Distributions  
According to the version of HA that I endorse, it is possible that φ iff something has 
a potentiality to φ. In this section I propose an understanding of potentiality in 
terms of possible potency distributions and hence a modified HA schema according 
to which it is possible that φ iff some potencies are (or potency is) possibly 
distributed such that φ. 
Reconsider the example of a fragile vase, v. As discussed, the proposition  
<possibly v breaks> is true in virtue of the vase’s potentiality to break, in virtue of its 
fragility, for short. But v’s fragility, I have argued, is grounded in the potentialities 
of its constituent molecules and atoms and, ultimately, potencies. More precisely, v’s 
fragility is grounded in some potencies jointly, since no single potency instance 
suffices by itself to ground v’s fragility.   
Now what, at the potency-level, would it be for v’s fragility to be 
manifested? It would, I suggest, be for some potency instances (potencies for short), 
perhaps those of the vase’s subatomic constituents, to be appropriately distributed. 
We might think of v’s being broken as a matter of the potencies of v’s constituent 
atoms and molecules being more scattered or distributed in a less orderly manner 
                                                     
26 To be precise, laws are partially grounded in possible distributions of potencies, they are also partially grounded 
in facts about our practical and scientific interests, which, in turn, inform our standards of simplicity and strength. I 
return to this point in section 6.7.  
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than they would be if v remained unbroken. For some potencies to be distributed 
someway is tantamount to their being coinstantiated with the appropriate extrinsic 
properties. Thus, how some potencies are possibly distributed is grounded in those 
potencies themselves and implied by those potencies’ modal profiles, which specify 
all the properties, including extrinsic properties, with which they are possibly 
coinstantiated. In short: whether a vase can break is a matter of its having the 
potentiality to break which is a matter of some potencies’ possibly being distributed 
such that it is broken.  
My suggestion is that a similar story could be told about all potentiality 
attributions. In general, then, I propose an understanding of potentiality as follows: 
 
Potentiality Instantiation: For x to instantiate a potentiality to φ is for 
some actual potencies to be possibly 
distributed such that x is φ.  
Potentiality Manifestation: For x’s potentiality to φ to be manifest is for 
some actual potencies to be distributed such 
that x is φ.  
 
Thus, I propose an understanding of potentiality, and hence metaphysical 
possibility, in terms of possible potency distributions, which implies the following: 
 
HA Schema*: It is possible that φ iff some actual potencies are possibly 
distributed such that φ.  
 
Possible potency distribution need not be interpreted as an alternative modal 
primitive to potentiality, rather it is a proposal for how to understand what is going 
on in cases where some potentiality is instantiated and grounded in potencies 
(which I have argued is the case for all non-fundamental potentialities).27 For a 
                                                     
27 Since a potentiality will often be grounded in various potencies jointly, the present proposal can be understood as 
in a similar spirit to Vetter’s discussion of potentialities “fitting” each other as a way of understanding joint 
potentiality (2015, 114). I just prefer to talk in terms of possible distribution than in terms of fitting and, as I’ll argue, 
I think that all potentialities, even single potency instances, can be understood in these terms.  
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potentiality to be instantiated is for some potencies to be possibly distributed some 
way. Saying that x has a potentiality to φ is shorthand for saying that some 
potencies are possibly distributed such that x is φ. As was the case when talking in 
terms of potentiality, modality is not eliminated, the idea is rather that all modal 
facts can be accounted for in terms of possible potency distributions, where possible 
potency distributions are grounded in the (qualitative) natures of the potencies 
themselves (see chapter 3 for discussion of the idea that qualities ground 
possibilities).  
The point of introducing this understanding of potentiality in terms of 
possible potency distributions is to show that modality, like the laws of nature, can 
be understood in terms of possible potency distributions. This will, in turn, allow 
me to say more about what the common ground thesis implies about relationship 
between laws and modality. Modal facts turn out to be a matter of how some 
potencies are possibly distributed and laws are features of a description of all 
possible potency distributions.  
One might object that metaphysical modality (and hence potentiality) is not 
in general a matter of some potencies’ possibly being distributed some way because 
some very basic modal fact might need no more than a single potency instance to 
ground it. And no sense can be made of the possible distribution of a single 
potency. But if we are still allowed to consider the potency instantiated in a 
manifold of spacetime points, then we can still talk about the possible distribution 
of a single potency because we can talk about it, say, being coinstantiated with the 
property of being at point L1 at time T1 and at point L2 at T2, etc., which is 
tantamount to its being distributed some way. If, however, the thought is that a 
single potency instance, P, could ground a modal fact independently of absolutely 
anything, even spacetime points, then it does seem unlikely that P could do so via 
grounding its being possibly distributed some way. But the obvious response is to 
bite the bullet here. The intuitive idea behind possible distribution is that some 
proposition, φ, is possible iff some potencies can be arranged or configured to bring it 
about that φ. If a single potency instance considered in complete isolation cannot be 
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arranged or configured to bring about anything, then it cannot ground any modal 
facts.  
As Vetter notes, we can we can treat individual potentialities as a limiting 
case of joint potentialities: 
 
[S]ince a single object is a limiting case of objects, the potentialities of a single 
object are a limiting case of potentialities possessed by objects. We can 
therefore say that the (joint) potentialities of objects are the metaphysical 
primitive, and leave it open whether those objects are ever more than one at 
a time. (Vetter 2015, 115).  
 
Similarly, we can take the possible distribution of a single potency as the limiting 
case of a possible distribution of potencies. It can thus be maintained that all modal 
facts concern possible potency distributions while remaining open as to whether 
those potencies distributed are ever more than one at a time.  
 
6.3  Unifying Laws and Modality  
The purpose of the above excursion into the notion of possible potency distributions 
is that it allows us to see quite clearly the close relationship between laws and 
modality. On the account presented, laws and modality both have something to do 
with possible distributions of potencies. For some proposition to be a law of nature 
is for it to be an axiom of the best systematization of all possible distributions of all 
and only the potencies instantiated at the actual world. For φ to be metaphysically 
possible is for there to actually exist some potencies that are (or indeed, potency that 
is) possibly distributed such that φ.   
The generality of the laws is such as to imply a wide range of (though 
probably not all) facts about the possible distributions of potencies and hence about 
what’s metaphysically possible. The laws might thus be understood as efficient 
summaries of all the facts about possible potency distributions and hence as 
efficient summaries of the space of metaphysical possibility.  
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Put another way, different functions on the possible distributions of 
potencies yield the laws in one case and metaphysical possibility in the other. Both 
functions take as input facts about possible potency distributions. The laws-function 
then outputs this information in a manner that best balances strength and 
simplicity. The result is a kind of coarse-graining of the information about possible 
potency distributions. This is useful for us because it provides easy access to as 
much of this information as possible, which can then be used to make predictions 
about, and perform interventions on, our environment to serve our practical and 
scientific interests. However, the laws-function, in virtue of its coarse-graining 
effect, will likely omit some information about possible potency distributions. The 
metaphysical modality-function, by contrast, simply takes all information about 
possible potency distributions as input and then outputs all resultant facts about 
metaphysical modality. This function loses no information, but it does not present 
the information in a manner that is particularly accessible or useful to us.   
In the next chapter, I’ll discuss the epistemological and methodological 
upshots of this view – in a nutshell; modal epistemology is assimilated to familiar 
scientific epistemology because scientific inquiry into the laws of nature presents 
our best route to knowledge of what is metaphysically possible. Next, I’d like to 
situate the common ground view with respect to two traditional views about the 
relationship between physical and metaphysical necessity; relativism (e.g., Smiley 
1963; Leech 2016) and primitivism (Fine 2005).  
 
6.4 Varieties of Varieties of Modality  
In this section, as a way of further illuminating the idea, developed in this thesis, 
that laws and modality share a common ground I will consider the following 
question: what is the relationship between physical and metaphysical necessity?  
Physical necessity and metaphysical necessity are often thought to be two 
among a variety of different necessities including perhaps mathematical, logical, 
normative, legal and others. We might wonder, then, what the relationship is 
between these various different necessities. In this section, I’ll discuss (the 
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shortcomings of) two familiar competing views of the relationship between physical 
and metaphysical necessity, what I shall call relativism and primitivism.  
Relativism comes in two slightly different versions: reductive and non-
reductive (see Leech 2016, 164). Central to both is the idea that p is physically 
necessary iff p follows logically from the laws of nature. But where the reductivist 
says that there is nothing more to physical necessity than logical necessity relative 
to some propositions that we call laws, the non-reductive version includes the claim 
that the laws enjoy their own distinctive, sui generis, variety of necessity. According 
to primitivism, physical and metaphysical necessity are wholly independent and 
incommensurable varieties of necessity.  
I’ll discuss some problems for relativism and primitivism before moving on 
to discuss how best to understand the relationship between physical and 
metaphysical necessity given the common ground view and how this overcomes the 
problems faced by relativism and primitivism. The point of this section is not to 
provide an exhaustive survey of all of the subtly different accounts that are on offer 
of the relationship between varieties of necessity, such a task would be beyond my 
present scope. Rather, the intention is to raise the question about the relationship 
between physical and metaphysical necessity, flag some potential pitfalls to which 
an account of this relationship may succumb and then to discuss what the common 
ground view implies and how it can avoid these pitfalls.   
 
6.4.1  Relativism 
For the purpose of my discussion of relativism I shall, following Fine (2005, 237), 
understand logical necessity as a restriction on metaphysical necessity such that a 
truth is logically necessary iff it is metaphysically necessary and a truth of logic. 
According to this view, logical necessity is just a species of metaphysical necessity 
(Fine 2005, 237).28  
Relativism takes metaphysical/logical necessity to be absolute, in the sense 
that if p is metaphysically/logically necessary, then there is no alethic sense of 
possibility according to which it is possible that not-p (see Hale 1996; Leech 2016) 
                                                     
28 Though see, for example, Edgington (2004) for an alternative view.  
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(by alethic I will mean factive and non-epistemic). According to reductive relativism, 
p is physically necessary iff p follows logically from the conjunction of truths about 
the laws of nature and physical necessity is understood as nothing more than logical 
necessity relative to the class of propositions about the laws of nature (Leech 2016, 
159, 164). Assuming that logical necessity is a species of metaphysical necessity, it is 
thus this reduction of physical necessity to logical necessity that the relativist may 
offer as an account of the relationship between physical and metaphysical necessity. 
It is clear, then, that if logical necessity weren’t a species of metaphysical necessity 
(see, notably, Edgington 2004 for this view) relativism would not even count as 
illuminating the relationship between physical and metaphysical necessity. Rather, 
the account would tell us about how physical necessity reduces to whatever non-
metaphysical variety of necessity logical necessity is and it would remain open how 
metaphysical necessity and this other necessity relate. It is thus interesting to flag 
here that a not insignificant assumption must be made for relativism to even count 
as accounting for the relationship between physical and metaphysical necessity. But 
there are at least two other pressing concerns for this view.  
One concern is that reductive relativism risks triviality. Just as we can define 
physical necessity as logical necessity relative to the conjunction of truths about the 
laws of nature, we might define wombat-necessity as logical necessity relative to the 
conjunction of truths about wombats or Argos-necessity as logical necessity relative 
to the class of truths about the Argos catalogue (see, e.g., Fine 2005; Bird 2007; 
Wilson 2013; Leech 2016). But physical necessity, unlike wombat or Argos-necessity, 
strikes us as deeply non-trivial. Thus, if the reductive relativist is to account for the 
relationship between physical and metaphysical necessity by defining the former in 
terms of (a species of) the latter, more needs to be said to distinguish between trivial 
and non-trivial relative necessities.   
Leech suggests that the reductive relativist can draw the distinction between 
trivial and non-trivial relative necessities by appeal to the class of propositions to 
which the different necessities are relative. The class of propositions about 
wombats, or items in the Argos catalogue, is of limited interest and scope, and this 
explains why necessity relative to either of these classes of propositions is itself 
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trivial. The class of propositions about the laws of nature, on the other hand, is 
broader and more interesting, hence the non-triviality of necessity relative to this 
class (Leech 2016, 163).   
However, this move seems to just shift the explanatory burden, for it leaves 
unanswered why propositions about the laws are of interest to us, why, for 
example, are funding bodies more likely to fund research concerning the basic laws 
of nature than research concerning items in the Argos catalogue? Leech suggests 
that perhaps this has to do with the fact that the conjunction of propositions about 
the laws is broader in scope than that about, say, the Argos catalogue (ibid). But 
breadth of scope can’t explain the interestingness of the laws. We can easily get a 
conjunction of propositions broader in scope than the conjunction of laws by 
conjoining the laws with the class of propositions about the Argos catalogue. But 
necessity relative to this broader class is surely less important than necessity relative 
to just the laws. The key question is: why is the conjunction of propositions about 
the laws and, hence, necessity relative to the laws, important? As it stands, the 
reductive relativist account of the relationship between physical and metaphysical 
necessity is obscure on this point.   
According to another type of triviality concern, reductive relativism 
trivialises the necessity of the laws themselves. Recall that, according to the 
reductive relativist it is physically necessary that p iff p follows logically from the 
conjunction of true propositions about the laws of nature and physical necessity is 
nothing more than logical necessity relative to the laws. It is thus true trivially that 
the laws of nature are physically necessary because they are logically implied by 
themselves and, according to the reductivist, the laws’ necessity consists in nothing 
more than their following logically from themselves. However, one might think that 
the necessity of the laws is a more substantive matter than trivial self-entailment. 
Here’s Fine on the matter:  
 
The general problem is that a definition of natural necessity as a form of 
relative necessity will tend to make the necessity of the propositions with 
respect to which the necessity is relative a trivial or insubstantial matter; yet 
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we are inclined to think that the necessity attaching to the laws and the like 
is not of this trivial sort. (Fine 2005, 247). 
 
However, as Leech discusses (2016, 164), there is a non-reductive version of 
relativism, which perhaps does better on this score. According to non-reductive 
relativism, natural necessities are understood as relative just in the sense that they 
are not absolute, where p is absolutely necessary iff there is no alethic sense of 
possibility according to which it is possible that not-p. Thus, according to the non-
reductive account of the laws’ relative necessity, the laws enjoy some form of 
necessity, but there is also a sense of possibility, namely logical/metaphysical, 
according to which for any p, if p is a law it is possible that not-p. And this is what is 
meant by the claim that the laws are relatively necessary. By endowing the laws with 
a kind of sui generis necessity that is weaker than absolute necessity, non-reductive 
relativism needn’t trivialise the necessity of the laws themselves. Physical necessity 
in general may be then defined as logical necessity relative to the laws of nature and 
this is supposed to illuminate the relationship between physical and metaphysical 
necessity without reducing the former to the latter and without rendering the 
necessity of the laws trivial. The distinctive modal force of physically necessary 
propositions is then inherited from the distinctive modal force of the laws 
themselves.  
Leech suggests that the lesson for the reductivist is that if they wish to define 
natural necessity in terms of the laws of nature, then the laws cannot themselves be 
defined in terms of their being naturally necessary, else the above triviality concern 
will arise. The suggestion, then, is that if the laws are given some analysis not in 
terms of their being physically necessary (such as, perhaps, a Lewisian best system 
analysis or an Armstrongian analysis in terms of higher-order universals) then the 
reductivist may be back in business (Leech 2016, 165).  
However, the above suggestion raises a critical dilemma for the reductivist. 
On the one hand, if the proposed analysis of laws does not endow them with some 
distinctive modal force, then nothing has been done to address the idea that some 
non-trivial modal force, some necessity, attaches to the laws, which needs accounting 
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for. But, on the other hand, if the analysis of laws does endow them with some 
distinctive non-trivial necessity, then the view would seem to collapse back to the 
non-reductivist view according to which the laws enjoy their own distinctive kind of 
necessity, which is not reducible to logical necessity. Thus I think that Leech’s 
suggestion that the reductivist needs to provide an analysis of the laws that is 
independent of their necessity (Leech 2016, 164–65) misses the mark, for if the 
reductivist succeeds they are either left without an account of the laws’ distinctive 
modal force or a view that is no longer reductive.  
I argue, contrary to Leech, that it is the non-reductivist who must give an 
account of the laws not in terms of their being physically necessary, but which 
nonetheless explains their necessity. I take the point that the non-reductivist is better 
placed to avoid rendering the laws’ necessity trivial by granting that their necessity 
is of a distinctive kind, but noting this point is only part of the job done. It is 
unexplanatory to merely stipulate that the laws enjoy some sort of sui generis 
necessity, the reductivist ought to provide an independently plausible account of 
the laws from which it follows that they in fact enjoy some such necessity. Only 
once this has been achieved may we have some confidence in the substance of the 
laws’ necessity and, hence, confidence in the substance of necessity relative to the 
laws. Indeed, this seems to be Lange’s point (2009, chap. 2). 
Lange (2009) has argued that two prominent accounts of laws; Lewis’s best 
system analysis and Armstrong’s nomic necessitation view fail because the alleged 
lawmakers, on these views, fail to make the laws necessary in the required sense. In 
a nutshell: Lewis’s account just makes laws thoroughly contingent, and 
Armstrong’s view calls the laws naturally necessary, but it is unclear how merely 
bestowing the laws with a name can make them necessary (Lange 2009, 58).  It 
would be beyond the scope of my present inquiry to survey the various analyses of 
laws and the extent to which they each succeed at securing the laws’ necessity. But 
suffice it to note that an important task is to account for the laws in a way that 
explains their necessity – simply calling the laws necessary will not do. In section 
6.4.3, I’ll argue that the laws’ necessity comes about because the laws are partially 
grounded in facts about possible potency distributions, where facts about possible 
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potency distributions are themselves metaphysically necessary. The laws thus 
inherit their necessity from their metaphysical ground.  
 
6.4.2  Primitivism 
Contrary to the relativist, Fine (2005) has forcefully argued that physical and 
metaphysical necessity are wholly distinct and incommensurable varieties of 
necessity. Call this view primitivism. In support of his view, Fine appeals to the 
triviality concerns faced by relativism, as well as to purported counterexamples to 
relativism, which, for brevity, I shall omit discussion of. Besides, Leech (2016) has 
argued, with equal and opposite force, that Fine’s purported counterexamples to 
relativism can be resisted. Instead of getting into the nuances of this debate, which 
unfortunately would lead me too far astray, I just want to put the primitivist view 
on the table as another contrast point with the common ground view.  
So, to reiterate, contrary to relativism, Fine’s primitivism takes physical and 
metaphysical necessity to be wholly independent and incommensurable varieties of 
necessity, neither of which can be understood or defined in terms of the other. 
According to Fine, it is the identities of things at the source of metaphysical necessity 
and the natural order at the source of physical necessities. Natural necessity is thus de 
dicto and metaphysical necessity is de re and “neither form of necessity can be 
subsumed, defined, or otherwise understood by reference to any other forms of 
necessity” (Fine 2005, 260). 
Primitivism answers the question about the relationship between physical 
and metaphysical necessity by denying the premise that there is any relationship. 
But if it is denied that there is any relationship between these varieties of necessity, 
then a new question arises: why think of these both as necessity at all? Primitivism, 
while perhaps avoiding the triviality concerns for relativism, opens up an 
explanatory chasm.  
These issues faced by relativism and primitivism highlight the need for the 
following:  
 
- An account of the laws’ necessity. 
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- An account of the laws’ importance. 
- An account of the relationship between physical and metaphysical 
necessity. 
 
In the next section, I discuss the implications of the common ground view on each 
of these points.  
 
6.5  Virtues of Common Ground  
The common ground view, which results from the conjunction of my preferred 
version of hardcore actualism and the Revised Potency-BSA, has it all. It explains 
how the lawmakers make the laws necessary and hence why the laws are important 
to us. It also points to an account of the relationship between physical and 
metaphysical necessity that avoids all of the triviality concerns discussed. For the 
remainder of this section, I’ll provide more detail on these points.   
The Lawmakers Explain the Laws’ Necessity. Recall that, according to the 
Revised Potency-BSA, the laws at a world, w, are the axioms of a description of all 
possible distributions of all and only the potencies instantiated at w, that maximises 
the virtues of informativeness and simplicity. It has also been argued that 
metaphysical possibility is a matter of how potencies are possibly distributed 
throughout spacetime. The lawmakers, namely possible potency distributions, are 
thus facts about what is metaphysically possible. Now plausibly, facts about what is 
metaphysically possible are themselves metaphysically necessary. That is to say that 
S5, which is characterised by the following axiom ◊φ → □◊φ, is the correct logic of 
metaphysical modality.29 Thus, the facts about metaphysically possible potency 
distributions, which ground the laws, are themselves metaphysically necessary and 
this accounts for the laws’ necessity.   
However, laws are not fully grounded in possible potency distributions. 
According to the Revised Potency-BSA, laws are partially grounded in possible 
potency distributions and partially grounded in our standards of strength and 
                                                     
29 The hardcore actualist may need to make additional metaphysical assumptions in order to validate the S5 axiom. 
Vetter (2015, 213) discusses some such assumptions.  
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simplicity, which, in turn, depend upon our scientific and practical interests, which 
are contingent. There is thus a sense in which the laws could have been different if 
our interests had been different. Of course, different interests would do nothing to 
alter the facts themselves about possible distributions of potencies such as mass and 
charge etc., which are indeed necessary. And it is this necessity of possible potency 
distributions, in which the laws are (partially) grounded, that accounts for the laws’ 
modal force. Those facts that the laws aim to capture in as strong and simple a 
manner as possible – facts about possible potency distributions – are necessary, 
hence the laws describe something necessary insofar as they latch on to those facts 
and this accounts for the modal force of the laws. But strictly speaking the laws, 
understood as descriptions, and not as themselves facts about possible potency 
distributions, could have failed to be laws, had our scientific interests been 
different. That is not to say that actual law statements could have been false, just that 
they could have failed to be laws had our interests been different and, hence, if we’d 
focused our attention on some other true generalizations.  
For a long time philosophers have debated the modal status of the laws and 
nowadays there is a clear divide between those who think that the laws are 
metaphysically necessary (e.g., Edgington 2004; Bird 2007; Wilson 2013) and those 
who believe that the laws are metaphysically contingent  (e.g., Loewer 1996; Lewis 
2001; Fine 2005; Schaffer 2005). A potential benefit of the common ground view 
might then be its ability to capture something of both of these competing intuitions 
regarding the modal status of the laws. On the one hand, it captures the necessity of 
the laws by explaining precisely why those facts described by the laws are 
metaphysically necessary. On the other hand, by conceiving of the laws as 
descriptions formulated by us to serve practical and scientific ends, it remains 
metaphysically possible that those very descriptions were never elevated to the 
status of law, so there is a sense in which the laws are contingent too. I do not, 
however, intend to suggest that the contingentists are making any kind of error – I 
do not think that that they are confusing law statements with the nomological facts 
themselves. So perhaps the contingentists will remain steadfast in their conviction 
that it is the nomological facts themselves that are contingent, not just facts about 
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what we happen to call “laws”, and hence reject the claim that the common ground 
view does anything to satisfy their stance.  
However, I think there is some scope to push back against this steadfast 
contingentist response. What the common ground view can capture is the 
possibility that the world seemed very different to us and that this difference was 
accompanied by a difference in the laws. In this respect, it may be argued that the 
common ground view captures something of the contingentist intuition. To see how 
the common ground view can achieve this, consider the following. A world that 
seemed very different to us, and which is possible according to the common ground 
view, is one in which our cognitive and/or perceptual capacities are very different 
from actuality. Perhaps, for example, one such difference in this world is that we 
primarily experience our surroundings through echolocation. But if we had different 
cognitive and/or perceptual capacities, our standards of strength and simplicity 
and, hence, the laws would be different too. According to the common ground view, 
then, there are possible worlds in which it is the case that things seem very different 
from actuality and the laws are different, which, I suggest, gets at something of the 
contingentist motivation.   
Admittedly, contingentists have other, more robust reasons for their position 
than wanting to capture the intuition that the world might seem different and that 
this difference be accompanied by a difference in which propositions count as laws. 
Schaffer (2005), for example, argues that our best semantics for counterfactuals 
requires that the nomological facts themselves be contingent. In the next chapter, I 
address this point and others in the course of defending the kind of 
necessitarianism about the laws implied by the common ground view.   
The Laws’ Importance Explained. The laws summarise facts about how 
potencies are possibly distributed, hence they summarise facts about what is 
metaphysically possible. Metaphysical possibility is possibility simpliciter thus the 
laws are important because they present information about possibility simpliciter in 
a way that is intelligible and useful to us in our practical and scientific endeavours. 
The laws’ importance, on this view, has little to do with their breadth of scope 
(contra, e.g., Leech 2016, 163), rather it comes about partly through inheritance  
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from the importance of the facts that they describe and partly because they present 
these facts in a way that is tractable, which is important for various scientific and 
practical ends.   
The Relationship Between Physical and Metaphysical Necessity. I’ve provided an 
account of the laws, namely the Revised Potency-BSA, I’ve explained how the 
lawmakers, namely possible potency distributions, account for the laws’ modal 
force and I’ve explained the importance of the laws, which consists in their 
providing a tractable presentation of information about possibility simpliciter. It 
might seem natural, then, to accept the following: 
 
?POSS? p is physically possible iff p is logically consistent with the 
Revised Potency-BSA laws  
 ?NEC? p is physically necessary iff p follows logically from the 
Revised Potency-BSA laws 
 
safe in the knowledge that the triviality concerns are avoided given the independent 
account of the laws’ necessity and importance outlined above. However, there is at 
least one strong reason against accepting ?POSS? and ?NEC?.  
 It seems plausible that if it is physically possible that p then it is 
metaphysically possible that p. The validity of this inference is something that we 
should seek to accommodate. However, ?POSS? and ?NEC? render this inference 
invalid.  
The laws, recall, are efficient summaries over the space of metaphysical 
possibility, in virtue of being axioms of the maximally strong and simple 
description of possible potency distributions. It is thus possible that the maximally 
strong and simple system of laws fall silent on some facts about metaphysical 
possibility; the addition, or complication of some law to capture just one more 
proposition about what’s metaphysically possible/necessary might add strength but 
at too great a cost in simplicity. So, p might be consistent with the laws just because 
the laws fall silent about p. It might nonetheless be the case that p is metaphysically 
impossible because, as a matter of fact, no potencies are possibly distributed such 
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that p. So, if we want to retain the implication from physical possibility to 
metaphysical possibility, we should not understand p’s physical necessity as 
consisting in p’s following logically from the Revised Potency-BSA laws and hence 
we should not understand p’s possibility as consisting in p’s being logically 
consistent with the Revised Potency-BSA laws. Hence, although the present view 
provides a good account of the laws’ necessity and importance, this is not enough to 
rescue relativism, definitive of which are biconditionals along the lines of ?POSS? 
and ?NEC?.  
When asking about the respective natures of physical and metaphysical 
necessity and about the relationship between the two, there is an implicit 
assumption that there really are distinct varieties of alethic (by which I mean 
factive, non-epistemic) modality, from among which we can pick out physical and 
metaphysical modality and then say something about how they are related. My 
inclination, however, is to deny the assumption that alethic modality really does 
exhibit this diversity. I have defended an account of metaphysical modality in terms 
of possible potency distributions and my inclination is to just stop there. That is, I 
am inclined to say that there is just one type of alethic modality and it is a matter of 
how potencies are possibly distributed. You can call this type of modality what you 
want – metaphysical, physical, schmisical – but there is just it.30 What justifies this? 
Well, so far, I have so far defended an attractive picture of properties, laws and 
modality and how they relate and if within that picture there is no room for a 
diversity of alethic modalities from among which we might pick out distinct 
varieties corresponding to physical and metaphysical modality, then so be it. On my 
view, there are the metaphysical modalities and efficient descriptions of them. No 
further modalities have been introduced. The result is a very parsimonious picture 
with various other theoretical benefits discussed in this chapter and the next.  
In the next chapter I will say more about the benefits of identifying physical 
and metaphysical modality, which is one way of understanding the present 
                                                     
30A caveat: perhaps there are also some acceptable restrictions on this modality. We might, for example, think of 
chemical, biological and psychological modalities as distinct subsets of the space of metaphysical modality. Thus, 
we might say that p is biologically necessary iff it is metaphysically necessary and a truth of biology. But this way of 
distinguishing different modalities just involves carving up the one true modal space into different categories.   
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suggestion, but for now, suffice it to note the following. This account doesn’t 
require us to controversially assume that logical necessity is a species of 
metaphysical necessity to account for the relationship between physical and 
metaphysical necessity. The relationship is identity. Nor does it succumb to any of 
the triviality concerns that faced the relativist view. Primitivism made a mystery of 
the connection between physical and metaphysical necessity in virtue of which both 
are rightly called types of necessity. The present view, on the other hand, makes this 
connection very clear because physical necessity just is metaphysical necessity, 
which is fully grounded in possible potency distributions. 
The above considerations are, however, consistent with distinguishing 
physical and metaphysical necessity but denying that the former is an alethic 
modality. We might grant that a proposition’s physical necessity consists in its 
following logically from the Revised Potency-BSA laws and that physical possibility 
consists in being logically consistent with the Revised Potency-BSA laws. But 
instead of holding that physical modality, so construed, is alethic, we might say 
instead that it is epistemic. Since the laws package up information about 
metaphysical possibility in a way that is useful and accessible to us, physical 
possibility, defined as consistency with the laws, is quite naturally understood as 
epistemic. If physical modality is epistemic, then it is unproblematic to deny the 
implication from physical possibility to metaphysical possibility because epistemic 
possibility does not entail metaphysical possibility. Physically modality so 
construed thus constitutes a representation of a scientific community’s (imperfect) 
knowledge what is absolutely (alethically) possible/necessary.  
But to reiterate: the official view that I shall work with is simply that 
according to which there is only one type of alethic modality, where sometimes I’ll 
express this with the claim that physical and metaphysical modality (both 
construed as alethic) are identical. 
In the next chapter, I’ll argue that one of the primary advantages of the 
common ground view is its potential to unify scientific and philosophical inquiry by 
justifying the use of scientific inquiry into the laws as a route to (alethic) modal 
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knowledge.   
 
6.6 Some Objections and Replies 
I’ve suggested that there is just one type of alethic modality (though perhaps it 
admits of acceptable restrictions – see fn. 24, above), which is a matter of possible 
potency distributions. The laws of nature get their modal force and are important 
because they package up information about necessity simpliciter in a way that is 
convenient for us. I thus present a unified account of laws of nature and 
metaphysical modality. In this section, to finish the chapter and to further elucidate 
the position developed, I’ll present some objections and replies.   
Objection: Logical and mathematical modality are species of metaphysical 
modality, but logical and mathematical possibilities and necessities are not 
grounded in potencies. Hence, you have not provided a properly unified account of 
laws and (all forms of) metaphysical modality. 
Reply: It is not compulsory to think that logical necessity is a species of 
metaphysical necessity. Edgington (2004) offers examples of propositions that are 
logically necessary but metaphysically contingent. According to Edgington, logical 
necessity is identical with being knowable a priori. Hence, for Edgington, logical 
necessity is an epistemic notion that is wholly distinct from metaphysical 
necessity.31 Alternatively, one might, for example, take the availability of different 
logics (classical, intuitionist, fuzzy, paraconsistent, etc.) to cast doubt on the idea 
that logic is an objective, interest and context-insensitive, species of metaphysical 
modality. The point, then, is that the common ground view is best accompanied by 
a view of logical necessity as epistemic or interest relative and hence not within the 
remit of an account of metaphysical modality.  
Regarding mathematical necessity, one option is to adopt fictionalism about 
mathematical truths and hence about mathematical necessities. If it is maintained 
that mathematical statements are only true ‘according to fiction’, then plausibly, 
statements of mathematics would not qualify as metaphysically necessary (see 
Vetter 2015, 278), and so the problem at hand would not even arise. Alternatively, 
                                                     
31 Though Hale (2015) and Rumfitt (2010) challenge Edgington’s argument.  
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the nominalist who does want to say that mathematical statements are non-
vacuously true, but not so in virtue of abstract objects, develops a strategy for 
grounding their truth in concrete objects (e.g., Field 1980). Following Vetter (2015, 
281) we might then say that whatever unobjectionable concrete objects ground 
mathematical truths have potentialities that ground those truths and those 
potentialities will, in turn, be a matter of possible potency distributions as discussed 
earlier in this chapter. Of course, more would need to be said on these issues, but it 
certainly seems that there are at least these two plausible avenues of response to the 
present objection.  
Objection: You say that physical and metaphysical necessity are one and the 
same – both fully grounded in possible potency distributions. But physical necessity 
is weaker than metaphysical necessity because some physical necessities, such as 
the fact that nothing travels faster than the speed of light, are metaphysical 
contingencies. 
Reply: I have suggested that there is just one type of alethic modality (I have 
left open the option of distinguishing physical and metaphysical modality if the 
former is understood as epistemic). Perhaps some will find this counterintuitive, 
but it is not really in the spirit of the picture developed here to afford too much 
weight to intuitions on matters modal. By recognising just one type of alethic 
modality, call it metaphysical, and by conceiving of the laws as summaries over the 
space of metaphysical possibility, science becomes the primary mode of inquiry into 
what is metaphysically possible/necessary and intuitions are forced to take a 
backseat. Science formulates laws, and these laws provide a range of knowledge of 
metaphysical modality. I’ll discuss these epistemological and methodological 
benefits in more detail in the next chapter. For now, I’d like to argue, more simply, 
that holding on to the intuition that physical necessity is a distinctive form of alethic 
necessity that is weaker than metaphysical necessity is really at the root of the 
problems discussed for relativism and primitivism, which constitutes a good reason 
to reject orthodoxy in this respect. 
For a variety of necessity, L* to be weaker than a distinct variety of necessity, 
L, is for it to be the case that L-necessity implies L*-necessity, but not vice versa. 
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Thus, according to orthodoxy, metaphysical necessity implies physical necessity, 
but not vice versa, because some physically necessary propositions are 
metaphysically contingent, but not vice versa. The two main accounts of the 
relationship between physical and metaphysical necessity that accommodate the 
idea that physical necessity is weaker than metaphysical necessity, in the above sense 
have already been discussed; they are relativism and primitivism. According to the 
relativist, p is physically necessary iff it is metaphysically necessary relative to some 
class of propositions, φ, perhaps about the laws of nature. But φ is itself 
metaphysically contingent, according to the relativist. So, p might be physically 
necessary but metaphysically contingent because its necessity is only relative to φ, 
which is itself contingent. Similarly, Fine (2005) takes the purported fact that some 
physical necessities are metaphysical contingencies as a datum to be 
accommodated. For example, Fine claims that it is physically necessary but 
metaphysically contingent that there is no schmass. Any claim to the contrary, Fine 
asserts, would be “too outlandish to deserve consideration” (Fine 2005, 240). 
Examples such as this partly motivate Fine’s view according to which physical and 
metaphysical necessity are wholly distinct and incommensurable varieties of 
necessity each with its own distinctive modal force.  
The problems with relativism were that it risked trivializing both physical 
necessity and the modal status of the laws themselves. Relativism’s failures in this 
respect are plausibly diagnosed as stemming from its attempt to capture the 
intuition that physical necessity is weaker than metaphysical necessity. To capture 
this intuition, the relativist must identify some privileged class of propositions, φ, 
relative to which the physical necessities are metaphysically necessary, but which 
are themselves metaphysically contingent. The following questions then arise: why 
should we care about φ in particular and, hence, metaphysical necessity with 
respect to φ? And, what accounts for the non-trivial modal force of φ itself? These 
are difficult questions, questions that I argued the common ground view, which 
recognises just one type of alethic modality, can overcome and hence, which 
provided motivation for the common ground view. But the common ground view 
may be understood as answering these difficult questions by the very fact of its 
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identifying physical and metaphysical necessity and hence denying the intuition 
that physical necessity is weaker than metaphysical necessity. Once physical and 
metaphysical necessity are identified with one another, the importance of the laws, 
which describe some of those necessities, is no longer a mystery and the non-
triviality of physical necessity itself is no longer a mystery because it is really 
necessity simpliciter.  
Primitivism makes a mystery of the relationship between physical and 
metaphysical necessity, in virtue of which they both deserve to be called necessity. 
But Fine’s arguments for primitivism are premised on the idea that physical 
necessity is weaker than metaphysical necessity, in the sense defined above. Thus, if 
the assumption that physical necessity is weaker than metaphysical necessity is part 
of an argument for primitivism, which is problematic for opening an explanatory 
gap, then the assumption that physical necessity is weaker than metaphysical 
necessity is part of that problem. So, by denying the intuition that physical necessity 
is weaker than metaphysical necessity we can block the argument for primitivism, 
and, hence, block the explanatory problems heralded by that view. 
In both cases, the assumption that physical necessity is weaker than 
metaphysical necessity is at the heart of the problems, which can be avoided by 
recognising just one type of alethic necessity. I thus suggest that we are justified in 
embracing the common ground view which, in a very principled manner, denies 
the intuition that physical necessity is a distinctive weaker alethic necessity than 
metaphysical necessity. 
Objection: According to the Revised Potency-BSA, the actual laws concern 
possible distributions of all and only those potencies instantiated at the actual 
world. However, metaphysical modality concerns potencies that are alien to the 
actual world too. Alien potencies such as schmarge and schmass, for example, are 
metaphysically possible, but beyond the remit of the natural laws, concerned as 
they are only with actual potencies. Hence, the laws of nature and metaphysical 
modality are not properly unified.  
Reply: The point of this objection is that laws and metaphysical modality are 
not unified because metaphysical modality concerns some entities that are not the 
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concern of the laws, namely alien potencies. There are potentially two distinct points 
that it will help to disambiguate here. One is that alien potencies, such as schmarge 
and schmass, are metaphysically possible but of no concern to the laws. The other is 
that alien potencies, such as schmarge and schmass, are themselves possibly 
distributed in various ways and hence give rise to various metaphysical possibilities 
beyond the remit of the laws.  
I have argued that, according to the hardcore actualist component of the 
common ground package, it is possible that φ iff some actual potencies are possibly 
distributed such that φ. So, if it is possible that schmass is instantiated, then this will 
be because some actual potencies are distributed such that schmass is instantiated. 
Since this possibility is grounded in possible distributions of actual potencies, it is 
the sort of thing that could in theory be implied by the laws.  
Now we might also say that schmass is itself possibly distributed such that 
φ* and hence that φ* is metaphysically possible. But since this metaphysical 
possibility is grounded in the possible distribution of an alien potency, it seems that 
the modal proposition <possibly φ*> is beyond the remit of the laws because the 
laws, by definition, are unconcerned with possible distributions of alien potencies. 
However, the proposition <possibly φ*> if true, is really an iterated modal 
proposition, ultimately grounded in actual potencies. Some actual potencies are 
possibly distributed such that schmass is instantiated and schmass is possibly 
distributed such that φ*. So, <possibly φ*>, if true, is ultimately grounded in 
possible distributions of actual potencies and hence is at least in theory within the 
remit of the laws – <possibly φ*> is not grounded in any entities that are not the 
concern of the laws.   
One might define a super alien potency as follows (see also Vetter 2015, 269): 
P is super alien iff no actual potencies are possibly distributed such that P is 
instantiated. Now the objector above might have super alien potencies in mind. If it 
were metaphysically possible that super alien potencies were instantiated and if 
super alien potencies could themselves ground metaphysical possibilities, then 
there would be some metaphysical possibilities well and truly outside the remit of 
the laws because the laws concern only possible distributions of actual potencies. 
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But such an objector would beg the question against the present view because to 
assume that super alien potencies are possible is to assume the falsity of the claim 
that all possibilities are grounded in possible distributions of actual potencies.     
I by no means intend to suggest that the objections and replies presented 
here are exhaustive. Rather, I hope to at least gesture at how some of the most 
obvious lines of criticism might be addressed. The objections considered here 
express a common theme, that is a kind of incredulity about what the common 
ground view implies for orthodox views about laws and modality and about what 
is, and what is not, metaphysically possible. It is true that the view developed 
perhaps has some counterintuitive implications. But this should be expected of a 
view that grounds modal truths not in our imaginative capacities or conceptual 
schemata, but in those concrete constituents of the actual world that are the primary 





















7.  DEMYSTIFYING MODALITY  
 
7.1  Introduction 
In this chapter, and to conclude the thesis, I’d like to say more about the benefits of 
identifying physical and metaphysical modality, namely, metaphysical modality is 
demystified and the epistemology of modality is assimilated to familiar scientific 
epistemology. This chapter thus constitutes a more extended defence of a 
particularly controversial feature of the common ground view. 
 
7.2  Philosophy and Metaphysical Modality  
Metaphysical modality is an important and interesting subject in its own right, but 
it is also important to philosophical inquiry more generally. All manner of 
philosophical arguments across a variety of subdisciplines are premised on 
purported metaphysical possibilities. The following are just a few of the many 
examples.   
The famous Zombie Argument (e.g., Chalmers 1996) in the philosophy of 
mind argues from the metaphysical possibility of zombies – exact physical 
duplicates of you or I which lack conscious experience – to the conclusion that 
physicalism is false. Run-of-the-mill sceptical attacks on ordinary knowledge claims 
argue from the metaphysical possibility that we are, say, brains in vats to the 
conclusion that we cannot know that we have hands. In the philosophy of religion, 
the metaphysical possibility that there exists a perfect being, where perfection 
includes necessary existence, has been invoked to argue that there actually exists a 
perfect being (e.g., Plantinga 1974). In ethics, the metaphysical possibility of a utility 
monster – a being which derives more utility from each unit resource than any other 
being – has been invoked to argue against utilitarianism (Nozick 1974). And in the 
metaphysics of modality itself, Fine (2005) has argued from the possibility of alien 
properties, such as schmass, to the conclusion that physical and metaphysical 
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necessity are distinct and incommensurable. (See also van Inwagen 1998 for more 
examples and for discussion of so-called possibility arguments).  
The centrality of metaphysical modality to philosophy makes the questions 
of what metaphysical modality is and how philosophers can know what is 
metaphysically possible or necessary, particularly pressing. If philosophers’ claims 
to modal knowledge turn out to be on shaky ground, then large parts of the wider 
philosophical edifice may be at risk of collapse. So, on what basis can philosophers 
claim to know that zombies, perfect beings, sceptical scenarios, utility monsters or 
alien properties are possible? A historically popular answer is that whatever can be 
conceived of, or imagined, is metaphysically possible, and since we have privileged 
epistemic access to our own imaginings, we are able to know these modal truths. In 
a similar vein, one might say that it is because stories about, e.g., zombies and 
perfect beings engender no logical contradictions that they are possible, hence we 
can use our logical prowess to acquire modal knowledge.  
However, superluminal travel speeds and the Bohr atom, for example, are 
conceivable ways a world might be, which engender no logical contradictions, yet 
we know that it is impossible to travel faster than light speed and we know that 
actual atoms are nothing like Bohr’s model, which is really an impossible 
description given the quantum nature of the reality that it is supposed to describe. 
Conversely, scientists of the past, and likely a great many present-day non-
scientists, would find much of what constitutes the modern scientific image utterly 
inconceivable, and some scientists have even taken experimental data from 
quantum mechanics to show that the world violates classical logic. Such 
considerations may reasonably lead one to question whether either conceivability or 
logical consistency has anything to do with what is really possible.  
Perhaps the obvious response to the above is to notice the shift from talking 
about metaphysical modality to talking about mere physical modality and then to 
claim that all my examples have shown is that conceivability and logical consistency 
cannot guide us as to the physically possible. Nevertheless, doubt can still be cast 
on the supposed link between inconceivability and metaphysical impossibility by 
providing evidence to the effect that something “inconceivable” is actual and hence 
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possible. And doubt can be cast on the link between (classical) logical inconsistency 
and impossibility by providing evidence to the effect that the actual world violates 
the laws of (classical) logic.  
More broadly, we might wonder why metaphysical possibility should be so 
very different from physical possibility. Both claim to be about objective reality, and 
both are types of possibility, so why should we be so confident in our ability to 
investigate the former solely from the armchair and largely via a priori methods, 
when empirical methods have proved so successful a means of investigating the 
latter? It is the empirical nature of scientific inquiry and its practical applicability 
that gives us some confidence that the physical possibilities and necessities that 
science discovers make some contact with objective reality. The popular armchair 
method of inquiry into matters of metaphysical modality, by contrast, should raise 
suspicions that perhaps we are not investigating the nature of objective reality at all 
and are instead doing something more like investigating philosophers’ stories and 
imaginings.   
Two concerns arise for the orthodox view about modality according to 
which the space of metaphysical possibilities outstrips that of mere physical 
possibilities:  
 
MYSTERY: Metaphysical modality is mysterious; what is this feature of 
reality, which by its very nature is beyond the remit of science and to which 
we have unique access via our intuitive or conceptual capacities? 
 
EPISTEMOLOGY: Why should our intuitive or conceptual capacities 
reliably inform us about this mysterious feature of reality – how is it that we 
can have modal knowledge?  
 
In recent years, several philosophers have expressed scepticism about the 
received “gap” between physical and metaphysical modality whereby metaphysical 
possibility is thought to outstrip mere physical possibility and which in turn 
justifies a disregard for empirical considerations when considering metaphysical 
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modality. A common thought among these dissenters is that if there is no gap 
between physical and metaphysical possibility then two distinct advantages present 
themselves, which constitute answers to MYSTERY and EPISTEMOLOGY, 
respectively:   
 
A1: Metaphysical modality is demystified; it is no more mysterious than 
familiar physical modality. 
 
A2: The epistemology of modality can then be assimilated to familiar 
scientific epistemology; science is a good guide to what’s physically possible 
and, hence, a good guide to possibility simpliciter.  
 
7.3 Mind the Possibility Gap!  
In this section, I’ll outline some arguments in the literature in favour of identifying 
physical and metaphysical modality and according to which science constitutes our 
best route to modal knowledge. In section 7.4, I’ll discuss how the common ground 
view closes the possibility gap in a very principled way and, hence, provides 
principled answers MYSTERY and EPISTEMOLOGY.  
 
7.3.1  Edgington and Kripke 
An early defence of the idea that metaphysical possibility is “constrained by the 
laws of nature”, as she puts it, can be found in Edgington (2004). Edgington 
suggests that with Kripke’s separation of the necessary and the a priori space is left 
for the metaphysical necessity of the laws. That is to say, we cannot prejudge the 
laws’ modal status purely on the basis of a failure to know the laws a priori. And, 
according to Edgington, this closing if the gap between physical and metaphysical 
modality has the benefit of demystifying the latter (2004, 2).  
To motivate her view, Edgington argues that contingentists about laws have 
failed to properly distinguish between lawful regularities and merely accidental 
regularities. The best attempt to draw this distinction, Lewis’ best system analysis 
(BSA), does not really capture our concept of laws for various well-rehearsed 
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reasons (it struggles to capture the laws’ necessity and explanatory power, for 
example). Edgington takes the problems faced by the best contingentist attempts to 
distinguish lawful regularities from merely accidental ones, as well as our tendency 
to think of the laws as necessary, to count in favour of the claim that the laws are 
necessary simpliciter.    
Later in the paper, Edgington draws our attention to the penultimate 
sentence of Kripke’s ‘Naming and Necessity’:  
 
The third lecture suggests that a good deal of what contemporary 
philosophy regards as mere physical necessity is actually necessity tout court 
(Kripke 1980, 164).  
 
And, in reference to this quote suggests that:  
 
Many of Kripke’s remarks in defence of particular metaphysical possibilities 
are naturally read as though this [i.e., that physical necessity is necessity tout 
court] were true (Edgington 2004, 15). 
 
Which is to say, many of the examples of possibilities that Kripke cites,32 such as  
 
1) If Hesperus had been hit by a comet, it might have been at a different 




2) If heat had been applied to stick S at t0; then at t0 stick S would not have 
been one meter long (1980, 55)  
 
are compatible with metaphysical necessity being constrained by the laws of nature 
(Edgington 2004, 16).  
                                                     
32 Edgington presents 4. I’ll give just 2 here for brevity. 
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It is tacit in 1 and 2 that the consequents, i.e., Hesperus being in a different 
position at some time and stick, S, not being 1 meter long at t0, are metaphysically 
possible, and these possibilities would require no law violation to realise. What’s 
more, Edgington suggests it is likely due to their consequents’ compatibility with the 
laws that we find these statements so plausible. To push this point, Edgington 
modifies the possibilities so that they require a law violation to realise and asks 
whether they indeed survive as possibilities. If metaphysical possibility is 
unconstrained by the laws then they should survive, but it is far from clear that they 
do, as illustrated by the following modification of the Hesperus example:  
 
1*) The astronomical situation into which Hesperus was born was such that 
there is nothing else around which could (given the laws of nature) interfere 
with its course. Add, if necessary, that these are the only circumstances in 
which Hesperus could have come into existence. Does the metaphysical 
possibility (as opposed to the a priori possibility) survive? (Edgington 2004, 
16). 
 
That is to say, does the possibility that Hesperus had a different orbit, which is tacit 
in 1, survive? Besides flagging the potential reluctance one may have to accept the 
purported metaphysical possibility that Hesperus had a different orbit given the 
situation described in 1*, Edgington is concerned that if we do accept it, i.e. if we 
think metaphysical possibility is not constrained by physical possibility, then “the 
manner of defending the original claims is potentially misleading” (2004, 16) i.e. the 
manner of defending possibility claims like 1 and 2 above is potentially misleading. 
What makes Kripke’s cases compelling, is that we “intuitively read them as natural 
possibilities” (2004, 16).  
Edgington suggests that our readiness to accept that there are metaphysical 
necessities not knowable a priori, i.e. our readiness to assent to one of Kripke’s key 
conclusions in Naming and Necessity, may be partly explained by our reading these a 
posteriori metaphysical necessities as natural necessities.   
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This last point is a subtle and interesting one that could be made clearer. To 
that end, the structure of Edgington’s argument seems to be something like this: we 
think (or some people think), having read Naming and Necessity, that there are some 
metaphysical necessities that we can only come to know a posteriori, such as that 
water is necessarily H2O, i.e., we are persuaded by Kripke’s arguments on this 
score. A good explanation for how it is that Kripke manages to persuade us that there 
are some a posteriori metaphysical necessities is that at first blush we read these 
necessities as natural (physical) necessities, which we grant willingly. But since 
Kripke’s arguments ultimately serve to convince us that these are a posteriori 
metaphysical necessities, physical and metaphysical necessity must coincide.  
I won’t comment on the soundness of the above reasoning, since my current 
concern is not with the sort of Kripke exegesis that would be needed to make clearer 
the limits of the argument. So, for now it will suffice to note just that Edgington finds 
in the structure and persuasiveness of Kripke’s arguments some evidence in favour 
of the idea that there is no gap between what’s physically and what’s 
metaphysically possible and indeed encourages this interpretation of Kripke.  
Metaphysical possibility, for Edgington, is thus more constrained than those 
possibilities that cannot be ruled out a priori, which she files under the heading of 
epistemic possibility. Metaphysical possibility, according to Edgington, is possibility 
for this world and those actual things we find in it (2004, 21). It shouldn’t be so 
surprising then that this sort of possibility is constrained by the natural laws if, as 
seems reasonable, there is some interesting connection between the things that 
constitute the world and the laws in accordance with which they behave. (My 
preferred account of this connection is developed in chapter 4, there I argue that the 
laws of nature are a matter of how actually instantiated basic properties are possibly 
distributed throughout space and time).   
 
7.3.2  Concern with the Methodology of Metaphysics 
The epilogue to Maudlin’s 2007 collection of essays “The Metaphysics Within Physics” 
is concerned with the methodology of metaphysics. Maudlin takes issue with the 
type of reasoning that helps itself to substantial metaphysical assumptions, in the 
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form of metaphysical possibilities, in order to draw metaphysical conclusions. 
Maudlin cites an argument offered by Kripke and Armstrong (in lectures delivered 
in 1979 and 1980, respectively); ‘the problem of homogenous spinning discs’, as his 
case in point. In this argument, it is asserted that two situations are possible; one in 
which a homogenous disc is spinning about an axis of symmetry and one in which a 
qualitatively identical homogenous disc is not spinning. It is then argued that a 
metaphysical view is strengthened (weakened) to the extent that it can (cannot) 
accommodate these two distinct possibilities.  
The problem with this argument, according to Maudlin, is that we have no 
reason to accept its premises because we have no good reason to think that 
homogenous discs are possible, and indeed we have good reason to think them 
impossible. Physics tells us that matter is not homogenous, thus, according to 
Maudlin, “we have every reason to believe that there is no such thing as ‘perfectly 
homogenous’ matter” (2007, 185). Furthermore, Maudlin argues that since all of our 
experience of matter is experience of actual matter and since there is no actual 
homogenous matter, we have no good reason to think that homogenous matter (even 
if it were possible) should have available to it the distinct states of motion appealed 
to in the argument, namely rotating and non-rotating.33  
Of course, the metaphysician may respond at this point by claiming that 
since metaphysical possibility extends beyond physical possibility, the physical 
impossibility of homogenous matter does not preclude its metaphysical possibility, 
from which we may draw the conclusions of the homogenous spinning discs 
argument. But this move, as Maudlin puts it: “makes metaphysics out to be nothing 
but the analysis of fantastical descriptions produced by philosophers, and, not 
surprisingly, these fantastical descriptions will have in them whatever features the 
philosophers decide to put into them” (2007, 188). Maudlin’s suggestion, then, is 
that without some serious reason, besides what we can conceive of, to think 
something possible, we fail to make any contact with reality. Discussion of such 
ungrounded possibilities is thus of minimal relevance to ontology or metaphysics 
                                                     
33 Maudlin goes on to note that physics does recognize a homogenous entity, namely a field, but that no sense can be 
made of rotating fields.  
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more broadly, concerned as it is with the most general, but nonetheless objective, 
features of reality.34  
The natural alternative to the kind of metaphysics with which Maudlin takes 
issue would then seem to be a metaphysics that is more sensitive to science, 
concerned as it is with the actual world and the laws of nature. If we take physical 
and metaphysical modality to be identical and, hence, take the laws as our best 
guide to what is metaphysically possible, then we can increase the likelihood that 
our metaphysics will make some contact with reality. This helps to protect against a 
kind of metaphysics that merely provides analyses of fantastical descriptions produced 
by philosophers.   
 
7.3.3  Bolstering Modal Necessitarianism  
Call the view according to which there is no gap between physical and 
metaphysical possibility, because physical and metaphysical modality are identical, 
modal necessitarianism, MN for short (MN, I have argued, is an implication of the 
common ground view, which recognises just one kind of alethic modality). Schaffer 
(2005) seeks to undermine the motivation for MN and to show that proper 
understanding of some important philosophical issues requires a gap between 
physical and metaphysical possibility. Wilson’s (2013) defence of MN largely 
consists in responding to Schaffer’s criticisms of the view but in the process of 
responding to Schaffer, Wilson also presents a positive case in favour of MN. 
Two of the motivations for MN that Schaffer criticizes are ‘the argument 
from natural necessity’ and ‘the argument from sustaining counterfactuals’. 
According to the first, since like charges, for example, must repel, the relationships 
between properties and their powers cannot be contingent (in other words, laws, 
construed as concerning properties and their powers, cannot be contingent) and 
hence are necessary. Schaffer responds that the modal force of the ‘must’ here is that 
of natural necessity, which is a restricted form of necessity in the sense that natural 
                                                     
34 I suppose this is a somewhat controversial stance on the subject matter of metaphysics. Some will staunchly deny 
that metaphysics is concerned with the world, as it exists independently of human thought and language. But call 
what I, and the authors discussed here, are concerned with whatever you want; its subject matter is language and 
mind independent.  
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necessities hold only in some restricted set of possible worlds. Room is left within 
the unrestricted space of all possible worlds for cases in which like charges fail to 
repel each other, hence in which the law concerning charge fails to hold. For the 
modal necessitarian to simply deny that the ‘must’ here is restricted in this sense 
would be question begging and so some independent motivation is required 
(Wilson 2013, 656). But independent motivation is indeed forthcoming.  
According to Wilson, an explanatory burden is placed on the contingentist 
who maintains that natural necessity concerns only some restricted set of worlds. 
The burden is that of explaining why we are so concerned with the particular 
modality corresponding to the set of worlds with the same laws of nature as ours, 
i.e. natural necessity, and not with, say, the set of worlds in which wombats exist, 
corresponding to wombat necessity. An initial contingentist retort to this challenge 
will typically involve citing the correspondence between natural necessity and the 
breadth of humanity’s scientific and practical interests. But this just pushes the 
demand for an explanation back a step because we can then ask why our interests 
should align in this way (this point, albeit framed slightly differently, was touched 
on in 6.4.1). 
The modal necessitarian can meet this explanatory demand in a manner 
unrivalled in its simplicity: according to MN, natural necessity is necessity 
simpliciter. Our concern with natural necessity is thus explained by showing it to be 
a concern with necessity in the broadest sense and the question as to why we 
should be interested in some subset of possible worlds more than any other just no 
longer arises. So, Wilson suggests that we may properly motivate the claim that the 
must of natural necessity is unrestricted by citing the explanatory virtues thus 
yielded.  
According to ‘the argument from counterfactuals’ laws support or imply 
counterfactuals. But if the laws are contingent, then the law according to which like 
charges repel, say, cannot support the counterfactual inference that two particular 
like charges would repel if they came into close proximity of each other because the 
law may fail to hold in the possible world under consideration. Schaffer responds 
along Lewisian lines, maintaining that sameness of laws is constitutive of the 
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closeness relation among possible worlds, which is in turn constitutive of the 
semantics of counterfactuals. On this view (roughly) a counterfactual is true iff at 
the closest possible world in which the antecedent is true the consequent is also true. 
And sameness of laws partially determines closeness. But again, this places an 
explanatory demand on the contingentist, one that the necessitarian will be able to 
meet with unrivalled ease. The question is: why should sameness of laws carry the 
weight that it does in determining closeness of possible worlds when evaluating 
counterfactuals? Wilson’s concern with the typical Lewisian response touted by 
contingentists is that:  
 
Lewis simply assimilated the question of why the counterfactual 
construction incorporating his particular nearness relation should be of 
interest to us to the question of why laws should be of interest to us (Wilson 
2013, 658). 
 
As before, the necessitarian, by contrast, has a strikingly simple answer to the 
question of why counterfactual antecedents should point us to worlds with the 
same laws as our world – because the laws are metaphysically necessary!35  
For brevity, I’ll just discuss two of Schaffer’s five direct arguments against 
necessitarianism to which Wilson responds: the argument from counterfactuals and 
the argument from conceivability. But this should suffice to give an idea of the sorts 
of defensive strategies available to the modal necessitarian. 
According to the argument from counterfactuals, the best semantics for 
counterfactuals requires the recognition of small miracles – local violations of the 
laws relative to the actual world (e.g., Lewis 1979). Without the possibility of small 
miracles, in deterministic worlds, counterfactual antecedents would require 
extensive backtracking to realise. For example if there were a beer in my fridge I would 
drink it is intuitively true. But to realise this counterfactual antecedent in a 
deterministic world, the initial state of the universe would have to have been 
                                                     
35 As discussed, on my view the truths expressed in laws are metaphysically necessary, but for any law, L, it is 
possible that it wasn’t a law, had our standards of strength and simplicity been different. This detail does not affect 
the present point.  
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different. So, it would also be true that if there were a beer in my fridge, the past state of 
the universe would be significantly different, which is intuitively false. And since 
(arguably) we don’t know if ours is a deterministic world, we don’t know if our 
counterfactual semantics has this unintuitive implication.  
Miracles allow for widespread match in matters of particular fact between 
the actual world, @, and the world at which the counterfactual is evaluated, w1, up 
until some time, t1, at which a small miracle occurs, which brings it about that there 
is a beer in my fridge.36 After the miracle at w1, the worlds diverge in as few 
respects as possible, consistent with there being a beer in my fridge in w1 but not in 
@.37 Miracles thus allow for our intuitions about counterfactuals to be satisfied in 
deterministic worlds.  
Wilson responds by claiming that MN is best twinned with a view of the 
laws of nature as involving quantum indeterminism (Wilson 2013, 661). ‘Miracles’ 
in the sense above can then be replaced by somewhat unlikely, but nonetheless 
physically possible, quantum ‘quasi-miracles’. This response makes MN hostage to 
empirical fortunes, but this is something that Wilson is willing to accept, plus he 
takes it to be “extremely unlikely” that the world will turn out to be deterministic 
(ibid). Indeed, characteristic of MN is its denial of any pertinent conceivability-
possibility link, which is central to the kind of modal rationalism that is being 
opposed. So, while empirical discoveries about the nature of quantum phenomena 
may harm MN, they may bolster it too. Since current evidence would strongly 
suggest that the world is indeterministic at the quantum level, MN gains 
plausibility. The fact that this plausibility is subject to empirical discoveries should 
not count against MN given that it is motivated by a desire to approach the 
metaphysics and epistemology of modality in a manner that is continuous with 
science. In other words, the charge that the tenability of MN is subject to empirical 
fortunes should carry no weight against the view because its proponents tout its 
sensitivity to actual science in its favour.  
                                                     
36 E.g. a law violation such that some neuron fires spontaneously while I’m in the supermarket, which makes me 
decide to buy beer. 
37 Is backtracking really so bad? Wilson considers the option of embracing widespread backtracking (Wilson 2013, 
660, fn. 15).  
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The argument from counterfactuals is closely related to the problem of 
counterlegals. Many of the counterlegal statements formable in natural language, 
and common in scientific discourse, would seem to be substantive. But if the laws 
are metaphysically necessary, as MN would have it, then possible worlds semantics 
yields the result that all counterlegals are vacuous. However, Wilson contends that 
this apparent problem derives primarily from a limitation of possible worlds 
semantics – everyone is stuck with a class of counterpossible counterfactuals that 
cannot be given non-trivial truth conditions via possible worlds; the modal 
necessitarian just adds to this class (Wilson 2013, 661). 
Lastly the argument from conceivability contends that the modal 
necessitarian’s apparent severance of the conceivability-possibility link leads to 
modal scepticism. But this concern just misses the mark. Modal necessitarianism is 
in no small part motivated by a desire to reject the sort of archaic rationalism that 
motivates this worry. Metaphysical possibility is a matter of how the world could 
be, regardless of what we can imagine or what conceptual schemata we may 
employ. So why think that what we can conceive of, whatever that means, should 
provide any privileged insight into the modal nature of reality? Don’t we frequently 
imagine impossibilities or take things to be possible which we later discover to be 
impossible?38 For the modal necessitarian modal epistemology is continuous with 
ordinary epistemology and scientific epistemology in particular. Insofar as science 
is concerned with the natures of things in the world and the laws describing their 
interactions, it is science that provides insight into how things could possibly be. 
This line of thought is a common theme among commentators sympathetic to the 
project of assimilating metaphysical possibility to physical possibility.   
 
7.3.4  Mutual Sensitivity of Metaphysics and Science  
According to Callender: “metaphysics is best when informed by good science and 
science is best when informed by good metaphysics” (2011, 48).39  
                                                     
38 That we may be subject to such modal illusions seems to be an important lesson from Kripke (1980), one which has 
inspired a vast literature on the proper way to account for such illusions (e.g., Yablo 1993; Chalmers 1996; Jackson 
2000; Wright 2004).  
39 This sentiment and others expressed in this chapter are to some extent echoed by Paul, who in various places in 
her (2012) concedes the mutual sensitivity of metaphysics and science. But while Paul expresses some scepticism 
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Callender laments the post Kripkean turn taken by some metaphysicians 
who stake “exclusive claim” to the domain of metaphysical modality (Callender 
points to Conee and Sider 2005, 203 for an expression, though not necessarily an 
endorsement, of this idea). Callender is concerned with the reliability, source and 
subject matter of “modal intuitions” and suggests that intuitions of what is possible 
ought to make some contact with science (2011, 42).  
Callender argues that it is a mistake to think of the metaphysician and the 
scientist as doing fundamentally different jobs and suggests that the subject matter 
of science is of primary relevance to the metaphysics of modality. Thus, science, 
concerned as it is with the actual world, and itself steeped in modality, replaces 
modal intuitions as an in to modal knowledge. The question of the reliability of our 
modal judgments is then assimilated to the familiar question of the reliability of the 
scientific method. 
But, Callender’s concern is not just with the epistemology of modality. It is 
rather with the relationship between science and metaphysics and their respective 
methodologies and subject matters, from which the above epistemological 
implications can be derived. So, it is worth taking a closer look at the considerations 
that motivate Callender’s view.  
Advances in modal logic and Kripke’s (1980) influential defence of 
metaphysical necessity led to renewed interest in metaphysics during the latter part 
of the 20th century, before which scepticism about the legitimacy of the field 
abounded. Henceforth, Callender argues, metaphysics proceeded to primarily 
concern itself with modality. The question of the relationship between science and 
metaphysics then becomes largely a question of the relationship between science 
and metaphysical modality. Critical of the post Kripkean metaphysical turn (made 
by some) that apparently denied any pertinent relationship between science and the 
metaphysics of modality, Callender says: 
 
                                                     
about exotic possibilia (2012, 20), she does not seem ready to concede the identity of physical and metaphysical 
possibility. But if, as I and the authors discussed here suggest, this identity claim yields significant theoretical fruit, 
then maybe it is something Paul should be open to given her explicit endorsement of appeal to theoretical virtues in 
the process of choosing between metaphysical theories.      
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The error is thinking that the science of the actual world doesn't affect what 
one thinks is possible or impossible. The history of science and philosophy 
amply displays that what we think is possible or impossible hangs on 
science. (2011, 43–44). 
 
The implication seems to be that those things that are the concern of science, the 
constituents of the actual world, ought also to be the concern of metaphysics 
(primarily concerned as it is with modality) because they are what is relevant to 
possibility and necessity in virtue of how they can possibly be, in some broad sense. 
The epistemological implication is thus that we can gain knowledge of modal truths 
via the scientific method, concerned as it is with the constituents of the actual world 
that ground metaphysical modality. When metaphysical inquiry proceeds purely 
via the investigation of our intuitions, it is ungrounded in this sense and risks 
becoming irrelevant to anything.     
Of course, proponents of the (meta) metaphysics to which Callender is 
opposed will maintain that intuitions about metaphysical modality concern some 
wider domain than what is merely physically possible. Thus, these metaphysicians 
may hold that it is metaphysically possible for the actual world to be certain ways, 
broadly speaking, that are physically impossible. Callender, by contrast, denies that 
there is any interesting domain of metaphysical modality that is immune to science 
(2011, 44). He continues: 
 
Our modal intuitions are historically conditioned and possibly unreliable 
and inconsistent. The only way to weed out the good from the bad is to see 
what results from a comprehensive theory that seriously attempts to model 
some or all of the actual world. If the intuitions are merely ‘stray’ ones, then 
they are not ones to heed in ontology. In metaphysics we should take 
possibilities and necessities only as seriously as the theories that generate them. 




What we can gather from Callender here is the thought that where modal intuitions 
outstretch science, they should be given minimal weight (or no weight at all); 
intuitions are not serious theories in the sense quoted above. The reliability of these 
intuitions is simply assumed by the kind of metaphysics that takes itself to be fully 
autonomous from science. Callender maintains that a satisfactory answer to 
pressing questions about the reliability, source and subject matter of modal 
intuitions suggests a closer link between science and the metaphysics of modality, 
with the implication that there is really no species of metaphysical possibility that 
outstrips what is physically possible.  
Turning to a specific example, Callender asks what it is about light that 
makes it true that it cannot travel faster than 299,792,458 m/s? Clearly it is not our 
concept of light, which we possessed well before the discovery of light speed. A 
natural answer presents itself; Callender suggests it is the laws of relativity that 
make this modal claim true. This raises the further question: what are laws? (2011, 
45). Callender does not provide us with an answer and is content to point out that 
laws are central to our theories whose job it is to explain and systematize the world 
(2011, 45). What we treat as possible or impossible, Callender suggests, is a function 
of our good systematizations of the world and, by implication, the laws of nature. 
Callender is thus arguing that deriving the possible from our best scientific theories 
is a more principled approach to modal metaphysics than simply appealing to 
intuitions.    
A question remains, however, about the relationship between the scientific 
systematization of the world and the possibilities. For the Humeans, modality will 
flow from the systematization, whereas for the anti-Humeans, the order of 
explanation will be reversed; the systematization will flow from modality in the 
sense that primitive modal facts will determine what constitutes a good 
systematization. Callender concludes that ‘serious’ (2011, 45) possibilities are tied 
up with our good (best?) systematization of the world, i.e., what is metaphysically 
possible is not independent of scientific theory. But he remains neutral on the 
ultimate source of modality (Humean or anti-Humean) and thus remains neutral on 
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the question of whether being connected to a good systematization of the world is 
constitutive or symptomatic of metaphysical possibilities (2011, 45).     
This question about the source of modality is one with which I have been 
centrally concerned in this thesis. I have advocated a view according to which 
metaphysical possibility is a matter of how potencies – basic physical properties 
that are necessarily connected with dispositions, because they ground those 
dispositions – are possibly distributed throughout spacetime.  
It was argued that to properly ground modality in the concrete constituents 
of the actual world in this way, an unHumean ontology of potencies, as opposed to a 
Humean, R-quidditist view of properties, must be accepted, otherwise one is forced 
to look elsewhere for the source of modality. If the Humean view is accepted, and 
the world is understood as a vast array of quiddities instantiated at point-sized 
space-time regions, then the actual world would seem to lack the resources to 
account for metaphysical modality and this has led Humeans to outsource modality 
to other possible worlds – a lamentable development in the eyes of many.  
If we want to use science, concerned as it is with systematizing the world, as 
a guide to what is metaphysically possible, surely the world that science 
systematizes ought to be imbued with the resources to ground facts about 
metaphysical modality. The Humean world is not so imbued, so why think that 
science in a Humean world should be a good guide to what is metaphysically 
possible or necessary? If we want science, qua systematization of the world, to be 
able to guide us as to what is metaphysically possible, then the world to be 
systematized ought to have the resources to ground modality. The unHumean 
world of qualities that ground dispositions that I present in this thesis has these 
resources. My answer to Callender’s question is thus that the good systematization 
of the world that science seeks, and which can serve as a guide to what’s 
metaphysically possible, flows from the properties and their necessary connections 




7.4  A Philosophical Justification for Heeding the Results of Science 
A particularly controversial feature of the common ground view is the implication 
that physical and metaphysical modality are identical. What I hope to have shown 
in this chapter is that there are independent reasons for identifying physical and 
metaphysical modality, not least of all that doing so helps us respond to MYSTERY 
and EPISTEMOLOGY. So, it is in fact a virtue of the common ground view that it 
implies that physical and metaphysical modality are one and the same.   
Perhaps, however, not everyone will be so concerned by MYSTERY and 
EPISTEMOLOGY that they are willing to make such a radical break from orthodoxy 
and identify physical and metaphysical modality in order to resolve these issues. It is 
also likely that a great many philosophers will be less convinced than myself and 
the authors presented in this chapter by the thought that the results and methods of 
science ought to inform metaphysical inquiry.  
But unlike the authors presented in this chapter, I have sought to justify the 
identification of physical and metaphysical modality and hence the use of scientific 
methods and results as a guide to metaphysical inquiry by building up to this 
conclusion from a relatively modest and uncontroversial starting point. I argued 
that there are good reasons to deny R-quidditism and, hence, to maintain that 
properties are necessarily connected with various dispositions. From here it was 
argued that this view of properties is naturally wedded with a very appealing 
metaphysics of modality – hardcore actualism (HA) – according to which all modal 
truths are grounded in the concrete constituents of the world. An attractive way of 
further fleshing out HA and of thinking about the relationship between properties 
and modality is that metaphysical possibility is a matter of how fundamental 
properties, or potencies, are possibly distributed throughout spacetime. I also argued 
that the laws of nature are features of a description of possible potency 
distributions, a description which presents this information about how all potencies 
are possibly distributed in a way that is useful and accessible to us. From this it 
follows that scientific inquiry into the laws presents our best route to knowledge of 
what is metaphysically possible. The epistemology and metaphysics of 
metaphysical modality are thus demystified – metaphysical modality is a matter of 
192 
 
how familiar physical properties are possibly distributed and science presents our 
best route to knowledge of such things.  
My view thus answers MYSTERY and EPISTEMOLOGY and justifies appeal 
to scientific methods and results in the course of philosophical inquiry in a very 
principled manner. The picture I develop has a modest starting point: the denial of 
R-quidditism, which perhaps even one who is less concerned by MYSTERY and 
EPISTEMOLOGY and by the promise of using scientific methods to gain 
philosophical insights could accept. A potential concern that one may have with the 
sorts of sentiments expressed in this chapter is that they are rooted in a kind of 
scientistic prejudice or a scepticism about philosophy and hence that assent to them 
constitutes something of a rejection of the distinctive philosophical method.  
However, from this thesis, it should be clear that one can accept the 
conclusion that science can guide philosophical inquiry without thereby 
denouncing philosophy. After all, to arrive at this conclusion I have employed 
distinctively philosophical arguments and methods. Indeed, what I have sought to do 
is build something of a philosophical system that comprises accounts of the 
metaphysics of properties, laws and modality, and which elucidates these 
important philosophical concepts and the relations between them. If it is an 
implication of this system that science can guide philosophical inquiry, this should 
not be seen as undercutting philosophy but rather as an interesting and appealing 
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